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		<title>Did 12 Senators Give China the West Philippine Sea?</title>
		<link>https://www.marcialslaw.com/did-12-senators-give-china-the-west-philippine-sea/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=did-12-senators-give-china-the-west-philippine-sea</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marcial Bonifacio]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 08:39:29 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Philippine History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philippine Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[West Philippine Sea]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>(Cover Photo: Subic Bay monument to the 12 Senators that voted for the closure of the U.S. naval base on September 16, 1991. Credit: Sebastian Strangio)</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/did-12-senators-give-china-the-west-philippine-sea/">Did 12 Senators Give China the West Philippine Sea?</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>(Cover Photo: Subic Bay monument to the 12 Senators that voted for the closure of the U.S. naval base on September 16, 1991. Credit: Sebastian Strangio)</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Marcial Bonifacio</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">11/9/26</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, the question of whether the Philippines would be better or worse today had the United States retained its naval base at Subic Bay is not merely a matter of historical curiosity. It is a question whose answer is written in occupied reefs, militarized artificial islands, and the tens of thousands of Filipino jobs that now exist where American warships once anchored. The evidence on both sides demands honest reckoning, and it begins with what happened when the United States left.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate voted 12 to 11 to reject renewal of the Military Bases Agreement, ordering the United States to vacate Naval Base Subic Bay by the end of 1992. The last American ship, the USS Belleau Wood, departed on November 24 of that year, ending a military presence that had begun when the United States acquired the Philippines from Spain under the Treaty of Paris in 1898. The prevailing fear in Washington at the time was stark: then-US Ambassador Nicholas Platt warned that foreign investment would dry up and the economy would collapse if the US bases pulled out.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That prediction proved entirely wrong. Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City, who would become the first chairman of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, transformed the former naval installation into the Philippines' first special economic and freeport zone under Republic Act 7227, the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992. Gordon himself stated: "Even before the departure of the US forces, I already had a vision to convert the naval base into a Freeport."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Within four years, the Subic Bay Freeport had created 200,000 jobs and generated US$2 billion in foreign investment. By December 2008, the zone employed 87,502 workers — more than three times the number employed by the US Navy at the height of its operations. By 2023, the workforce had grown to over 162,000, nearly five times what it was in 1992.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the economic record alone, the case for the closure holds. The Freeport's success depended entirely on the transfer of 680 square kilometres of developed US military infrastructure to Philippine civilian authority, an economic foundation that could not have been created alongside a continued American military presence.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Philippine Constitution, under Article XVIII, Section 25, requires that any foreign military presence on Philippine soil be authorized by a treaty ratified by the Senate, a provision drawn directly from the American system of government, one that Philippine lawmakers rarely acknowledge and Filipino voters almost never consider. That provision, invoked in 1991 by the twelve senators whose monument now stands at Subic Bay, was the legal basis for the closure.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The constitutional argument for sovereignty was not wrong. But sovereignty exercised in a vacuum of military capability is not sovereignty. It is an open invitation to those with both the will and the weapons to take what they want.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">George Washington stated before Congress in January 1790: "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace." The American founders, whose constitutional architecture the Philippine Senate invoked in 1991, understood what every Philippine government since has relearned: that a nation which cannot defend its territory does not truly possess it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China enacted its Law of Territorial Waters in 1992, codifying its expansive maritime claims into law within months of the final American departure, and then proceeded to occupy Mischief Reef, Scarborough Shoal, and a chain of artificially constructed military islands across the West Philippine Sea. That sequence of events was deliberate. As I have documented in <em><a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/8-nations-14-aggressions-chinas-2500-year-invasion-record/">8 Nations, 14 Aggressions: China's 2,500-Year Invasion Record</a></em>, China's pattern of calculated territorial expansion reaches back across two and a half millennia and fourteen separate aggressions against neighboring nations. The Mischief Reef occupation was not opportunism. It is the documented record of a great power exploiting a strategic vacuum, one that the Philippine Senate created by a margin of one vote.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The economic case for the closure, however, ends precisely where the case against it begins. Within three years of the last American ship leaving Subic Bay, the consequences of the resulting strategic vacuum became undeniable.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In early February 1995, Filipino Navy patrol vessels discovered eight Chinese ships and newly erected concrete structures flying a Chinese flag on Mischief Reef, a submerged reef within the Philippines' own exclusive economic zone, barely 240 kilometres off the island of Palawan. It was the first blatant violation of Philippine territorial sovereignty since the country lost its external defense deterrent in 1992.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The weakness of the Philippine armed forces, which had long depended on the American military presence as a de facto deterrent, provided China with the opportunity to extend its claims without military confrontation. As the Christian Science Monitor reported in February 1995, it was tantamount to an invasion.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Marvin Ott, Professor of National Security Policy at the National War College and former Southeast Asia chairperson at the Foreign Service Institute, has stated without equivocation: "The Chinese decision to establish a position in Mischief Reef would not have occurred if the US was still at Clark Air Base and Subic Base." A senior Philippine official who participated in the November 1996 state visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Manila later recalled that Zemin conveyed the view that the moment China occupied Mischief and put up structures on the reef, the Philippines had lost it, because in international politics, occupation is identical to sovereignty.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Today, Mischief Reef is no longer a cluster of octagonal huts on stilts. It is a fully militarized Chinese outpost with a 3,000-metre airfield runway, radar systems, and warehouses that defense analysts assess to house surface-to-air missile systems, all built on land China reclaimed from what was once an open reef in Philippine waters.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mischief Reef was not the last loss. In 2012, China seized Scarborough Shoal, located just 200 kilometres from Subic Bay, after a tense standoff with Filipino forces who could not compel Beijing to withdraw. Across the top military brass of the Philippines today, the view is uniform: China would not have taken over Mischief Reef had US forces remained in the country.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These losses carry a human cost that no policy paper adequately records. More than 1,500 fishermen from Masinloc, Zambales, the community nearest to Scarborough Shoal, abandoned their traditional fishing grounds entirely after China seized the reef in 2012. Before that year, a single trip to the Shoal yielded up to three tons of high-value catch per vessel; since then, Filipino fishermen attempting to return have been chased by Chinese Coast Guard speedboats, driven back by water cannons, and physically blocked by barriers installed by Chinese forces in waters that an international arbitral tribunal confirmed in 2016 belong to the Philippines. The sovereignty that the twelve senators invoked in 1991 was not an abstraction — and neither is its absence.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is in the context of these losses that the later statements of Senator Gordon take on a sharper significance. In January 2019, two unnamed Chinese shipbuilders sought to acquire the failed Hanjin shipyard inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, a purchase that would have granted Beijing a strategic foothold directly facing the West Philippine Sea; Gordon responded by proposing that the Philippine Navy establish its headquarters at that site on Luzon's western side.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That the very man who built the Freeport found it necessary, 27 years later, to argue for a Philippine Navy headquarters at the same base from which the United States had been expelled speaks to the strategic void the 1992 closure produced. Gordon has also stated: "No other country will help us if they see we are not serious about helping ourselves with a reliable defense in air and naval assets."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Richard Gordon proved that the Philippines could build a thriving economy at Subic Bay without American warships. He proved equally, by his own later warnings, that the Philippines could not defend it without them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Philippine government has since drawn precisely that conclusion. In February 2023, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and United States Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin expanded the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, designating four additional bases where American forces may rotate and pre-position weapons, bringing the total to nine sites across the Philippines — the largest US military footprint in the country since the Senate voted to end the American presence in 1991. That expansion is not incidental. It is the Philippine government's formal acknowledgment, three decades after the fact, that the strategic consequences of the 1992 closure were not acceptable and that the security of the Filipino people requires the alliance the Senate voted to dissolve.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, the Philippines is economically stronger because of what Richard Gordon and thousands of volunteers built at Subic Bay after 1992, and strategically weaker because of what China built at Mischief Reef after 1995. No freeport, however thriving, recovers for a nation the maritime territory it surrendered to a foreign military power.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The price of that one-vote margin in 1991 is Mischief Reef, Scarborough Shoal, and a generation of Filipino fishermen driven from their own waters at gunpoint. The Philippines would be worse: not in its economic indicators, which the Freeport model proved could succeed independently, but in its sovereignty, its territorial integrity, and its standing as a nation capable of defending what is constitutionally its own. That is a cost no jobs report can offset and no freeport can repay. Demand of your leaders the military capability to enforce what is already the Philippines' own under international law, and hold every vote accountable to that standard. For the specific legal and diplomatic tools available to the Philippine government short of war, I have laid them out in detail in <em><a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/how-the-philippines-can-enforce-its-arbitral-award-without-going-to-war-with-china/">How the Philippines Can Enforce Its Arbitral Award without Going to War with China</a></em>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Long live the Republic of the Philippines and long live our alliance with the US!</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p><p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/did-12-senators-give-china-the-west-philippine-sea/">Did 12 Senators Give China the West Philippine Sea?</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>Wood and Malcolm: The Evidence Your Philippine History Class Left Out</title>
		<link>https://www.marcialslaw.com/wood-and-malcolm-the-evidence-your-philippine-history-class-left-out/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=wood-and-malcolm-the-evidence-your-philippine-history-class-left-out</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marcial Bonifacio]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 08:29:29 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[American Government]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philippine Government]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philippine History]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.marcialslaw.com/?p=2572</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Marcial Bonifacio 11/7/26 My friends and countrymen, the anti-colonial critique of American governance in the Philippines has long cast Governor-General Leonard Wood and Justice George Malcolm as instruments of colonial suppression, men whose governance set at naught the aspirations of an entire people. What that critique omits is evidence of a different kind: that [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/wood-and-malcolm-the-evidence-your-philippine-history-class-left-out/">Wood and Malcolm: The Evidence Your Philippine History Class Left Out</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Marcial Bonifac</em>io</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">11/7/26</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, the anti-colonial critique of American governance in the Philippines has long cast Governor-General Leonard Wood and Justice George Malcolm as instruments of colonial suppression, men whose governance set at naught the aspirations of an entire people. What that critique omits is evidence of a different kind: that Wood's most relentless political adversary praised his character upon his death, that the Philippine legislature formally adopted Malcolm as a Son of the Philippines in 1955, and that the Filipino framers who suffered under Wood built a presidency more powerful than the office he held. A full accounting of history demands that we apply the same standard of evidence to those we defend that we apply to those we condemn, and by that standard, neither Wood nor Malcolm deserves the title of tyrant.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Governor-General Leonard Wood</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Governor-General Wood arrived in the Philippines in October 1921 not as a conqueror but as a reformer summoned to address a genuine crisis. The administration of his predecessor, Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison, had presided over a catastrophic financial collapse. After a serious fiscal crisis erupted in 1920 and 1921 in the wake of World War I, the Philippines suffered institutional failures in the Philippine National Bank, corruption in the civil service, and a deterioration in fiscal standing that Harrison himself privately acknowledged before departing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Wood found, in the candid assessment preserved in Philippine historical records, those conditions riddled with inefficiency, graft, and nepotism. Economic reforms implemented during his administration helped the Philippine economy recover from that crisis. Under Wood's governance, the Philippine National Bank was stabilized, government expenditure was brought under discipline, and the fiscal standing that Harrison's policies had eroded was restored. This is not American apologetics; it is the documented outcome of his governance.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The specific charges in the Filipino Grievances document deserve honest treatment. Several of them, including the Khaki Cabinet appointments, the manipulation of the appropriations process, and the disregard for Senate confirmation requirements, were genuine violations of the Jones Act of 1916. Filipino leaders were right to object, and their objections were legally grounded.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He served until he died in office in August 1927; no court removed him, no Congress recalled him, and no legal proceeding condemned his administration. Even Manuel L. Quezon, who was Wood's most relentless political adversary and the man who led the cabinet resignations of 1923, rendered this assessment of Wood upon his death: "He was a hard working chief executive and always determined in his purpose to do the right thing as he saw it." That verdict came from an opponent, not an admirer, and it carries the weight that only an honest enemy can provide.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Additionally, Judge Guillermo Guevara, one of the more sober Filipino legal voices of that era, offered this precise summary: "We had during the Wood regime an interlude of business-like administration at the expense, often, of Philippine autonomy." Business-like administration at the expense of autonomy is a legitimate grievance.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What distinguishes it from despotism, however, is a distinction the evidence itself makes plain: every one of Wood's violations was openly contested through legitimate channels, documented in formal grievances, carried to Washington by elected representatives, debated in a free press, and placed before the United States Congress for review. No actual tyranny permits the governed to publish, transmit, and politically contest the ruler's conduct through the ruler's own institutional framework while remaining free to do so. It is not the record of a despot.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Justice George Malcolm</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Justice George Malcolm presents an entirely different case. His critics have treated him as a shadowy figure who corrupted Filipino legal development by inserting colonial ideas into it. The historical record does not support that portrayal. Malcolm founded the University of the Philippines College of Law, the institution whose graduates produced the Constitution and three Philippine presidents. Filipino constitutional scholar Joaquin Bernas, a Jesuit and one of the Philippines' most respected legal minds, described Malcolm as "the man who more than any single American contributed most to early constitutional development in the Philippines." That judgment comes from a Filipino scholar of the postcolonial era, writing without any obligation to be generous toward an American administrator.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">His ruling in <em>Villavicencio v. Lukban</em> (1919) went directly against executive overreach, finding that no government official, regardless of public health justifications, could deprive any person of liberty without lawful process. His ruling in <em>Government v. Springer</em> (1927), though it limited the Philippine Legislature's control over government corporations, was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in 1928, confirming it as a legally sound application of separation-of-powers doctrine. That doctrine had been derived from the United States Constitution itself and applied consistently across American jurisprudence long before it reached the Philippines; Malcolm did not construct it to disadvantage Filipino legislators, but applied it as written, to a colonial situation where its structural consequences were unavoidably asymmetric.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The <em>Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro</em> ruling of 1919, which upheld the forced settlement of Manguian indigenous people, reflects the paternalistic consensus of its era and is troubling by modern standards. The Philippine legislature, however, rendered its own final verdict on Malcolm in 1955 by passing Republic Act 1386 to adopt him formally as a Son of the Philippines and to confer upon him the rights of Philippine citizenship. These are not the honors a people bestow upon a tyrant.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What American Rule Actually Built</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The case for Wood and Malcolm does not rest on the absence of tyranny alone. American colonial administration produced concrete benefits for ordinary Filipinos that no available alternative would have delivered. In August 1901, approximately 540 American teachers arrived in Manila aboard the USS Thomas and were deployed throughout the archipelago to establish a free public school system; these teachers, known as the Thomasites, built the Philippine Department of Public Instruction and helped lift Filipino literacy from below ten percent under Spain to over sixty-five percent by the end of the American period. The full account of that transformation, from enrollment figures to institutional legacy, is documented in my commentary <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-full-ledger-why-america-remains-the-philippines-greatest-ally/"><em>The Full Ledger: Why America Remains the Philippines' Greatest Ally</em></a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Two years later, the Pensionado Act of 1903 dispatched Filipino students to universities across the United States at government expense, with guaranteed positions in government service upon their return. Filipino historian Esteban de Ocampo described the program as "one of the wisest and most far-reaching steps taken" by American colonial administrators. The Pensionado Act remained the largest American scholarship program until the Fulbright Program was established in 1948, and it produced the generation of Filipino physicians, lawyers, educators, engineers, and politicians who built the professional foundations of an independent republic. Historian O.D. Corpuz, whose two-volume <em>The Roots of the Filipino Nation</em> is the most comprehensive account of this period by any Filipino scholar, documented how American colonial administration constructed the institutional framework without which Philippine independence in 1946 would have been an aspiration without structure. Wood and Malcolm did not design these programs; they administered and adjudicated within the same institutional framework that produced them, and the charge against them cannot be separated from the record of the system they served.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Comparative Standard</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The affirmative record of American colonial governance established, there remains a second standard that the anti-colonial critique consistently fails to apply: the full record of what other colonial powers did to their subjects.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Spain</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The structural record of three hundred and thirty-three years of Spanish rule, including the absence of democratic institutions, public education, an independent judiciary, and any promise of independence, is documented in my commentaries <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-case-for-gratitude-why-american-colonialism-served-the-philippines/"><em>The Case for Gratitude: Why American Colonialism Served the Philippines</em></a> and <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-founders-you-erased-how-the-anti-american-narrative-denies-filipino-agency-in-the-1935-constitution/"><em>The Founders You Erased: How the Anti-American Narrative Denies Filipino Agency in the 1935 Constitution</em></a>. What those essays do not examine is the parallel that speaks most directly to Wood and Malcolm.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Jose Rizal was shot by a firing squad in 1896 precisely because he had asked, in print and in petitions, for reforms that Wood's Filipino critics were able to publish in a free press, present before a sitting legislature, and transmit to Washington through an elected resident commissioner. Under Spain, Rizal died for writing what under American governance Quezon was permitted to deliver in formal grievances to the United States War Department.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Britain</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Consider what Britain did in its colonies during the same period. In April 1919, the same year Malcolm wrote his troubled <em>Rubi</em> ruling, British Brigadier General Reginald Dyer ordered his troops to open fire on unarmed civilians gathered at Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar, India, killing between 379 and 1,000 people and wounding more than 1,200. Winston Churchill, then serving as Secretary of State for War, described Dyer's action before the House of Commons as "an extraordinary event, a monstrous event, an event which stands in singular and sinister isolation."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">No Filipino cabinet member was shot for resigning in 1923. No Filipino legislator was fired upon for passing resolutions demanding Wood's recall. British India had no Jones Act promising independence; it had no Pensionado Program sending Indian students to British universities at government expense with guaranteed civil service positions upon their return. The British commitment to Indian independence emerged not from principle but from exhaustion after World War II, a war that began thirty years after the Jones Act had already committed the United States to Philippine independence as a matter of binding law.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Germany</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Consider what Germany did to its own colonial subjects. Between 1904 and 1908, German General Lothar von Trotha issued formal extermination orders against the Herero and Nama peoples of German South West Africa. His command was recorded in writing: every Herero, with or without arms, was to be shot. The campaign that followed killed between 65,000 and 100,000 people through execution, starvation, dehydration, forced labor, and concentration camps.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A 1985 United Nations report classified these events as the first genocide of the twentieth century, and the German government officially acknowledged that designation in 2021. Germany had maintained ambitions in the Pacific before World War I, and the record of its governance in Africa is the most reliable guide available to what Philippine governance under Germany would have meant for the Filipino people.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Japan</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Consider, finally, Japan. Filipino historians and survivors have documented what Japanese governance meant between 1942 and 1945: the Bataan Death March of April 1942, in which American and Filipino prisoners of war were forced on a sixty-five-mile march resulting in thousands of deaths from execution, exhaustion, and disease; the comfort women system, which subjected Filipino women to systematic sexual enslavement; and the Battle of Manila in February and March of 1945, documented in the written Japanese operational order preserved in the historical record, "All people on the battlefield with the exception of Japanese military personnel...will be put to death."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The full accounting of what that order produced, including approximately 100,000 Filipino lives lost in a single month and the reduction of Manila to the second most devastated Allied capital of the entire war, is documented in my commentary <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-full-ledger-why-america-remains-the-philippines-greatest-ally/"><em>The Full Ledger: Why America Remains the Philippines' Greatest Ally</em></a>. The Manila that Wood governed was a functioning city with a legislature, a Supreme Court, a free press, and a legally binding timetable for independence. The Manila that Japanese forces left in March of 1945 was rubble.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The colonial powers surveyed above provide the only honest frame for judging Wood and Malcolm. The question is not whether they governed without error; this commentary has not claimed they did. The question is whether the Filipino people, under any available alternative, would have been better governed, more justly treated, or more fully prepared for independence. No honest reading of the colonial record answers that question in the affirmative.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What the Constitution Reveals</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The constitutional record adds a final dimension that the comparative standard alone cannot supply. The same Filipino leaders who demanded Wood's recall then went on to draft a 1935 Constitution that concentrated far more power in a single executive than Wood himself had ever exercised. If Wood was a tyrant, the question that history demands we ask is why the men who suffered under him designed a presidency even stronger than the office he held.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The answer, as that constitutional record makes plain, is that Wood's governance was objectionable not because his power was absolute but because a Filipino did not hold it. To hold Wood to a standard that the framers themselves exceeded the moment they held the pen is not honest history; it is the application of a double standard that the constitutional record exposes. The comparative standard confirms what the constitutional record reveals: the Filipino nationalist movement, the very movement that American institutions had paradoxically equipped Filipinos to build, demanded the presidency for Filipinos rather than the abolition of the presidency, the legislature, and the courts that American colonial rule had established.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, the American colonial administration was not innocent. Among the documented atrocities of the Philippine-American War was Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith's order on Samar, issued in October 1901, to kill everyone over the age of ten and make the island "a howling wilderness," an order morally comparable to the written commands cited above against Germany and Japan. That parallel is not evaded here. It is answered by a distinction the other colonial powers cannot match: Smith was tried, convicted, and removed from the army in 1902; his sentence amounted to forced retirement rather than imprisonment. That the punishment fell short of the crime is a fair criticism of American military justice; what it does not change is the operative distinction: Smith faced institutional accountability within two years of his order, while every officer of every other colonial power cited in this commentary faced none whatsoever. Von Trotha faced no trial. Dyer was praised by the House of Lords. The Japanese officers who ordered the Manila massacre faced judgment only as war criminals after military defeat, not through the accountability mechanisms of their own government. The full accounting of the Philippine-American War, including Samar, belongs to my commentary <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-full-ledger-why-america-remains-the-philippines-greatest-ally/"><em>The Full Ledger: Why America Remains the Philippines' Greatest Ally</em></a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Wood violated the Jones Act in ways that Filipino leaders correctly identified and formally documented. Malcolm's <em>Rubi</em> ruling imposed a reservation policy on Manguian Filipinos that denied them the liberty the organic law was supposed to protect. These facts belong in any honest account of American colonial rule, and no defense of Wood or Malcolm should omit them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yet a tyrant does not build the law school that trains his subjects to argue against him in open court. A despot does not schedule his own departure. And a colonial power does not, as a matter of law rather than rhetoric, commit to Philippine independence while every other major colonial power of that era clung to its territories until forced out by war, rebellion, or collapse.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By the full comparative standard of colonial history, Wood and Malcolm were not despots. They were fallible administrators of a historically singular arrangement. The full scope of that arrangement, from the Jones Act's binding statutory commitment to independence fulfilled in 1946 to the institutional legacy it produced, is examined in my commentaries <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-full-ledger-why-america-remains-the-philippines-greatest-ally/"><em>The Full Ledger: Why America Remains the Philippines' Greatest Ally</em></a>, <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-case-for-gratitude-why-american-colonialism-served-the-philippines/"><em>The Case for Gratitude: Why American Colonialism Served the Philippines</em></a>, and <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-founders-you-erased-how-the-anti-american-narrative-denies-filipino-agency-in-the-1935-constitution/"><em>The Founders You Erased: How the Anti-American Narrative Denies Filipino Agency in the 1935 Constitution</em></a>. Were their governance and their rulings everything that the Philippines deserved? That is the question the full record now places before you.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Long live the Republic of the Philippines, and long live our alliance with the USA!</p><p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/wood-and-malcolm-the-evidence-your-philippine-history-class-left-out/">Wood and Malcolm: The Evidence Your Philippine History Class Left Out</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>The Strongest Arguments for Calling Israel Genocidal: Examined, Tested, and Answered</title>
		<link>https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-strongest-arguments-for-calling-israel-genocidal-examined-tested-and-answered/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-strongest-arguments-for-calling-israel-genocidal-examined-tested-and-answered</link>
					<comments>https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-strongest-arguments-for-calling-israel-genocidal-examined-tested-and-answered/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marcial Bonifacio]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 07:53:57 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[American History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israeli War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philippine History]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.marcialslaw.com/?p=2558</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>(Cover Photo: Manila After Bombing,1945, Old Photo Gallery) By Marcial Bonifacio 11/2/26 The Legal Standard My friends and countrymen, the civilian suffering in Gaza is real, and every death in war is a human tragedy that military doctrine and the law of armed conflict exist to prevent. It is precisely because that suffering is real [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-strongest-arguments-for-calling-israel-genocidal-examined-tested-and-answered/">The Strongest Arguments for Calling Israel Genocidal: Examined, Tested, and Answered</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>(Cover Photo: Manila After Bombing,1945, Old Photo Gallery)</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Marcial Bonifacio</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">11/2/26</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Legal Standard</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, the civilian suffering in Gaza is real, and every death in war is a human tragedy that military doctrine and the law of armed conflict exist to prevent. It is precisely because that suffering is real that the legal charge built upon it deserves to be evaluated not by emotion but by evidence: the charge of genocide leveled against Israel in its war against Hamas, upon careful examination of that evidence, stands as one of the most unfounded accusations in the history of modern armed conflict. The charge is serious enough to deserve a thorough answer, and what follows provides one.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To evaluate it honestly, one must begin not with opinion but with law: Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1948, defines genocide as acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Intent is not incidental to this definition. It is its indispensable legal foundation: what international law calls <em>dolus specialis</em>, or specific criminal intent. Without demonstrated intent to annihilate a people as a people, no military operation, however destructive in its consequences, constitutes genocide under international law.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One party to this conflict, however, has such intent on written record. Article 7 of the Hamas Covenant, published August 18, 1988, and available in full through the Yale Law School's Avalon Project, quotes a Hadith declaring that "the Day of Judgement will not come about until Muslims fight the Jews," and proceeds to specify that Jews must be killed wherever they hide. A revised Hamas document issued in 2017 softened some of this language but did not formally revoke the 1988 Covenant, and the massacres of October 7, 2023, in which Hamas killed over 1,200 Israeli civilians, confirmed which document governs Hamas's actual conduct. The burden of the genocide accusation, properly applied, falls there.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Israel's declared military objective, stated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and confirmed in Israel's submissions to the International Court of Justice, was the destruction of Hamas as a military organization and the recovery of the hostages taken on October 7, 2023. An army cannot simultaneously declare its target to be a terrorist organization and be committing genocide against the civilian population that organization governs. Consequently, the stated war aim and the genocide charge are, by the very definition of dolus specialis, legally incompatible.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That intent is further contradicted by Israel's publicly declared vision for Gaza after the conflict. In January 2024, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant presented the first formal Israeli plan for post-war Gaza governance, stating explicitly that "Hamas will not govern Gaza" and that "Israel will not govern Gaza's civilians," with Palestinian civil committees assuming the territory's civilian administration. Prime Minister Netanyahu similarly stated that a civilian government, not Israel, should rule Gaza after the war. A state prosecuting genocide does not simultaneously plan the civilian governance of the population it intends to destroy.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Expert Witness</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The question of intent demands evidence, and evidence is precisely what retired Army Major John Spencer has spent the past three years systematically compiling. Spencer subsequently served as a Colonel in the California State Guard and currently chairs the urban warfare studies program at the Modern War Institute at West Point. He completed two combat tours in Iraq as a platoon leader and company commander, and his field research on the Gaza conflict includes direct observation in Israel and Gaza. Spencer holds no political appointment and carries no institutional interest in the outcome of this war.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He is the most credentialed urban warfare scholar in America, and his conclusion, drawn from his January 31, 2024, Newsweek article titled "Israel Implemented More Measures to Prevent Civilian Casualties Than Any Other Nation in History," is stated plainly: "Israel has implemented more measures to prevent civilian casualties than any other military in the history of war."</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">History's Closest Parallel</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To understand the weight of that statement, one must examine the historical parallel that Spencer himself has identified as the most instructive comparison to Israel's operations in Gaza: the 1945 Battle of Manila. For Filipino readers, this is not a foreign analogy drawn from distant archives but their own history, the memory of a city that numbered among the most devastated capitals of the entire Second World War and a civilian population that suffered not incidentally but deliberately at the hands of an occupying force that turned the city into a battlefield. I, your humble advocate for the rule of law, have examined the full scope of that alliance in a separate commentary, <em><a href="https://claude.ai/chat/URL"><em></em></a></em><em><a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-full-ledger-why-america-remains-the-philippines-greatest-ally/">The Full Ledger: Why America Remains the Philippines' Greatest Ally</a></em>; the Battle of Manila belongs to that larger story. The month-long battle, fought from February 3 to March 3, 1945, was the fiercest urban combat of the entire Pacific War. Manila had a population of 1.1 million residents and held over 1,000 American prisoners of war within its limits.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Japanese fortified buildings and tunneled to connect them via their basements, just as Hamas has used the urban infrastructure of Gaza. They used the Philippine General Hospital as a military stronghold in direct violation of the Geneva and Hague Conventions, in the same manner that Hamas has militarized hospitals in Gaza.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Article 19 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 is unambiguous on this point: when a defending force uses a protected site to commit acts harmful to the enemy, that site forfeits its protected status, and legal and moral responsibility for any resulting casualties transfers to the defending force, not the attacker.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Beyond the hospitals, the Japanese deliberately executed tens of thousands of Filipino civilians, not as collateral damage in combat, but as a calculated act of reprisal against a population they held responsible for welcoming the Americans.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Deliberate Restraint of Force</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The critical parallel Spencer draws between Manila and Gaza is the deliberate restraint each attacking army exercised in its use of lethal force. Gen. Douglas MacArthur forbade air strikes over Manila entirely, on the grounds that such strikes would inevitably kill large numbers of civilians and that while they might speed the conclusion of operations and save American soldiers' lives, he would not permit their use. He additionally restricted unobserved artillery fire. The result was grinding, month-long, house-to-house combat that cost the American XIV Corps over 1,000 soldiers killed and 5,500 wounded.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Israel Defense Forces applied the same principle in Gaza. Spencer's account of IDF precautionary measures includes altered rules of engagement, restricted fire lines, no-fire areas around protected structures, and release authority requirements for strikes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Furthermore, the IDF deployed an unprecedented civilian notification system: leaflets, millions of direct phone calls to residents, text messages, and drones equipped with loudspeakers warning civilians of impending operations and directing them to evacuation routes. As a consequence, before the heaviest fighting commenced in Northern Gaza, the IDF evacuated over 850,000 civilians, between 85 and 90 percent of the area's resident population.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Critics have raised the +972 Magazine report claiming Israel used AI targeting systems with minimal human oversight and pre-approved civilian casualty thresholds. That report was based entirely on anonymous sources and was formally and specifically denied by the IDF. AI decision-support systems are used by every major military in the world, including the United States and NATO allies; their existence alone establishes nothing about genocidal intent.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The dispositive legal question is what the systems were designed to target. A system designed to identify Hamas operatives, that is, individuals with specific military connections to a specific terrorist organization, is evidence of intent to destroy Hamas. On the contrary, a system intended to destroy Palestinians as a people would identify group membership, not organizational affiliation. An AI system that generates target lists based on organizational affiliation with Hamas is evidence of intent to destroy Hamas, not of intent to destroy Palestinians as a people.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Throughout the conflict, Israel also maintained humanitarian aid deliveries to Gaza through the Kerem Shalom crossing, keeping it open for the transfer of food, medicine, and fuel even as Hamas directed rocket fire at the crossing and at the soldiers operating it. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that 83 percent of planned aid deliveries were blocked in the year following October 7. Israel disputes this figure and its methodology, and the dispute primarily concerns attribution: UN OCHA itself documented Hamas's systematic diversion of aid for military purposes, meaning aid that did not reach civilians was not blocked at the crossing but seized by Hamas after entry. Even accepting the disputed figure, the legal question under Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention is not whether aid was insufficient but whether Israel deliberately inflicted conditions calculated to bring about the group's destruction. A state genuinely pursuing genocide through starvation does not maintain aid crossings at any level, does not keep them open under rocket fire that kills its own soldiers, and does not, as Israel did, continue supplying electricity to Gaza from its own power plants throughout the conflict.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When the IDF's precautionary measures fail, moreover, accountability follows. The April 2024 strike that killed seven World Central Kitchen aid workers traveling in clearly marked vehicles on a pre-coordinated route was immediately acknowledged by Israel as an error. An investigation followed. A brigade commander and a colonel were dismissed. Additional officers were reprimanded. A state with intent to kill protected persons does not investigate and publicly discipline its own military officers for killing them. Errors resulting from negligence in an individual strike may constitute war crimes in that specific instance. They do not constitute genocide, which requires specific intent to destroy a group as a group applied systematically at the institutional level. The accountability that followed the WCK strike contradicted rather than confirmed any such intent.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Casualty Record</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The casualty figures then complete the comparison. In the 1945 Battle of Manila, the American military killed approximately 100,000 civilians in the course of destroying approximately 17,000 Japanese defenders. Israel has produced a lower civilian-to-combatant ratio in Gaza than the United States produced in Manila, where that ratio stood at six civilians for every one combatant killed, a standard against which America has never faced a genocide charge.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Critics argue that this ratio is artificially deflated because Israel classifies military-age males as combatants by default. This assertion is unsupported by IDF operational orders and rests almost entirely on casualty figures produced by the Hamas-controlled Gaza Health Ministry, which does not disaggregate combatants from civilians by any verifiable independent methodology. In fact, the arithmetic holds even under the critics' own figures. The United Nations has estimated approximately 70 percent of those killed in Gaza were civilians. Applying that figure to the most widely cited total death count of approximately 44,000 yields approximately 30,800 civilian deaths and 13,200 combatant deaths: a ratio of one combatant to 2.3 civilians, well below Mosul's ratio of one combatant to 2.5 civilians and far below Manila's benchmark of one combatant to six civilians.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Even if the civilian proportion is extended to 80 percent, representing the upper range of critics' estimates, the resulting ratio of one combatant to four civilians remains below Manila's standard. Only at a civilian proportion of 90 percent or higher does the ratio approach Manila's level, and that figure exceeds the estimates of every major institution, including those most critical of Israel's conduct. As a result, the comparison holds under every methodologically defensible set of numbers. The primary cause of the Manila civilian deaths was not American firepower but Japanese deliberate targeting of the Manileño population, a fact that bears directly on how responsibility for civilian death is assigned in both battles.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Two American Precedents</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Spencer further documents that in the 2016–2017 Battle of Mosul, the largest urban battle since World War II, the U.S.-led coalition killed 10,000 civilians to destroy 4,000 ISIS fighters, a ratio of one combatant to 2.5 civilians. Manila's ratio was one combatant to six civilians.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Spencer's March 2024 analysis published in Newsweek established that Israel's ratio in Gaza stood at approximately 1.5 civilians killed for every combatant, a figure he described as historically low for modern urban warfare and one that falls below both of those American precedents.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This finding draws independent corroboration from Peter R. Mansoor, retired Army colonel and professor of military history at Ohio State University, whose analysis titled "A Not-So-Distant Mirror: What the Battle of Manila During World War II Suggests About Urban Combat, War Crimes, and the Battle for Gaza," published in Strategika, the journal of the Hoover Institution, drew the same Manila-Gaza parallel and found that, by historical comparison, Israel does not come out looking worse.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That judgment does not come from Israeli government spokesmen. It comes, after all, from two of America's foremost military historians, writing independently of each other.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">An army's documented precautions against civilian harm constitute direct legal evidence of the absence of genocidal intent. Genocidal intent and systematic civilian protection are logically incompatible. No army that warns the civilians of a city before it fires, evacuates hundreds of thousands of civilians before it fights, and restricts its own lethal capabilities to its soldiers' detriment can simultaneously be acting with the specific intent to destroy those civilians as a people. That case has now been made on the evidence. Thus, the strongest remaining objections deserve equally direct answers.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Scale Objection Answered</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Critics who acknowledge these ratios often pivot to the argument of scale: that the total number of Palestinian deaths, the extent of infrastructure destruction, and the conditions prevailing in Gaza constitute proof of genocidal intent regardless of the combatant-to-civilian ratio.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This argument confuses the legal standard with a numerical threshold that does not exist in the Genocide Convention. Article II of that Convention does not establish a minimum body count; it establishes an intent requirement. The relevant legal question, therefore, is not how many people have died but whether the army responsible for those deaths acted with the specific intent to destroy a people as a people.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A legally informed skeptic will go further and cite Article II(c) of the Convention, which prohibits deliberately inflicting on a group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction. This is the legal foundation of the siege and blockade argument. The answer is the same as the answer to the killing provision: Article II(c) requires the identical dolus specialis. Israel's maintenance of humanitarian aid crossings throughout the conflict and the full catalogue of precautionary measures Spencer has documented are incompatible with a deliberate policy of destruction through deprivation. The word "deliberately" in Article II(c) performs the same legal function as the word "intent" in Article II(a): it requires a state of mind that the IDF's operational conduct systematically contradicts.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Perhaps the most legally sophisticated version of the scale argument holds that genocidal intent need not be proven by direct evidence but may be inferred from a systematic pattern of conduct. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia established this principle in <em>Prosecutor v. Krstić</em>, Appeal Chamber Judgment of April 19, 2004, and it has been applied only where the pattern involved mass graves, systematic execution of identified group members by reason of group membership, and deliberate destruction of cultural identity, as in Srebrenica and Rwanda. The pattern in Gaza includes the IDF's documented precautionary measures, its evacuation of 850,000 civilians before combat, and its unprecedented notification systems. Those precautions are conduct too, and they point in the opposite direction from the inference critics seek. A force with intent to destroy Palestinians as a people does not systematically protect them from combat operations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By the only standard the Convention recognizes, the evidence points in one direction: the IDF warned civilians before strikes, restricted its own weapons, evacuated the population before combat, and produced a civilian-to-combatant ratio lower than the United States achieved in both Manila and Mosul.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Hamas, by contrast, has fired more than 13,000 rockets, missiles, and drones at Israeli civilian centers since October 7, 2023, every one of which constitutes a violation of the law of war, and every one of which was aimed not at military targets but at men, women, and children in their homes and cities. By every standard the international community has applied to armed conflict since 1945, the conduct of the party bearing documented genocidal intent in this war is Hamas, not Israel.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Critics who find this evidence insufficient often retreat to a broader historical argument. The Genocide Convention, however, is specific in its temporal and legal scope. It applies to acts committed with the defined intent at a defined time. It does not establish liability for historical political disputes, prior military conflicts, or decades-old policies, however contested those may be. Critics who invoke the 2007 blockade, the 1948 displacement, or the broader history of the conflict as evidence of genocide are conflating legitimate political grievances with a specific legal standard the Convention does not permit them to satisfy by historical accumulation. The question before any honest tribunal is not what happened in 1948 but what intent governed Israel's conduct beginning in October 2023, and that question must be answered by evidence, not by history.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Individual Rhetoric and State Policy</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The most emotionally charged counter-argument is not statistical but personal: that statements made by Israeli officials in the immediate aftermath of October 7, 2023, most notably Defense Minister Yoav Gallant's declaration that "We are fighting human animals and we are acting accordingly," constitute direct evidence of genocidal intent at the state level.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">International law draws a precise and well-established distinction between inflammatory rhetoric from individual officials and the demonstrated institutional policy of a state. State genocidal intent, as established through decades of international tribunal jurisprudence including the judgments arising from the Srebrenica massacre, must be inferred from state policy and operational conduct, not from isolated statements made in the immediate aftermath of the largest massacre of Jewish people since the Holocaust.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Israel's official submissions to the International Court of Justice documented that its state policy, its military operational orders, and its government communications consistently framed the conflict as directed against Hamas as a terrorist organization, not against Palestinians as a people. Gallant was subsequently removed as Defense Minister by Prime Minister Netanyahu, further undermining any claim that his statement represented enduring Israeli state policy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The case of Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich carries the same legal argument even further, and by its own logic discredits the charge more thoroughly than Gallant's statement ever could. Smotrich, leader of the far-right Religious Zionist Party, made a series of statements that critics have rightly condemned as indefensible: a March 2023 call for the Palestinian village of Huwara to be wiped out, a declaration in Paris that same month that there is no such thing as the Palestinian people, and a May 2024 call for total annihilation in Gaza. These statements cannot be rehabilitated by context. They should not be defended.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">They were not defended. Netanyahu's government condemned the Huwara remarks and moved immediately to distance itself from them. The United States administration described them as repugnant and formally urged Netanyahu to publicly reject and disavow them. The United Nations, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia condemned them. French government officials and major French Jewish organizations refused to meet with Smotrich during his Paris visit precisely because of them. Haaretz, Israel's leading newspaper, published an editorial calling for his dismissal over the Gaza statements.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Smotrich is not a moderate voice who briefly exceeded appropriate limits. He is the leader of a fringe far-right party whose positions are, by the assessment of Israeli analysts themselves, in direct opposition to the views held by the Israeli mainstream, including those on the nationalist right. He holds no position in the military command structure of the Israel Defense Forces. He does not set rules of engagement. He does not direct strikes. He does not command soldiers in the field. That a coalition government in a functioning democracy contains a minister whose statements his own coalition, his Western allies, and the international community have uniformly condemned is evidence of the difficulties of democratic coalition politics, not of a state pursuing genocide.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The most prominent objection in this category, however, concerns not a minister but the head of government himself. On October 28, 2023, Netanyahu, in an address to soldiers preparing for the ground invasion, invoked the biblical Amalek: "You must remember what Amalek has done to you, says our Holy Bible. And we do remember, and we fight." Critics cited this as genocidal intent at the highest level of command. The rebuttal is both contextual and structural. Contextually, "Amalek" functions in Jewish political discourse as a longstanding metaphor for existential enemies, applied across history to the Romans, the Nazis, and the Soviets, and Netanyahu's own office clarified that the reference concerned Hamas and its October 7 attacks specifically. One of his advisers confirmed the term functions as a stand-in for existential threat. Structurally, the Amalek reference is not an operational order. It specifies no targets, no methods, and no rules of engagement. The instruments that specify all three, namely the IDF's actual rules of engagement, strike authorization protocols, restricted fire lines, and evacuation procedures documented by Spencer, contain no such language and directly contradict any genocidal reading of the speech. Political rhetoric and battlefield command are distinct categories in both practice and law, and international tribunals have consistently required evidence of the latter to establish genocidal intent.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Individual inflammatory rhetoric, however reprehensible, has never been held sufficient in any genocide conviction to establish the dolus specialis required for a finding of genocide. It is the army's operational conduct that establishes intent: the evacuations, the notification systems, the restricted fire lines, the humanitarian crossings kept open under rocket fire. Statements made by fringe officials or in political heat by leaders whose words are not operational orders are not the evidence that settles a genocide case. If they were, the fact that those same statements were immediately and publicly condemned by Israel's own government would settle it in Israel's favor.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Institutional Findings and Their Limits</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Skeptics regularly cite two institutional findings as validation of the genocide charge: the January 26, 2024, provisional measures ruling of the International Court of Justice in <em>South Africa v. Israel</em>, and Amnesty International's December 2024 report explicitly concluding that Israel is committing genocide. Both deserve direct examination.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The ICJ ruling has been consistently mischaracterized. The Court did not find that genocide was occurring. It did not order a ceasefire. It applied the procedural threshold of plausibility required to justify interim protective measures pending a full hearing on the merits: a standard so low that it requires only a demonstration that the claim is not frivolous, not that it is likely to succeed, and certainly not that it has been proven. The Court's order confirmed that its finding went to whether South Africa's asserted rights were plausible, not to whether genocide had been established as a matter of fact. The final ruling on the merits will require years of full legal proceedings. A finding that a legal claim survives initial scrutiny is not a finding of fact on that claim's substance. It is, by the Court's own design, the beginning of a legal proceeding, not its conclusion.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Amnesty International is an advocacy organization, not an international legal tribunal, and it does not possess the authority under international law to make binding genocide determinations. That authority rests exclusively with the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. Amnesty's conclusion rests on the same pattern-of-conduct inference this essay has addressed and rebutted on the evidence: the IDF's documented precautionary measures are themselves part of the pattern, and they point in the opposite direction from the inference Amnesty draws. Spencer, whose field observation of the Gaza conflict is direct and documented, co-authored a December 2024 Newsweek opinion piece with Arsen Ostrovsky, international human rights lawyer and CEO of the International Legal Forum, describing Amnesty's conclusion as "no less than a blood libel." Mansoor's independent analysis appeared in the Hoover Institution's journal. When these authorities are weighed against an advocacy organization making a legal determination it has no jurisdictional authority to render, the weight of evidence does not favor Amnesty.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The case rests, finally, not on what advocacy organizations conclude or on what courts have yet to rule, but on what the record shows. That record speaks clearly.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Taken in its totality, the evidence points in one direction. The law requires specific intent to destroy a group as a group. Israel declared its objective to be the destruction of Hamas, not Palestinians. Its army warned civilians, evacuated populations, restricted its own weapons, and produced casualty ratios lower than those the United States produced in battles no court has ever classified as genocide. Its government condemned the most extreme statements made by its own officials. Its aid crossings remained open under fire. Its post-war governance plan explicitly provides for Palestinian civilian administration of Gaza, not Israeli occupation or the displacement of the Palestinian people. The party in this conflict with documented, written, institutionalized genocidal intent directed at a specific people is Hamas, whose Covenant calls for the killing of Jews wherever they hide and whose October 7 attacks were the largest massacre of Jewish people since the Holocaust. The evidence does not merely fail to establish Israeli genocidal intent. Quite to the contrary, it affirmatively establishes its absence.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, the question before any honest inquirer is not whether civilians have died in Gaza, for they have, and every civilian death in war is a tragedy that military doctrine and the law of armed conflict exist to prevent. The question is whether those deaths reflect an intent to destroy the Palestinian people as a people, or whether they reflect the documented consequence of urban warfare against an enemy that deliberately embeds itself among the civilian population it claims to defend.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Retired Army Major John Spencer, who has studied every major urban battle in modern military history and visited the battlefield firsthand, has answered that question. By the standard set by the United States itself in Manila in 1945, Israel has not committed genocide. It has exercised greater restraint than America did in a war the world has universally recognized as just. The verdict of history, rendered by America's own military record, is unambiguous. Which army, then, deserves the charge of genocide: the one that warns before it fires, or the one that fires without warning at the innocent?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Long live the rule of law, and long live the state of Israel!</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p><p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-strongest-arguments-for-calling-israel-genocidal-examined-tested-and-answered/">The Strongest Arguments for Calling Israel Genocidal: Examined, Tested, and Answered</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>Who Built America? The Answer Depends on What &quot;Built&quot; Actually Means</title>
		<link>https://www.marcialslaw.com/who-built-america-the-answer-depends-on-what-built-actually-means/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=who-built-america-the-answer-depends-on-what-built-actually-means</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marcial Bonifacio]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 05:54:52 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[American Government]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Immigration]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.marcialslaw.com/?p=2554</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Marcial Bonifacio 10/30/26 My friends and American countrymen, a false account of America's founding has taken hold in our politics, and its consequences for the republic are severe. The American left and prominent Democratic politicians have repeatedly claimed that America was built by its ethnic immigrants, meaning the waves of non-Anglo-Protestant populations who arrived [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/who-built-america-the-answer-depends-on-what-built-actually-means/">Who Built America? The Answer Depends on What "Built" Actually Means</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By Marcial Bonifacio</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">10/30/26</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and American countrymen, a false account of America's founding has taken hold in our politics, and its consequences for the republic are severe. The American left and prominent Democratic politicians have repeatedly claimed that America was built by its ethnic immigrants, meaning the waves of non-Anglo-Protestant populations who arrived on these shores in the centuries after the founding. Conservatives, including the Indian-American scholar Dinesh D'Souza, have argued something fundamentally different: that America was built by its early Anglo-Protestant settlers, and that conflating settlers with immigrants is not merely a historical imprecision but a deliberate act of revisionism designed to delegitimize the very Founders and founding principles that made America the freest and most prosperous nation in human history.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In order to settle this dispute with the rigor it deserves, it is necessary to begin with the question that the left consistently refuses to ask: what does it mean to "build" a nation?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Distinction That Changes Everything: Settler vs. Immigrant</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In his 2014 book <em>America: Imagine a World Without Her</em>, Dinesh D'Souza draws a distinction that the left studiously avoids. A settler arrives at territory without an established governmental or legal system and creates the institutional framework of civilization from nothing — its laws, its government, its language, its constitutions, and its values. An immigrant, by contrast, arrives at an already-established civilization and assimilates into its pre-existing institutions. These are not minor variations on the same activity. They are categorically different acts. Huntington made precisely this point in <em>Who Are We?</em>: "To describe America as a 'nation of immigrants' is to stretch a partial truth into a misleading falsehood, and to ignore the central fact of America's beginning as a society of settlers."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The objection that North America was already inhabited when European settlers arrived is acknowledged, and the full history of that encounter is a serious subject in its own right. What is at issue in this debate, however, is not who first occupied the continent but who created the governmental, legal, and constitutional framework that became the United States. No such framework existed prior to the Founders. None was inherited from a pre-existing sovereign authority. It was constructed, from its philosophical foundations upward, by the Anglo-Protestant settlers and the men they produced.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Pilgrims who stepped ashore at Plymouth in 1620 and drafted the Mayflower Compact, pledging to "covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil Body Politick" for the "general good of the Colony," were not immigrating to America, for there was no American nation to immigrate into. They were settling it, and in settling it, they performed the first act of American self-governance on record. The Founders who gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 to draft the Constitution of the United States were not arriving guests; they were architects, and the blueprint they produced has governed the most powerful republic in the history of the world for nearly two and a half centuries.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What This Argument Is Not</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is not an argument for racial superiority, and it must not be misread as one. The Anglo-Protestant founding culture of America is not a racial category; it is a cultural, legal, and philosophical tradition. It has admitted, over the course of American history, members of every race and nation who embraced its principles and assimilated into its practices.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The clearest evidence of this is Frederick Douglass, who in his 1852 address "What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?" invoked the Declaration of Independence not as a document of his oppressors but as the founding text of his own aspirations for freedom. "The principles contained in that instrument," Douglass declared, "are saving principles." He argued that those principles, properly applied, demanded the abolition of slavery — that the tradition itself contained the tools of its own correction. A founding culture so constituted is not a racial prison. It is a universal standard that judges the failures of those who created it against the principles they proclaimed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What "Building" a Nation Actually Means</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">With the settler/immigrant distinction in hand, a second definitional question follows: what precisely does it mean to "build" a nation? The left employs a deliberately broad definition: anyone who ever planted a crop, laid a brick, drove a nail, or staffed a mill "built America" in their view. This definition is not without a grain of truth, for physical labor has always been necessary to sustain any society.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The question, however, is not who sustained America but who created the conditions that made America distinctively America: its constitutional order, its system of individual rights, its tradition of self-governance, and its written guarantees against the arbitrary exercise of government power. These are not the products of labor but of thought, legal tradition, and political philosophy. A nation that loses its farmlands and factories can rebuild them. A nation that loses its constitutional principles loses its identity. On the question of which act of creation most decisively determines a nation's character and continuity, the institutional founding is the only defensible answer.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The historical evidence on this definition is not ambiguous. The Declaration of Independence (1776), whose principal author was Thomas Jefferson, of Welsh, English, and Scottish descent, articulated the philosophical basis of American self-governance: that all men are created equal, endowed by their Creator with unalienable rights, and that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. The Constitution of the United States (1787) established the framework of republican self-government that has endured since its ratification: the separation of powers, the system of checks and balances, the federal structure, and the principle of judicial review.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Bill of Rights (1791) codified individual liberties against government overreach, drawing explicitly from the English common law tradition codified in Sir William Blackstone's <em>Commentaries on the Laws of England</em> (1765–1769). The Federalist Papers (1787–1788), written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, provided the intellectual defense of the constitutional framework and remain to this day among the most consequential works of political philosophy produced on American soil. In Federalist No. 2, Jay himself described the American people as "a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs." The Founders did not merely embody a shared heritage; they named it and defended it as the very basis of American unity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These documents were not the products of physical labor. They were the intellectual and legal architecture within which every subsequent act of American life — economic, political, social — took place. They were created by men who were, by an overwhelming majority, of Anglo-Protestant heritage; this tradition, by the time of the founding, had absorbed not only English, Scottish, Welsh, and Irish stock, but also the French Huguenot and Dutch Protestant families, including the family of John Jay, who had been rooted in colonial New York for generations. That heritage is not incidental to what they created. It is the source of it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Anglo-Protestant Foundation of the American Founding</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Samuel Huntington, the Harvard political scientist and author of <em>Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity</em> (2004), stated the case with precision: "America's core culture has been and, at the moment, is still primarily the culture of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century settlers who founded American society. The central elements of that culture...include the Christian religion, Protestant values and moralism, a work ethic, the English language, British traditions of law, justice, and the limits of government power." The signatory record of the Declaration confirms his characterization precisely. Of the 56 signers of the Declaration of Independence, 38 were of English extraction, five Welsh, four Scottish, and eight Irish — meaning 55 of 56 were of British Isles origin, and 47 were of specifically English, Welsh, or Scottish descent. Only one, John Morton of Pennsylvania, was of Swedish ancestry. Furthermore, 48 of the 56 were born in the American colonies themselves, meaning the overwhelming majority were not immigrants at all but colonial-born Americans, predominantly of British heritage.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The English language became the common tongue of governance, law, and commerce not by accident but because the men who built American institutions were English-speaking. English common law, as systematized by Blackstone, became the legal tradition of the new republic because the men who wrote the Constitution had been educated in that tradition.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Max Weber documented the theological dimension of this heritage with precision in <em>The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism</em> (1905). Calvinist theology, Weber argued, held that worldly success in one's vocation, or <em>Beruf</em>, was a sign of divine election; this doctrine produced, over generations, the habits of disciplined labor, deferred gratification, and productive reinvestment that Weber identified as the spirit of capitalism. It was not coincidental that this spirit produced its most durable political expression in the New England colonies, where Puritan Calvinist theology was the dominant cultural force, and that the civic habits it engendered shaped the American conviction that the individual, not the state, was the primary unit of political and economic life, a conviction that the Founders encoded in the Constitution and that no subsequent wave of immigration had any part in creating.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>D'Souza's Central Argument</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What makes America exceptional, therefore, is not its demographic diversity but the founding ideas that the Anglo-Protestant tradition produced: individual liberty, limited government, free markets, and constitutional self-governance. This is the core of D'Souza's argument across both <em>What's So Great About America</em> (2002) and <em>America: Imagine a World Without Her</em> (2014). D'Souza extends this to its most powerful implication in the latter: "It was the American founding that established the principles that made possible the success of the Civil Rights Movement." The left's revisionist history is specifically designed to obscure this sequence of causation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In <em>What's So Great About America</em>, D'Souza observes that immigrants "are walking refutations of cultural relativism" because they are "voting with their feet in favor of the new culture" that the settlers built. They did not bring that culture with them; they arrived to receive it as beneficiaries of a constitutional order they had no part in creating. The millions of immigrants who came to America's shores were drawn precisely by the promise of what the Founders had already established. To reassign credit for the architecture to the people who arrived because of it is not historical correction; it is historical inversion. For a fuller account of what the republic the Founders built has produced and why it remains worth defending, see my companion commentary, <em><a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/8-indisputable-reasons-america-remains-exceptional-at-250/"><em>8 Indisputable Reasons America Remains Exceptional</em></a></em>, at marcialslaw.com.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Left's Argument and Its Logical Flaw</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">D'Souza further observes that immigrants to America were expected to assimilate into the founding culture: to learn English, to embrace constitutional principles, to adopt the civic values of the republic. This expectation was itself an acknowledgment that there was a pre-existing culture to assimilate into, a culture established by the settlers and Founders that defined what America was. An immigrant who rejected that culture was not building America. An immigrant who embraced it was honoring what the Founders had built.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The left, nevertheless, marshals three principal claims in support of its argument that those very immigrants were the builders of the republic they were required to adopt. Each claim, examined against the evidence, collapses under the weight of its own logical confusion.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">First, they cite Chinese laborers, who constituted the majority of the workforce that built the Central Pacific Railroad between 1863 and 1869. These men performed work of extraordinary physical difficulty and deserve the recognition they were long denied. Nevertheless, they built that railroad within a legal and governmental framework that predated their arrival on American soil by nearly a century. The right of way, the land grants, the corporate charters, the labor contracts, the courts that enforced those contracts. All of these were products of the constitutional republic that the Anglo-Protestant Founders had built. The Chinese laborers built a railroad. The Founders built the republic within which that railroad was possible.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Moreover, the Naturalization Act of 1790, passed by the very first Congress of the United States, restricted citizenship to "free white persons" of good character, which meant the Chinese workers who built the Central Pacific were legally barred from citizenship in the republic they were helping to expand. This exclusion stands as one of the founding order's most significant moral failures, and it was eventually corrected through the republic's own amendment processes. However, the fact of that exclusion is itself evidence that the foundational institutions existed prior to and independently of the Chinese contribution. They built within a structure that preceded them, governed them, and only later, through its own corrective mechanisms, extended to them its full promise.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Second, the proponents of the 1619 Project, led by New York Times journalist Nikole Hannah-Jones in August 2019, argue that the labor of enslaved Africans built America's economy, and that 1619, when the first enslaved Africans arrived in Virginia, rather than 1776, should be understood as America's true founding. This argument conflates economic production with institutional founding. That enslaved labor was morally wrong and economically significant is not in dispute.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The question of whether the men and women who performed that labor under compulsion thereby became the founders of America's constitutional order is a different question entirely, and the answer is plainly no. The Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence, the English common law tradition, the system of republican self-government — none of these originated with the enslaved population. They originated with the Anglo-Protestant settlers and Founders, many of whom held enslaved persons as property; a contradiction that the founding generation itself recognized, that Abraham Lincoln confronted, and that the nation ultimately resolved through the costliest war in its history.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Furthermore, Hannah-Jones advances a stronger structural claim: that slavery shaped the very development of American capitalism and democracy in ways that make 1619 a more honest founding date than 1776. Even granting that slavery influenced the development of Southern agriculture and Northern textile industries, the question of economic development is categorically distinct from the question of constitutional authorship. The Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the common law tradition that underlies them were not written, debated, or ratified by enslaved persons. The 1619 Project's central logical error is to conflate influence on a nation's economic history with authorship of its founding political documents.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Third, the left points to the waves of Irish, Italian, Eastern European, and other ethnic immigrants who arrived in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and built the industrial economy of modern America. These men and women built factories, laid rail, dug canals, and staffed hospitals. Their contributions were real and lasting. Nevertheless, they built within a republic whose foundational institutions — its Constitution, its courts, its currency, its language of law — had been established decades to a century before their arrival. They arrived because of the house. They did not build the house.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Why This Debate Matters Today</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Victor Davis Hanson, the classicist and military historian at the Hoover Institution, has argued across multiple works, including <em>The Dying Citizen</em> (2021), that the deliberate erasure of America's Anglo-Protestant founding culture from the historical narrative serves a political agenda rather than a historical one. In <em>Who Are We?</em>, Huntington extended his argument beyond heritage to politics: the greatest threat to the founding culture came not from immigrants themselves, he argued, but from the American elite class — the politicians, academics, corporate leaders, and media figures who had adopted what he called a denationalized identity, indifferent to national borders, founding traditions, and the civic bonds that make a republic function. An elite class that has no attachment to its founding culture will not defend it; it will, instead, systematically dismantle the institutions and narratives that sustain it, under the guise of inclusion and progress.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The evidence of this dismantling is not abstract. In September 2020, President Donald Trump established the 1776 Commission by executive order, charging it with producing a report on the American founding and restoring its teaching in the nation's public schools. The Commission released its report on January 18, 2021. Two days later, on his first day in office, President Joseph Biden dissolved the Commission by executive order, and the report was withdrawn from the White House website the same day. Whatever one's political affiliation, the sequence is instructive: the first official act of a sitting president in the domain of American education was to eliminate the only federal commission devoted to the teaching of the republic's founding history.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and American countrymen, the question of who built America is not merely a question about the past. It is a question about what America is, what principles it stands upon, and what its citizens are obligated to preserve. What the conservative argument insists upon is this: the Anglo-Protestant tradition existed, it produced the founding documents and institutions of the United States, it was the work of a specific group of settlers and Founders, and it cannot be preserved if it cannot be accurately named and honestly acknowledged. The answer that the left offers, namely that no specific group built America and that it was built by everyone who ever arrived on its shores, is not history at all; it is politics dressed as history, and its consequence is to leave Americans without a clear account of what they are defending when they defend their republic.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Recovering that account is within every citizen's power, and it begins with four specific obligations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Every citizen who takes this argument seriously has four immediate obligations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Read the primary sources. The Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Federalist Papers are not museum pieces; they are the operating documents of a republic that depends on an informed citizenry for its survival. The Library of Congress makes all of them freely available at loc.gov, and each can be read in a single afternoon. A citizen who has read these documents is immune to the most common forms of revisionism, because revisionism depends on ignorance of the originals.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Make the distinction. Whenever you encounter the claim that America is a "nation of immigrants," answer it with precision: America began as a society of settlers who created a constitutional republic, and the immigrants who followed built their lives within the institutions those settlers established. The distinction is not hostile to immigrants; it is honest about history. Huntington was correct that to collapse it is to stretch a partial truth into a misleading falsehood, and a citizen who permits that falsehood to go unchallenged in conversation has ceded ground that does not belong to the left to claim.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Engage your local school board. The 1619 Project's curricula have entered thousands of American classrooms with the deliberate intention of replacing the 1776 founding narrative. Attend a school board meeting, ask which founding history materials are being taught, and advocate for instruction centered on the founding documents and the men who produced them. The 1776 Commission's report, though withdrawn from the White House website on January 20, 2021, was preserved by the Internet Archive and republished by several civic organizations; a search for "1776 Commission Report" will locate it, and it provides a principled framework for what that instruction should contain.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Read further. Dinesh D'Souza's <em>What's So Great About America</em>, Samuel Huntington's <em>Who Are We?</em>, and Victor Davis Hanson's <em>The Dying Citizen</em> each develop the arguments in this commentary with the depth that a single essay cannot provide. A republic whose citizens read seriously is more resistant to deception than one whose citizens read only the headlines their opponents have written for them. My <em><a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/8-indisputable-reasons-america-remains-exceptional-at-250/"><em>8 Indisputable Reasons America Remains Exceptional</em></a></em>, also at marcialslaw.com, extends that examination directly.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Long live the Republic of the United States of America!</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p><p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/who-built-america-the-answer-depends-on-what-built-actually-means/">Who Built America? The Answer Depends on What "Built" Actually Means</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>EXPLAINER: Why the Prosecution Went All In on Article II</title>
		<link>https://www.marcialslaw.com/explainer-why-the-prosecution-went-all-in-on-article-ii/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=explainer-why-the-prosecution-went-all-in-on-article-ii</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marcial Bonifacio]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 07:35:36 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Philippine Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Duterte Impeachment Trial]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.marcialslaw.com/?p=2548</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Marcial Bonifacio 10/24/26 My friends and countrymen, on the thirty-ninth day of the impeachment trial of Vice President Sara Duterte (about which I have written separately in The Case for the Conviction of Vice President Sara Duterte and The Empty Chairs That Could Acquit Sara Duterte), the House prosecution panel made the most consequential [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/explainer-why-the-prosecution-went-all-in-on-article-ii/">EXPLAINER: Why the Prosecution Went All In on Article II</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Marcial Bonifacio</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">10/24/26</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, on the thirty-ninth day of the impeachment trial of Vice President Sara Duterte (about which I have written separately in <em><a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-case-for-the-conviction-of-vice-president-sara-duterte/">The Case for the Conviction of Vice President Sara Duterte</a></em> and <em><a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-empty-chairs-that-could-acquit-sara-duterte/">The Empty Chairs That Could Acquit Sara Duterte</a></em>), the House prosecution panel made the most consequential procedural decision of the entire proceeding: it withdrew three of the four articles of impeachment and staked the entire case on a single charge. That decision has generated fierce debate between the prosecution and the defense, and Filipino citizens who wish to evaluate the trial's outcome intelligently must understand both sides. What follows is an attempt to present each perspective fairly, with the documented statements of the principals themselves.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What Happened</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On October 13, 2026, House lead prosecutor and Batangas Representative Gerville Luistro announced before the Senate impeachment court that the prosecution would drop Article I (misuse of P612.5 million in confidential funds from the Office of the Vice President and the Department of Education), Article III (bribery of DepEd employees), and Article IV (grave threats and inciting to sedition against the President). Only Article II, covering unexplained wealth, false Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth, and continued business interests prohibited by the Constitution, would remain.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Luistro told the court: "Today, the prosecution respectfully manifests that it will no longer pursue three of them. It will stand on one, and that is Article 2 on unexplained wealth."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Presiding Officer Francis Escudero granted the motion, citing the precedent set during the 2012 impeachment trial of then Chief Justice Renato Corona, in which the prosecution withdrew five of eight articles and secured conviction on the remaining charges. Escudero also lifted the sub judice rule on the three withdrawn articles, meaning both sides may now discuss them publicly. He further ruled that Articles I and IV could no longer be refiled for the duration of the 20th Congress, or until the end of Duterte's term in June 2028. As of this writing, Escudero has not issued a separate ruling on whether the defense may present rebuttal evidence on the three withdrawn articles; that question remains a live point of contention before the court.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Prosecution's Case for Dropping Three Articles</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The prosecution advanced three principal arguments for narrowing the case.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The defense was planning to delay.</strong> Two prosecutors, Manila Third District Representative Joel Chua and prosecution spokesperson Benjamin Tolosa Jr., stated publicly that the prosecution dropped the three articles because it believed the defense intended to stretch the trial into 2027. Chua said the prosecution had "seen through their strategy." Tolosa added that the defense had "copied" the prosecution's own witness list during pretrial, signaling that it planned to call the same witnesses to relitigate every article. With four articles requiring separate witness presentations, cross-examinations, redirects, and re-crosses, the defense would have had months of procedural opportunities to stall.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Article II was the strongest charge.</strong> Chua stated plainly: "We picked the strongest article, or the strongest as the people think, because while we say that all articles are strong, the people said this has more weight." Prosecution spokesperson Ace Barbers separately called Article II the most compelling charge.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The evidentiary basis for this assessment was substantial. Forensic financial analyst Alexander Cabrera testified on Day 37 that Duterte and her husband, lawyer Manases Carpio, had P817.87 million in alleged undeclared assets and unexplained wealth from 2022 to 2025. The Anti-Money Laundering Council recorded P4.4 billion in covered and suspicious bank transactions involving the couple from 2007 to 2025. Cale88 Foods Corp., in which Carpio holds a 47.5 percent stake, received P319.33 million in remittances from mainland China and Hong Kong. BIR records showed that the couple's combined after-tax income from 2007 to 2025 was only P85.34 million, yet their undeclared financial footprint was many times larger.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This evidence came from independent government agencies (the AMLC, the BIR, the SEC, PhilGEPS, and the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office), not from political witnesses whose credibility could be attacked.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Conviction requires only one article.</strong> The prosecution only needs the senator-judges to convict on a single article to remove Duterte from office. Pursuing four articles when one is overwhelmingly documented and the other three would require weeks of additional witness presentations was, in the prosecution's judgment, an inefficient use of the trial's remaining time. Lead prosecutor Luistro cited the Corona impeachment as the governing precedent. Private prosecutor Chel Diokno added that the evidence against Duterte was based on "independent, verifiable facts."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The dropped articles are not lost.</strong> Luistro confirmed that the evidence already presented on the three withdrawn charges would be turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman for possible criminal prosecution. The prosecution is not abandoning those charges. It is routing them through a separate institution that operates on its own timeline, while concentrating the impeachment court on the charge most likely to produce a verdict before the political window closes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Defense's Case Against Dropping Three Articles</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defense raised objections that deserve equally serious consideration.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Due process and the risk of mistrial.</strong> Lead defense counsel Sheila Sison warned that allowing the prosecution to withdraw three articles after presenting evidence on them carried "the unmistakable characteristics" of a mistrial. Her argument was specific: the senator-judges had already heard prosecution witnesses on the confidential funds, grave threats, and bribery allegations. Those impressions now reside in the senator-judges' minds and cannot be unheard.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If the defense is barred from presenting rebuttal evidence on those articles, Duterte has been effectively accused without the opportunity to answer. Sison told the court directly: "The prosecution cannot make decisions for the respondent and the defense." She called the withdrawal "ridiculous" and "unacceptable."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Fairness cannot be sacrificed for speed.</strong> Sison later clarified that her principal objection concerned not the prosecution's right to withdraw (which she acknowledged as the House's prerogative) but the potential restrictions on the defense's ability to present evidence on allegations already aired before the court. As Sison stated: "This is not fairness." She warned that shortening the proceedings by limiting the defense's presentation of evidence could result in a mistrial, arguing that the desire to reach a verdict quickly should not come at the expense of due process.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>No constitutional time limit on impeachment.</strong> Senator Alan Peter Cayetano stressed that the Constitution imposes no deadline on the conduct of an impeachment trial. He told the court: "It is our choice." The implication of this argument is that the prosecution's desire for speed should not override the respondent's right to a complete defense. If the evidence on all four articles was sufficient, then all four should have been pursued, regardless of how long the trial might take.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The prosecution's precedent does not precisely apply.</strong> Sison disputed the prosecution's reliance on the Corona impeachment. In that case, the prosecution withdrew five articles before the presentation of evidence. In Duterte's case, the prosecution withdrew three articles after presenting witnesses and evidence on at least two of them (the confidential funds and the grave threats). The procedural posture is different, and Sison argued that the Corona precedent does not authorize what amounts to a post-evidence withdrawal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Duterte's own response.</strong> Vice President Duterte issued a public statement declaring that the prosecution dropped the bribery article because "they don't have evidence." She announced that she would never resign and declared her intention to run for president in 2028. She described the impeachment cases as "already failing" and said "all evidence is fabricated."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What Each Side Does Not Say</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The prosecution does not openly state the political calculation behind its decision, though the logic is visible. The conviction threshold was reduced to 14 votes on Day 29, down from the standard 16 required when all 24 senator-judges are seated, after six minority senators refused to participate in that vote. Senator Robin Padilla has threatened to walk out of the trial entirely. The 2028 presidential election is approaching. Duterte maintains a 56 percent trust rating compared to President Marcos's 36 percent.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Every month the trial extends gives pro-Duterte forces more time to pressure wavering senator-judges, and every month brings the trial closer to campaign season, when conviction becomes exponentially harder to achieve. The prosecution's decision to narrow the case is, at least in part, a recognition that impeachment is a political proceeding conducted inside a political body, and political bodies are subject to pressures that courts are not.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defense does not openly state the strategic advantage of a longer trial, though that advantage is equally visible. With four articles, the defense could call dozens of witnesses, file motions to exclude evidence, challenge document authenticity on each charge, request continuances, and raise procedural objections across a much wider front. Each of those steps consumes trial days.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The prosecution's own representatives admitted publicly that the defense had copied their witness list and appeared to have no independent witnesses to present. If that assessment is accurate, the defense's primary weapon was not evidence but time, and the prosecution's decision to narrow the case took that weapon away.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The American Parallel</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Filipino voters who find this strategic narrowing unfamiliar should consider the second impeachment of President Donald Trump in January 2021. The House filed a single article of impeachment, incitement of insurrection, even though additional charges were available, because the political window was closing; President-elect Joseph Biden would be inaugurated on January 20, and a focused case offered the only realistic path to a Senate trial before that deadline. Trump's defense protested that the accelerated timeline denied adequate preparation and that the House had bypassed committee hearings; those objections mirror almost word for word the arguments of defense counsel Sison in the Duterte trial. The Senate ultimately acquitted Trump on a vote of 57 to 43, ten votes short of the two-thirds required for conviction. The underlying principle holds in both countries: when a legislature narrows its case to a single charge, it is making a judgment that focus and speed serve the public interest better than comprehensiveness, and that judgment carries both strategic advantages and constitutional risks.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Question for Filipino Citizens</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The central question is whether the prosecution's gamble serves justice or undermines it. The prosecution argues that a focused, swift conviction on the strongest charge is worth more than a comprehensive trial that risks never reaching a verdict. The defense argues that a trial in which the respondent cannot answer all the charges already aired is not a fair trial at all.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Both positions contain truth. A trial that never ends is not justice. A trial in which the accused cannot fully defend herself is not justice either.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Senate impeachment court, by granting the prosecution's motion, has determined that the first risk outweighs the second. Whether that determination was correct will be judged not by legal commentators but by the senator-judges who must now render a verdict on a single question: Can Vice President Sara Duterte account for P817.87 million in alleged unexplained wealth?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, the prosecution has placed its bet. The defense will answer beginning November 9, and the court has set no formal verdict deadline, though the prosecution's stated urgency makes plain that proceedings cannot extend indefinitely without surrendering the political ground the narrowing was designed to protect. The evidence is now before the court, and the court is now before the people. Hold your senator-judges accountable. Demand that they judge on the evidence, not on political convenience. The Republic depends on it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Long live the Philippines, and long live the Constitution that protects her!</p><p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/explainer-why-the-prosecution-went-all-in-on-article-ii/">EXPLAINER: Why the Prosecution Went All In on Article II</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>8 Nations, 14 Aggressions: China&#039;s 2,500-Year Invasion Record</title>
		<link>https://www.marcialslaw.com/8-nations-14-aggressions-chinas-2500-year-invasion-record/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=8-nations-14-aggressions-chinas-2500-year-invasion-record</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marcial Bonifacio]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 04:36:30 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Chinese History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Imperialism]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.marcialslaw.com/?p=2534</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Marcial Bonifacio 10/21/26 My friends and countrymen, certain political voices have advanced the claim that China has never invaded another country. That claim is not merely factually wrong; it is a deliberate falsification of 2,500 years of documented history, and it is being circulated precisely to justify a foreign alignment that serves no Filipino [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/8-nations-14-aggressions-chinas-2500-year-invasion-record/">8 Nations, 14 Aggressions: China's 2,500-Year Invasion Record</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Marcial Bonifacio</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">10/21/26</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, certain political voices have advanced the claim that China has never invaded another country. That claim is not merely factually wrong; it is a deliberate falsification of 2,500 years of documented history, and it is being circulated precisely to justify a foreign alignment that serves no Filipino interest. The record is neither obscure nor ambiguous, and it is compiled below.</p>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>Imperial China invaded and occupied the different kingdoms of present-day Korea, The Han Dynasty, starting from 108 BC, took control of the Kingdom of Gojoseon and controlled the northern parts of present-day Korea for four centuries, until the Korean Kingdom of Goguryeo reclaimed the territory in 313 AD. The Yuan Dynasty invaded the Kingdom of Goryeo, the basis for the name "Korea," beginning in 1231. After 28 years of fierce Korean resistance, Goryeo submitted in 1259 and became a vassal state of the Yuan dynasty, a relationship of subjugation that endured for approximately 80 years.</li>



<li>Communist China invaded the Korean peninsula in October 1950 as part of the Korean War. Communist China is the reason Korea remains divided to this day, since its intervention halted the reunification that the United Nations was advancing, and it has continued to influence North Korea from 1950 to the present day. China deliberately redesignated the People's Liberation Army under the name People's Volunteer Army, maintaining the fiction that private citizens had volunteered for war, so as to avoid a formal declaration of war with the United States and the legal consequences that would have followed. The deception was deliberate, documented, and calculated.</li>



<li>Imperial China, starting from the Han Dynasty, invaded and occupied Vietnam. Beginning in 111 BC, Chinese imperial domination continued until 938 AD, when the Southern Han dynasty was defeated by Vietnamese forces led by Ngo Quyen at the Battle of Bach Dang (as illustrated in this article's featured photo). The Ming Dynasty invaded Imperial Vietnam in 1407 and occupied it until 1427, when the Ming forces were finally expelled by the Lam Son Uprising.</li>



<li>Communist China invaded Communist Vietnam on February 17, 1979, demonstrating that Beijing's aggression is not driven by ideology but by territorial ambition; it will invade even a nation that shares its political system. China suffered approximately 26,000 casualties before withdrawing on March 16, 1979, having failed to achieve its stated objective of "teaching Vietnam a lesson."</li>



<li>Imperial China invaded Japan twice, in 1274 and 1281, both times under the Yuan Dynasty. Both invasions ended in failure, largely on account of devastating storms the Japanese would come to call kamikaze, meaning "divine wind."</li>



<li>Communist China invaded parts of India during the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and won that war, owing in no small part to the poor preparedness of the Indian response to Chinese aggression.</li>



<li>Communist China again made incursions against India in 1967 in what would become known as the Nathu La and Cho La Incidents. On both occasions, the Indian Army repulsed the Chinese forces decisively, delivering the People's Liberation Army its first military defeat at Indian hands since the 1962 war. Several further incursions have since been made by China, with the latest occurring as recently as August 2026, in the Taksing area of Arunachal Pradesh.</li>



<li>Present-day Myanmar was also the target of invasion by Imperial China under both the Ming and Qing Dynasties, all of which failed after repeated attempts.</li>



<li>Imperial China under the Qing Dynasty invaded the Kingdom of Tibet in 1910 but withdrew in 1911 after the Xinhai Revolution toppled the Qing Dynasty.</li>



<li>Communist China again invaded the Kingdom of Tibet in 1950 and incorporated it entirely into Chinese-held territory. The Dalai Lama, the Kingdom's rightful ruler, has since lived in exile in India.</li>



<li>The Qing Dynasty conquered the Uyghur homeland in 1759 after a campaign that annihilated the Dzungar people, one of the most catastrophic acts of destruction in 18th-century Asian history. Communist China reasserted military control over the region in 1949, renamed it Xinjiang, meaning "New Territory," and has since subjected its predominantly Muslim population to a documented campaign of cultural suppression. The name itself is a declaration of conquest.</li>



<li>Communist China forcefully attacked and expelled South Vietnamese troops from the Paracel Islands in January 1974. South Vietnam had administered those islands since 1956, when France completed its military withdrawal pursuant to the Geneva Accord of 1954.</li>



<li>On March 2, 1969, a specially prepared People's Liberation Army detachment executed a premeditated ambush against Soviet border guards at Damansky Island along the Ussuri River. Declassified Soviet state commission records confirm that 58 Soviet troops were killed between March 2 and 22 of that year, with 49 of those fatalities being border guards.</li>



<li>A special mention: Communist China has been the chief supporter, financier, and supplier of the New People's Army. Despite China's long record of territorial aggression, the CPP-NPA-NDF has never issued a single public denunciation of China. One need only ask why.<br /></li>
</ol>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The fourteen cases above span the Han Dynasty to the present day, two political systems, and eight nations. No honest reading of Asian history supports the claim that China has never been an aggressor. This record refutes that narrative in full. There are further false narratives being circulated to justify the current alignment with Beijing, and we will examine each of them in later posts.<br /></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Remember, my friends and countrymen, that those who circulate false historical narratives do so because accurate history is inconvenient to the alliances they are constructing. The record above is neither classified nor disputed. It is simply withheld from those who might act on it. The philosopher George Santayana observed that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. A nation whose citizens do not know who has invaded their neighbors, financed their insurgents, and seized their seas will not recognize the next betrayal until it has already arrived. Read this record. Share it. And hold every voice that tells you China has never been an invader to the full weight of what you now know.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><br />Long live the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines!</p><p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/8-nations-14-aggressions-chinas-2500-year-invasion-record/">8 Nations, 14 Aggressions: China's 2,500-Year Invasion Record</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>The Founders You Erased: How the Anti-American Narrative Denies Filipino Agency in the 1935 Constitution</title>
		<link>https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-founders-you-erased-how-the-anti-american-narrative-denies-filipino-agency-in-the-1935-constitution/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-founders-you-erased-how-the-anti-american-narrative-denies-filipino-agency-in-the-1935-constitution</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marcial Bonifacio]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 14:58:24 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[American Colonialism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Government]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philippine Constitution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philippine Government]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philippine History]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.marcialslaw.com/?p=2513</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Marcial Bonifacio 10/12/26 My friends and countrymen, there is a claim that has circulated in Philippine public discourse for generations, repeated so often that it has acquired the appearance of settled truth. The claim is that the 1935 Constitution was not a Filipino document; that it was an American imposition dressed in Filipino signatures; that [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-founders-you-erased-how-the-anti-american-narrative-denies-filipino-agency-in-the-1935-constitution/">The Founders You Erased: How the Anti-American Narrative Denies Filipino Agency in the 1935 Constitution</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Marcial Bonifacio</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">10/12/26</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, there is a claim that has circulated in Philippine public discourse for generations, repeated so often that it has acquired the appearance of settled truth. The claim is that the 1935 Constitution was not a Filipino document; that it was an American imposition dressed in Filipino signatures; that the republic it established was merely a colonial office with the nameplate changed. This claim is not only incomplete; it is, on the most critical points, demonstrably wrong.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I have compiled the most common assertions made by those who characterize the 1935 Constitution as an instrument of American domination rather than an act of Filipino self-determination. Each is stated as it is typically presented, then examined against the full historical record. The evidence does not support the narrative that many of our countrymen have accepted without scrutiny.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Claim 1</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">"The 1935 Constitution had to cross the Pacific for American approval before Filipinos could even vote on it. It was a constitution for independence that needed permission to exist."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 was the very mechanism by which the United States Congress authorized Philippine independence. The certification requirement existed because the Philippines was still a Commonwealth under American sovereignty during a defined ten-year transition period, with full independence scheduled for July 4, 1946. Every transitional independence arrangement in modern history has included an approval step by the sovereign power. Britain required approval of the constitutions of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma before those nations achieved independence. The United Nations trusteeship system imposed comparable requirements on every trust territory from Tanganyika to Palau.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The certification was not a cage. It was a gate being opened on a published schedule, and the schedule was kept.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Claim 2</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">"Washington did not wait to see what Filipinos would write. Washington wrote the required provisions in advance, and the delegates simply attached them as an appendix."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The provisions Washington required, contained in the Ordinance Appended, were transitional protections with an expiration date. They addressed American military installations, the property rights of American citizens, trade relationships, and immigration controls during the ten-year Commonwealth period. They were not permanent features of Philippine governance. They were the terms of an orderly transfer of sovereignty.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Every decolonization agreement of the twentieth century included comparable provisions. Britain's Indian Independence Act of 1947 contained transitional clauses on the division of assets, military arrangements, and the continuation of existing laws. France imposed far more restrictive conditions on its African territories under the Communauté française. The Netherlands attempted to retain permanent economic privileges in Indonesia. Compared to any of these, the American terms were modest in scope and fixed in duration.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Those who cite the Ordinance Appended as evidence of imperial control consistently omit the single most important fact about it: the Ordinance expired on July 4, 1946, the date it was always scheduled to expire.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is true that the Bell Trade Act of 1946 extended economic privileges for American citizens, including parity rights, beyond independence. This is a legitimate criticism of American economic policy in the postwar period. It does not, however, transform the Ordinance Appended into a permanent instrument of control, because the Ordinance and the Bell Trade Act are separate legal instruments with distinct histories, terms, and political contexts. The Ordinance was a precondition of the constitution. The Bell Trade Act was a postwar trade agreement negotiated between two sovereign governments. To conflate the two is to obscure, not clarify, the constitutional record.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Claim 3</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">"The signature that made the constitution real was American. It was never going to be a Filipino one."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This assertion reverses the sequence of authority. President Roosevelt's certification on March 23, 1935, confirmed that the document conformed to the requirements of American law. It did not enact the constitution. The constitution became operative for the Filipino people only after the plebiscite of May 14, 1935, in which over 1.2 million Filipinos voted in favor. Fewer than 45,000 voted against. The signature that made the constitution binding upon the Philippine people was their collective vote, and no American signature substituted for it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Claim 4</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">"The Filipino voter could not amend the document. He could not strike the appendix. He could not touch a clause. He could only write yes or no to the entire thing."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This describes the standard procedure for constitutional ratification in virtually every democratic nation that has ever adopted a constitution by popular vote. State conventions ratified the United States Constitution itself by voting to accept or reject the entire document. No American ratifying convention had the authority to amend individual clauses on the convention floor. The French Constitution of 1958 was submitted to the French people as a yes-or-no referendum. The Japanese Constitution of 1947 was adopted by the Diet without clause-by-clause popular amendment. A yes-or-no ratification vote is how constitutional democracies adopt their founding documents. It is not a colonial imposition; it is a universal democratic mechanism.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Claim 5</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">"The Philippine presidency was not modeled after the American presidency. It was modeled after the Governor-General's office, the same colonial chair Filipinos had fought for thirty years, with the nameplate changed."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is the most consequential claim in the anti-American narrative, and it requires the most careful examination, because it entirely omits the three facts that distinguish the 1935 presidency from the Governor-General's office.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">First, the Philippine president was elected by the Filipino people. The Governor-General was appointed by Washington and answered to the American president. Accountability to one's own voters versus accountability to a foreign sovereign is not a change of nameplate. It is the entire substance of self-governance.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Second, the 1935 Constitution included a Bill of Rights drafted by the committee chaired by Jose P. Laurel. That Bill of Rights constrained presidential power in ways the Jones Law of 1916 never constrained the Governor-General. It guaranteed freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to peaceful assembly, due process of law, protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the right to form associations. No equivalent set of justiciable rights existed under the colonial framework.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Third, the comparison between the Philippine unitary system and the American federal system is structurally misleading. The United States is a federation of forty-eight sovereign states (as it was in 1935), each with its own governor, legislature, and judiciary. The Philippines had no history of federated sovereign states, and no colonial or pre-colonial precedent for such a system. The vast majority of democracies in the world operate as unitary republics with centralized executive authority: France, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and nearly every nation in Latin America. To compare a unitary republic unfavorably to a federation and conclude that the unitary model is a colonial defect is to condemn most of the democratic world as constitutionally deficient.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Claim 6</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">"When Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972, he did not break the 1935 Constitution. He cited it. The commander-in-chief clause authorized his dictatorship."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Every constitution that grants emergency powers can be abused by an authoritarian who is willing to exceed those powers and resist removal. Adolf Hitler cited the Weimar Constitution's Article 48 in his consolidation of power. The French Constitution's Article 16 grants the French president extraordinary powers in times of crisis. The existence of an emergency provision is not evidence of a constitutional design flaw; it is evidence of a universal constitutional dilemma.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Moreover, the claim that Marcos acted within the 1935 Constitution is historically indefensible. Marcos cited Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph 2 as his authority, yet the martial law he imposed bore no resemblance to the limited emergency power that provision authorized. He dissolved the legislature. He arrested opposition senators, journalists, and civic leaders without charge. He ruled by decree for over a decade. He rewrote the constitution itself in 1973 under conditions of martial law, through a ratification process that the Supreme Court could not certify as free.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The 1935 Constitution did not authorize the dissolution of the legislature, the arrest of senators without charge, or the imposition of one-man rule by decree. To attribute these acts to the document rather than to the man who violated it is to blame the lock for the burglar.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Claim 7</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">"Filipinos did not copy the American government. They copied the government Washington used on them."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The preceding points have addressed the specific instances of this claim: the nature of the presidency and the martial law it allegedly enabled. This final formulation is the overarching thesis from which those specific claims derive, and it fails for the same reason each of them fails. It reduces seven months of convention deliberation by 202 elected delegates to a single act of unconscious replication, and in doing so, it commits the very offense it claims to oppose: it denies Filipino agency.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The delegates themselves rejected this characterization from the start. Delegate Camilo Osias declared on the convention floor that "this Constitutional Convention, not being an adjunct of, or an auxiliary to, any other body or entity, is supreme in its own field of action." Another delegate stated that the convention's purpose was not to draft a temporary charter for the Commonwealth alone but "a constitution for the Philippine Republic that is to be sovereign, free and independent." These were not the words of men who believed they were copying a colonial template.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Constitutional Convention of 1934 included documented disagreements over unicameralism versus bicameralism, the length of presidential terms, the scope of the Bill of Rights, the role of social justice provisions, and the relationship between church and state. The delegates drew from multiple legal traditions: American constitutional law, the Spanish legal codes that preceded it, the Malolos Constitution of 1899, and contemporary constitutional movements in Europe and Asia. The Malolos Constitution itself drew from the constitutions of France, Belgium, and several Latin American republics, as the constitutional historian Cesar Adib Majul documented and as the convention's primary drafter, Felipe Calderon, acknowledged in his own writings.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The constitutional scholar Joaquin Bernas, S.J., who later served as a framer of the 1987 Constitution, examined this question directly in a 1967 article in the <em>Ateneo Law Journal</em>. Bernas analyzed the convention debates and found that the delegates actively contested whether the Tydings-McDuffie Law limited their authority to drafting a Commonwealth charter or whether they possessed the sovereign power to draft a constitution for the independent Republic itself. The delegates resolved that question in favor of their own sovereignty. That debate, documented in the convention proceedings and analyzed by one of the most respected constitutional scholars in Philippine history, is itself proof that the framers were not passive recipients of an American template.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The 1934 delegates were heirs to a constitutional tradition that was already multicultural before a single American provision entered the discussion. To claim that the framers simply reproduced a colonial template is to erase the record of their deliberations and to treat the most educated legal minds in Asia as passive recipients of instruction. This is not anti-colonialism. It is a different form of condescension.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Before proceeding, I wish to acknowledge what motivates the claims I have just examined. The resentment is not invented. The experience of foreign governance was real, the indignity of needing American permission for Filipino self-determination was real, and the desire to claim full ownership of our national story is honorable. I do not ask my countrymen to abandon that desire. I ask them to follow it to its logical conclusion.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If we are serious about claiming ownership of our republic, then we must also claim ownership of the choices the framers made, including the ones that proved unwise. The anti-American narrative, in its determination to deny America credit, also denies Filipinos credit. It trades one form of diminishment for another.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Claim 8</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">"American colonialism gave Filipinos nothing they could not have built for themselves. The Americans extracted what they wanted and left."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Those who reduce the American period to a single word, "colonialism," and treat that word as a complete account must contend with the following facts, all of which are part of the same historical record.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The United States established a public education system in the Philippines on a scale no colonial power in Asia had attempted. By 1935, Filipino literacy rates had risen from an estimated 20 percent under Spain to over 50 percent, and English-language education had produced the very lawyers, legislators, and civic leaders who staffed the Constitutional Convention.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The United States created the Philippine civil service, established the Bureau of Lands, built the judicial system the framers inherited, and introduced competitive examinations for public office, replacing the patronage systems of the Spanish colonial era.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The United States introduced local elections in the Philippines as early as 1901 and established the Philippine Assembly in 1907, making it one of the first elected national legislatures in Southeast Asia. By the time the Constitutional Convention met in 1934, Filipinos had nearly three decades of continuous legislative experience.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Jones Law of 1916, which anti-American commentators cite exclusively for the powers it granted the Governor-General, also Filipinized the Philippine legislature, created an elected Senate, and declared in its preamble that the purpose of American governance in the Philippines was to prepare the Filipino people for independence. No other colonial power in Asia made a comparable commitment in law.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention themselves acknowledged this. On August 3, 1934, the convention passed a formal resolution "expressing the sincere gratitude of the delegates of the Constitutional Convention to the Congress and people of the United States for the opportunity they have given the Filipino people to become an independent nation."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Manuel Quezon, testifying before the United States Congress in 1919, stated the matter in terms that anti-American commentators have never answered: "How can you afford not to recognize the independence of the Filipino people whom you have solemnly promised independence, whom you have helped to acquire the science and practice of self-government, and who are bound to you by ties of affection, friendship, and eternal gratitude?" In his 1939 speech on civil liberties, Quezon added: "No one has outdone me in giving credit to the government and people of the United States for what they have done in the Philippines." These are the words of the first president of the Commonwealth, the man who led the independence movement. Those who claim to honor his legacy while denying American contributions to Philippine self-governance have not read him carefully.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The abuses of the American period are documented facts. The Philippine-American War, the racial paternalism that attended even well-intentioned policies, and the economic arrangements that favored American interests are realities that responsible commentary does not deny. I address these in full, including the specific atrocities of the Philippine-American War and their place in the complete historical ledger, in a separate commentary, <em><a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-full-ledger-why-america-remains-the-philippines-greatest-ally/">The Full Ledger: Why America Remains the Philippines' Greatest Ally</a></em>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The abuses do not, however, erase the rest of the record. Any complete account of the 1935 Constitution must acknowledge that the framers were not colonial subjects groping in the dark. They were trained, experienced, and deliberate political actors who made choices within real constraints, and those choices, including the ones that proved unwise, were their own.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Claim 9</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">"The American colonial period was no different from Spanish or Japanese rule. Colonialism is colonialism, regardless of which flag flies over the palace."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is perhaps the most historically reckless assertion in the anti-American repertoire, because the comparison is devastating to the thesis it is meant to support.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Spain governed the Philippines for over three hundred years and produced no elected legislature, no public education system, no independent judiciary, and no credible promise of independence at any point. The Spanish colonial government was administered for the benefit of the Crown and the religious orders, and Filipino participation in governance was confined to the local principalía under Spanish supervision.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Japan occupied the Philippines from 1942 to 1945, established a puppet republic under Jose P. Laurel (the same Laurel who had chaired the Bill of Rights committee in 1934), and presided over the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Filipinos. Some scholarly estimates place the toll above one million. The destruction of Manila in 1945 made it one of the most devastated cities of the Second World War.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Dutch governed Indonesia for over three centuries and resisted independence by military force from 1945 to 1949. France fought a war in Indochina from 1946 to 1954 to prevent Vietnamese independence. Britain, the most orderly of the European colonial powers, did not introduce elected legislatures in Malaya until the 1950s.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To place these facts in sequence: the United States introduced local elections in 1901, established a national legislature in 1907, passed a law promising independence in 1916, enacted a specific independence timetable in 1934, and honored that timetable in 1946 despite the intervening devastation of the Second World War. No other colonial administration in the region approached this sequence of commitments.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Philippines is, in fact, the only American-administered territory to have received a binding independence timetable under federal law. Puerto Rico, Guam, and American Samoa remain under American sovereignty to this day. The Philippine experience was not a reflection of a general American policy of decolonization; it was the product of a specific political relationship, a specific set of Filipino leaders who fought for independence over three decades, and a specific series of legislative acts that those leaders secured. That specificity makes the Philippine case more remarkable, not less. To treat the American period as equivalent to Spanish or Japanese colonialism is not historical analysis. It is ideological commitment masquerading as scholarship.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Claim 10</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">"The flaws of the 1935 Constitution prove that it was an American product. Filipinos would not have designed a government that concentrated so much power in a single office."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The 1935 Constitution had real defects. The presidency it created was too strong, and subsequent history confirmed that weakness. The unitary structure concentrated too much authority in Manila. The social justice provisions were aspirational rather than enforceable. These are legitimate criticisms, and honest Filipino commentators have made them for decades.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Those defects, moreover, did not die with the 1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution, under which Filipinos live today, drew directly from the 1935 document. The Bill of Rights that Laurel's committee drafted in 1934 is largely preserved in the current charter. The presidential system, the unitary structure, and the social justice provisions all trace their lineage to the choices the 1934 delegates made. Every time a Filipino invokes a constitutional right, files a case in court, or votes for a president, the framers' decisions are still operating. This is not a question about a dead document. It is a question about who authored the government Filipinos live under today.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What is not legitimate is the claim that these defects were American in origin. Washington required the Ordinance Appended, which expired. Washington did not require a strong presidency. Washington did not require a unitary state. Washington did not require the specific distribution of powers that the framers chose. Those choices were made by Filipinos, in a Filipino convention, after months of deliberation, and they were ratified by the Filipino people in a free vote.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To deny this is to deny Filipino agency in the most consequential political act of the twentieth-century Philippines. It is to say that our own founders were not authors of their own republic, merely scribes copying a foreign template. That is not a position of national pride. It is a position of national diminishment, and it does not withstand contact with the evidence.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Those who invoke President Quezon against the Americans should read him in full. His most famous remark, "I would rather have a government run like hell by Filipinos than a government run like heaven by Americans," is quoted endlessly as an anti-American declaration. It was nothing of the kind.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the same speech, Quezon clarified: "That is not an admission that a government run by Filipinos will be a government run like hell. Much less can it be an admission that a government run by Americans, or by the people of any other foreign country for that matter, can ever be a government run like heaven." Quezon was not condemning America. He was asserting Filipino competence. He was saying that self-governance, with all its imperfections, is superior to foreign administration, however benign, because a free people can correct their own mistakes. That is not anti-Americanism. That is the founding principle of the republic the delegates wrote.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Remember, my friends and countrymen, there is no shame in reexamining the assumptions we have inherited. There is, however, great shame in refusing to examine them at all, and greater shame still in denying the authorship and the agency of the very Filipinos who built our republic with the tools they had, under the constraints they faced, in the best judgment they could exercise. They were not scribes of someone else's design. They were the founders of their own republic.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Long live the Republic of the Philippines!</p><p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-founders-you-erased-how-the-anti-american-narrative-denies-filipino-agency-in-the-1935-constitution/">The Founders You Erased: How the Anti-American Narrative Denies Filipino Agency in the 1935 Constitution</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>The Case for Gratitude: Why American Colonialism Served the Philippines</title>
		<link>https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-case-for-gratitude-why-american-colonialism-served-the-philippines/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-case-for-gratitude-why-american-colonialism-served-the-philippines</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marcial Bonifacio]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 14:31:52 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[American History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philippine History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Phillippine Economic Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Colonialism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Government]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philippine Constitution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philippine Education]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philippine Government]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.marcialslaw.com/?p=2511</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Marcial Bonifacio 10/12/26 My friends and countrymen, there is a fashionable argument circulating among Filipino academics, activists, and social media commentators which holds that the American colonization of the Philippines was an unqualified evil, a mere extension of Western imperialism that exploited our people and distorted our national development. This argument is not entirely [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-case-for-gratitude-why-american-colonialism-served-the-philippines/">The Case for Gratitude: Why American Colonialism Served the Philippines</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Marcial Bonifacio</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">10/12/26</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, there is a fashionable argument circulating among Filipino academics, activists, and social media commentators which holds that the American colonization of the Philippines was an unqualified evil, a mere extension of Western imperialism that exploited our people and distorted our national development. This argument is not entirely without merit; the Philippine-American War claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Filipinos, and the economic arrangements imposed during the colonial period often served American commercial interests at the expense of Filipino self-sufficiency. These are historical facts, and no honest commentator should deny them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, an honest commentator must also do what the anti-American critics consistently refuse to do: examine the full record. A nation's colonial history cannot be judged solely by its worst chapters any more than a man's character can be judged solely by his worst day. The question is not whether American colonialism was perfect. It was not. The question is whether the Philippines, on the whole, emerged from the American colonial period with stronger institutions, broader freedoms, and greater capacity for self-governance than it would have possessed under any plausible alternative. The evidence, when examined without ideological prejudice, answers that question decisively.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In this commentary, I will present that evidence across six dimensions of national life: constitutional governance, mass education, linguistic opportunity, military security, the counterfactual alternatives, and the legitimate grievances themselves. I do this not to excuse every American action during the colonial period, but to demonstrate that the net result of American involvement in the Philippines has been, by any measurable standard, beneficial to the Filipino people.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Constitutional Framework</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The full constitutional inheritance that the American period gave the Philippines, including the 1935 Commonwealth Constitution drafted by 202 elected Filipino delegates, the Bill of Rights under Jose P. Laurel's committee, and the deliberate choices the framers made within and beyond the American model, is examined in <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-founders-you-erased-how-the-anti-american-narrative-denies-filipino-agency-in-the-1935-constitution/"><em>The Founders You Erased: How the Anti-American Narrative Denies Filipino Agency in the 1935 Constitution</em></a>. For the purposes of this commentary, what matters is the counterfactual: what would Philippine governance have looked like without it?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Consider what this replaced. Under three centuries of Spanish rule, the Philippines had no democratic institutions, no tradition of popular elections, no independent judiciary, and no legally enforceable individual rights. The friar orders held effective veto power over civic life in the provinces. The Malolos Constitution of 1899, drafted by the revolutionary government of Emilio Aguinaldo, was a remarkable document for its time, but it drew primarily from French, Belgian, and Latin American constitutional traditions. It established a unicameral legislature with supreme authority over the executive, a structure that concentrates power rather than distributing it. It contained no equivalent of judicial review, the mechanism by which courts can strike down laws that violate constitutional rights.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Without the American constitutional model, the Philippines would have entered the 20th century with a parliamentary or quasi-parliamentary system derived from European civil law traditions, with weaker checks on executive power and no institutional tradition of courts protecting individual citizens against the state. The American insistence on regular elections, flawed as they were under colonial oversight, established the democratic habit that Filipinos carry to this day. It is precisely because Filipinos have internalized the expectation of free elections that they have repeatedly resisted authoritarian overreach, from the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos Sr. in 1986 to the ongoing vigilance against executive abuse in the present day.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The anti-colonial critics who denounce the American period rarely pause to explain what constitutional framework they would have preferred. The Spanish system offered none. The Malolos Constitution, had it survived, would have concentrated legislative power without judicial check. The question is not whether the American model was imposed. Indeed, it was. However, the question is whether the Philippines is better governed today because of it. The answer, measured by the institutional resilience that has sustained Philippine democracy through multiple crises, is a resounding yes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Education and Mass Literacy</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Before the American period, formal education in the Philippines was controlled almost entirely by the Spanish religious orders. Schools were few, instruction was conducted in Spanish, and access was restricted overwhelmingly to the children of the principalia and the ilustrado class. The vast majority of Filipinos received no formal schooling. Thus, literacy was a privilege of the elite, not a right of the citizen.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The scale of the American educational project in the Philippines, from the Thomasite teachers of 1901 to the founding of the University of the Philippines in 1908, the rise of Filipino literacy from single digits to over 60 percent, and the opportunities it created for Filipino women in business and the professions, is documented in full in my commentary <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-full-ledger-why-america-remains-the-philippines-greatest-ally/"><em>The Full Ledger: Why America Remains the Philippines' Greatest Ally</em></a>. For the purposes of this commentary, what matters is the counterfactual: what would Philippine education have looked like without it?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Without the American public education system, the Philippines would have entered independence with a tiny, Spanish-speaking educated class and a vast, illiterate majority. The democratic institutions transplanted by the Americans would have been hollow without an educated citizenry capable of exercising them. Education was not a secondary benefit of the American colonial period. On the contrary, it was the mechanism by which every other benefit became sustainable.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Language and Economic Opportunity</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The establishment of English as a national language has proven to be one of the most economically consequential outcomes of the American colonial period. Today, the Philippines is the largest English-speaking nation in Southeast Asia, and this linguistic capacity has directly enabled its most important modern industry: the business process outsourcing sector. The Philippine BPO industry, now one of the country's largest employers and export earners (documented with current figures in <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-full-ledger-why-america-remains-the-philippines-greatest-ally/"><em>The Full Ledger</em></a>), exists because of widespread English fluency.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This industry exists because of widespread English fluency. It does not exist in Vietnam, Thailand, or Indonesia at comparable scale precisely because those nations lack the depth of English-language education that the Philippines possesses. The connection is not incidental; it is causal. American colonial education policy created the linguistic infrastructure upon which an entire modern industry was built, more than a century after the policy was implemented.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Without American colonization, the Philippines would have remained linguistically fragmented. Spanish would have persisted as the language of the elite, while the regional languages of Tagalog, Cebuano, Ilocano, and Hiligaynon would have dominated daily life among the general population. The Philippines would today resemble the linguistic landscape of many Latin American nations that gained independence from Spain: a single elite language layered over deep regional variation, with no widely shared second language connecting Filipinos to the global Anglophone economy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The cultural consequences are equally significant. The deep familiarity that Filipinos have with American culture, institutions, and professional norms has made the Philippines one of the most globally connected nations in Asia. Filipino professionals work in American hospitals, serve in the United States Navy, and occupy positions in multinational corporations worldwide. This global mobility is a direct downstream effect of the educational and linguistic infrastructure that the American colonial period established.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Military Security and the China Question</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The United States and the Philippines are bound by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, reinforced by the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which together constitute the single largest deterrent to Chinese territorial aggression in the West Philippine Sea. The full architecture of this alliance, from the Visiting Forces Agreement to the nine EDCA sites, is documented in <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-full-ledger-why-america-remains-the-philippines-greatest-ally/"><em>The Full Ledger</em></a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled decisively in the Philippines' favor, declaring China's nine-dash line claims to have no legal basis, and China has ignored that ruling entirely, a pattern of coercion documented incident by incident in <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-full-ledger-why-america-remains-the-philippines-greatest-ally/"><em>The Full Ledger</em></a>. The question for this commentary is not what China has done, but what it would do without the American deterrent.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The only reason China has not acted with even greater aggression is the risk of triggering a direct military confrontation with the United States. Remove the American alliance from the equation, and the Philippines becomes strategically defenseless against a nuclear-armed superpower with the largest navy in the world by sheer vessel quantity. On the other hand, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, while capable and professional, do not possess the naval or air assets to deter Chinese expansion unilaterally.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Without the American alliance, the Philippines would face the same dynamic now visible in Cambodia, Laos, and Sri Lanka: economic dependency on Chinese infrastructure loans, political deference to Beijing on matters of sovereignty, and the gradual erosion of national autonomy through debt-trap diplomacy. The Belt and Road Initiative has already demonstrated China's willingness to leverage economic investment as a tool of political control. Hence, a Philippines without the American security guarantee would be profoundly vulnerable to precisely this pattern.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The anti-American critics who advocate severing ties with the United States on grounds of colonial grievance have never adequately answered the question of who would replace America as the guarantor of Philippine sovereignty. The answer, absent any credible alternative, is no one.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Counterfactual Test</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The most revealing exercise in evaluating the American colonial period is to ask the question that its critics rarely confront honestly: if not America, then who? The historical context of 1898 does not permit the comfortable assumption that the Philippines would simply have governed itself in peace. Spain's grip was failing, but the revolutionary republic under Aguinaldo was fragile, underfunded, and internally divided. Multiple imperial powers were actively competing for territories in the Pacific.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Germany maintained a naval squadron in Manila Bay during the Spanish-American War and had explicit ambitions to acquire Pacific territories. Had the United States not taken the Philippines, Germany was positioned and motivated to do so. German colonial administration in its existing territories, including German New Guinea and German Samoa, was extractive and authoritarian, with no tradition of preparing colonized peoples for self-governance.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Japan, which would eventually invade the Philippines in 1941 regardless of American presence, was the other plausible colonial power. Japan's colonial record in Korea (1910 to 1945) and Taiwan (1895 to 1945) included rapid industrialization in certain sectors but also the systematic suppression of local languages, forced cultural assimilation, conscription of colonial subjects into the imperial military, and the exploitation of forced labor. The Philippines under Japanese colonization would have experienced modernization on Japanese terms, which is to say, modernization designed to serve the economic and military interests of the Japanese Empire, not the civic development of the Filipino people.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The most optimistic alternative scenario is that the First Philippine Republic survives, consolidates power, and governs independently from 1899 onward. This scenario, while appealing to national pride, must contend with several realities: the republic had no revenue base sufficient to fund mass education, infrastructure development, or military defense. It had no established judiciary. It had no diplomatic recognition from any major power. Its leadership class, the ilustrados, were themselves products of Spanish colonial education and held economic interests that were not always aligned with the welfare of the broader population. Whether this republic would have survived the first two decades of the 20th century without being absorbed by another imperial power is, at best, an open question.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Every plausible alternative to American colonization resulted either in colonization by a less benevolent power or in a fragile independence that would have left the Philippines without the institutional, educational, and security foundations it possesses today (possibly giving rise to dictatorship or tyrannical government). This is not a defense of colonialism in the abstract; it is an honest accounting of the specific historical alternatives that existed in 1898.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>An Honest Accounting of Grievances</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Intellectual honesty requires that the legitimate grievances against the American colonial period be named and acknowledged, not as concessions to the anti-American position, but as evidence that the case for American interests does not depend on denying the costs.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Philippine-American War, fought from 1899 to 1902, was brutal by any measure, and the full accounting of its costs, from the atrocities on Samar to the hundreds of thousands of Filipino dead, is presented without omission in <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-full-ledger-why-america-remains-the-philippines-greatest-ally/"><em>The Full Ledger</em></a>. Those costs are not denied here. They are weighed against the institutional inheritance that followed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The economic arrangements of the colonial period also deserve scrutiny. The Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909 and the subsequent free trade agreements oriented the Philippine economy toward the export of raw agricultural commodities to the American market, creating a dependency that stunted industrial development. The Americans preserved the hacienda system inherited from Spain rather than redistributing land, which cemented the economic dominance of the landed elite and left the agrarian majority without ownership of the land they worked. This failure of land reform continues to haunt the Philippine economy to this day.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These are real costs, and they must be weighed honestly. However, the critics who present these costs as the totality of the American colonial record are committing the same intellectual error they accuse the pro-American side of making: they are selecting evidence to fit a predetermined conclusion. The full record includes the democratic institutions, the public education system, the linguistic infrastructure, the military alliance, and the postwar reconstruction assistance that rebuilt the Philippines after Japanese occupation. A nation that acknowledges only the wounds and ignores the foundations is not engaging in honest history. It is engaging in disingenuousness.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The measure of a colonial period is not whether it was free of injustice. No colonial period in human history meets that standard. The measure is whether the colonized nation emerged with greater capacity for self-governance, economic development, and national defense than it possessed before, and whether it emerged in a stronger position than it would have under the available alternatives. By both of those measures, the American colonial period served the Philippines, and the current exceptional nation (which I wrote about in <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/8-indisputable-reasons-america-remains-exceptional-at-250/"><em>8 Indisputable Reasons America Remains Exceptional</em></a>) continues to serve the Philippines.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends, the fashionable rejection of the American colonial legacy is not a sign of intellectual maturity or honesty, but a sign of intellectual dishonesty or ignorance. To condemn the United States for the sins of the Philippine-American War while ignoring the constitutional democracy, the public education system, the English language, and the military alliance that have sustained the Philippines for over a century is not scholarship. It is selective memory dressed as patriotism.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The honest Filipino does not deny the suffering of 1899. He honors it by ensuring that the institutions built in its aftermath are preserved, strengthened, and defended against those who would replace American partnership with Chinese dependency. The honest Filipino does not pretend that colonialism was a gift. He recognizes that among the colonial powers competing for the Philippines in 1898, the United States was the one that built schools instead of only extracting resources, that established courts instead of only imposing order, and that, however imperfectly, prepared a people for self-governance rather than permanent subjugation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Therefore, my friends and countrymen, let us be honest with our history, complete in our accounting, and clear in our convictions. The American alliance is not a relic of colonial submission. It is the most consequential strategic partnership in Philippine history, and it deserves to be defended with the same vigor with which our forefathers defended our independence.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Long live the legacy of the Philippines and long live our alliance with America!</p><p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-case-for-gratitude-why-american-colonialism-served-the-philippines/">The Case for Gratitude: Why American Colonialism Served the Philippines</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>EXPLAINER: Why the Philippines Has No Second Amendment and Why It Matters in the Duterte Impeachment Trial</title>
		<link>https://www.marcialslaw.com/explainer-why-the-philippines-has-no-second-amendment-and-why-it-matters-in-the-duterte-impeachment-trial/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=explainer-why-the-philippines-has-no-second-amendment-and-why-it-matters-in-the-duterte-impeachment-trial</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marcial Bonifacio]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 02:37:02 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Philippine History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philippine Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Duterte Impeachment Trial]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SALN]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sara Duterte]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Second Amendment]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.marcialslaw.com/?p=2505</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Marcial Bonifacio 10/2/26 My friends and countrymen, on the 30th day of the impeachment trial of Vice President Sara Duterte last Monday, Police Major Joericson Sangalang of the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Office testified that 51 firearms were registered to Duterte and her husband, lawyer Manases Carpio. Several senator-judges questioned the relevance [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/explainer-why-the-philippines-has-no-second-amendment-and-why-it-matters-in-the-duterte-impeachment-trial/">EXPLAINER: Why the Philippines Has No Second Amendment and Why It Matters in the Duterte Impeachment Trial</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Marcial Bonifacio</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">10/2/26</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, on the 30th day of the impeachment trial of Vice President Sara Duterte last Monday, Police Major Joericson Sangalang of the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Office testified that 51 firearms were registered to Duterte and her husband, lawyer Manases Carpio. Several senator-judges questioned the relevance of this testimony. Senator Juan Miguel Zubiri, who described himself as a "pro-gun" legislator, emphasized that owning firearms in the Philippines is a privilege, not a constitutional right, unlike the right to bear arms under the United States Constitution. Zubiri's distinction between the Philippine privilege and the American constitutional right was more significant than it may have appeared in the moment, because it identified a constitutional difference that every Filipino citizen should understand. The framework that protects American gun owners simply does not exist in the Philippines. It has never existed. The history of Philippine law confirms this without ambiguity, and the Philippine Supreme Court has settled the question definitively.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In my commentary, "<a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-case-for-the-conviction-of-vice-president-sara-duterte/">The Case for the Conviction of Vice President Sara Duterte</a>," I examined the broader constitutional grounds for her conviction. The constitutional framework behind the firearms testimony, however, deserves its own examination.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Deliberate Omission of 1902</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When the United States Congress enacted the Philippine Bill of 1902 to serve as the organic law of the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, it transplanted many provisions from the American Bill of Rights. It incorporated protections for speech, due process, and the free exercise of religion. It did not, however, include the Second Amendment. The omission was deliberate, not accidental.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The context was the Philippine-American War of 1899 to 1902 and its aftermath. The United States was governing a territory where armed resistance remained active, where private armies were common among provincial elites, and where the colonial administration's primary security concern was pacification and the establishment of civil order. Granting a constitutional right to bear arms to a population the United States had just fought a war to subdue would have been directly contrary to American colonial security interests. The colonial government needed to control the flow and possession of firearms, not constitutionally protect it. No congressional committee report from the 1902 deliberations has been identified that states the exclusion of the Second Amendment in explicit terms. The historical circumstances, however, leave little room for an alternative explanation. A colonial government engaged in active pacification of armed resistance does not constitutionally guarantee the right to bear arms to the population it is pacifying.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>An Omission That Carried Through Every Constitution</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The exclusion established in 1902 was never reversed. The 1935 Commonwealth Constitution, drafted under American supervision and ratified by the Filipino people, did not include a right to bear arms. The 1973 Constitution, enacted during the Marcos era, did not include it. The 1987 Constitution, drafted in the aftermath of the People Power Revolution and ratified as the supreme law of the restored republic, did not include it either. Across four constitutions spanning more than a century, no Philippine constitutional convention and no Philippine legislature has ever elevated firearms ownership from a regulated privilege to a constitutional right.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Supreme Court Has Settled the Question</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Philippine Supreme Court has confirmed this history in its jurisprudence. In the landmark case of <em>Chavez v. Romulo</em> (G.R. No. 157036, 2004), the Court stated: "Our Constitution contains no provision similar to the Second Amendment, as we aptly observed in the early case of <em>United States vs. Pomeroy</em>." In <em>Acosta v. Ochoa</em> (G.R. No. 211559), the Court ruled with equal clarity: "The history of our laws reveals that we Filipinos have never had such constitutional right. None of our Constitutions ever provided the right to bear arms." The Court further stated that "the right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Because the right is statutory rather than constitutional, the State may regulate gun ownership freely through its police power without facing constitutional challenge. The current governing statute is Republic Act No. 10591, the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act of 2013, which requires all firearms to be registered with the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office and imposes licensing requirements on every citizen who seeks to own one. This is a fundamental distinction that separates the Philippine legal framework from the American one.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Practical Consequence for the Impeachment Trial</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The distinction between a constitutional right and a statutory privilege is not academic. It has a direct consequence in the impeachment trial now before the Philippine Senate. Because firearms ownership in the Philippines is a privilege regulated entirely by statute, the government can require public officials to disclose every registered firearm in their Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth without any constitutional obstacle. The SALN obligation itself is grounded in two statutes: Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which instructs public officers to file a true and detailed SALN, and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which requires disclosure of personal property and acquisition cost, including "all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like." In the United States, a comparable disclosure requirement would enter contested constitutional territory, because the Second Amendment has been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court as protecting an individual right to keep and bear arms, and any regulation touching that right is subject to judicial scrutiny. The Philippine legal framework presents no such barrier.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is precisely why the prosecution could present the testimony of Police Major Joericson Sangalang regarding the 51 firearms registered to Vice President Duterte and her husband as evidence of SALN non-compliance. Sangalang testified that 22 firearms were registered to Duterte and 29 to Carpio, with a combined market value of more than P7.2 million. House prosecutor Representative Terry Ridon stated that the firearms were not listed in the Vice President's SALN from 2007 to 2025, and that "on top of not declaring cash in bank and cash on hand in her SALN from 2019 to 2025, the Vice President also failed to declare these firearms." Private prosecutor Lorna Kapunan framed the testimony as evidence of a broader pattern: "Even though they say it is only P7 million, when you submit your SALN, you are certifying under oath that it is all that you own."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Senate received this testimony with significant skepticism. Senator Raffy Tulfo called the testimony "a waste of time." Presiding officer Francis Escudero noted that the P7.2 million in firearms would be "well within the SALN submitted of P88 million as of the latest," expressed doubts on the testimony's relevance, and pointed out that there is "no requirement for a firearm to be declared separately in the SALN." Senator Tito Sotto, who noted that he owns firearms and declares them in his SALN under "personal properties," echoed the same concern.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The legal dispute centers on whether existing SALN rules required individual firearms declaration at all. Prosecutor Bel Zamora cited Section 34 of the 2025 Omnibus Rules on the SALN, which requires the individual declaration of registered personal property, including motor vehicles, aircraft, and firearms. Defense counsel Carlo Narvasa, however, argued that the provision applies only to 2026 SALNs onwards and cannot be applied retroactively. CSC Resolution No. 1300173, issued in 2013, did not explicitly state that firearms should be specifically declared in one's SALN. House lead prosecutor Gerville Luistro acknowledged this gap but pressed the point: "If it was not particularly declared as firearms, which item did they declare these personal properties in their SALN?"</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Whether or not the testimony carries the evidentiary weight the prosecution intends, the constitutional framework that permitted its presentation remains unchanged. That framework is precisely what made the prosecution's case legally possible in the Philippines, where an American prosecution on identical grounds would be far more complicated.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Constitutional Question Before the Senate</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, when we understand this constitutional history, the Duterte impeachment proceedings become clearer. We are not witnessing an overreach of government power. We are witnessing the application of a legal framework that has been in place since 1902, one that the Philippine people have reaffirmed through four constitutions and that the highest court of the land has upheld without reservation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Remember, my friends and countrymen, the framers of every Philippine constitution chose not to include a right to bear arms. That choice has consequences, and those consequences are now being tested in the impeachment court. The prosecution has presented documented evidence of 51 firearms registered to the Vice President and her husband. The defense has argued that existing SALN rules did not require their individual declaration. The senator-judges have expressed skepticism about the testimony's weight. These are questions of evidence and statutory interpretation that the Senate must resolve. The constitutional question, however, is settled. The government of the Philippines possesses the legal authority to require full disclosure of firearms from its public officials, and every Filipino citizen has the right and the obligation to understand why.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Long live the rule of law, and long live the Republic of the Philippines!</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p><p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/explainer-why-the-philippines-has-no-second-amendment-and-why-it-matters-in-the-duterte-impeachment-trial/">EXPLAINER: Why the Philippines Has No Second Amendment and Why It Matters in the Duterte Impeachment Trial</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>From 20 to 12.5: What Trump&#039;s Tariffs Actually Mean for Filipinos</title>
		<link>https://www.marcialslaw.com/from-20-to-12-5-what-trumps-tariffs-actually-mean-for-filipinos/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=from-20-to-12-5-what-trumps-tariffs-actually-mean-for-filipinos</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marcial Bonifacio]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 08:27:16 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[American Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philippine Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Phillippine Economic Policy]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.marcialslaw.com/?p=2492</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Marcial Bonifacio 9/23/26 My friends and countrymen, when United States President Donald Trump announced a 19 percent tariff on Philippine goods entering America on July 22, 2025, the reaction in much of the Philippine press was predictable: alarm and the swift conclusion that America had extracted a lopsided bargain from a smaller ally with [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/from-20-to-12-5-what-trumps-tariffs-actually-mean-for-filipinos/">From 20 to 12.5: What Trump's Tariffs Actually Mean for Filipinos</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Marcial Bonifacio</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">9/23/26</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, when United States President Donald Trump announced a 19 percent tariff on Philippine goods entering America on July 22, 2025, the reaction in much of the Philippine press was predictable: alarm and the swift conclusion that America had extracted a lopsided bargain from a smaller ally with no leverage to refuse it. The Philippine Daily Inquirer cited Nomura Global Markets Research estimating the tariff would shave 0.4 percentage point off Philippine GDP growth. Rappler noted that the one-point reduction from 20 to 19 percent "meant little to experts." That reaction is understandable. It is also, on the evidence, substantially wrong; the evidence deserves a hearing before the verdict is delivered. That evidence includes the fact that the Philippine tariff rate has already fallen from a threatened 20 percent to 12.5 percent, with a legislative pathway to 10, and that Philippine exporters now face a concrete 2.5-percentage-point disadvantage against Indonesian and Malaysian competitors that domestic action by the Philippine Congress can close.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What the Headline Does Not Tell You</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The 19 percent figure that dominated the news cycle is a rate applied to a fraction of Philippine exports, not to all of them. Joey Salceda, former chair of the House Committee on Ways and Means, former presidential economic adviser, and now head of the Institute for Risk and Strategic Studies, explained the arithmetic plainly at a briefing after the deal was announced: Trump's tariff threat was a threat on just 27 percent of Philippine goods, because 73 percent were already exempt in April when Philippine trade negotiators secured their inclusion in Annex II of Executive Order 14257, placing them under preferential tariff rates from existing trade agreements rather than the headline reciprocal rate. Electronics and semiconductors — the single largest category of Philippine exports to the United States, accounting for more than half of total Philippine export revenue according to the Philippine Statistics Authority — carried their own exemption. Agricultural exports worth over one billion dollars carried the same protection, including coconut oil, processed pineapples, desiccated coconuts, bananas, dried mangoes and mangosteens, frozen tuna fillets, and confectionery products, as confirmed by the Department of Trade and Industry.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Those protections expanded further still. On November 14, 2025, President Trump signed a second Executive Order expanding agricultural exemptions retroactively to November 13, with Trade Secretary Cristina Roque announcing that "the majority of our agricultural exports to the United States are now exempted from reciprocal tariffs." The Palace confirmed that more than $1 billion worth of agricultural products now enter America duty-free, accounting for nearly half of the Philippines' $14.5 billion in total exports to the United States. The direction of travel in this tariff story is not toward more burden on Filipino exporters. On the contrary, it is toward less.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Honesty requires noting that not every Filipino has felt the benefit. A December 2025 Nikkei Asia report found individual coconut farmers in Quezon province remaining downbeat, with farmer Ellizer Manza saying the exemptions would have little impact on smallholder livelihoods, and that domestic structural reform matters more than tariff relief. That critique is legitimate and separate from the tariff question; it is a structural argument about the Philippine agricultural economy, not a refutation of the exemptions themselves.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is worth stating plainly which Philippine industries faced the full headline rate without exemption under the original IEEPA regime, and still lack protection today. The University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies identified garments, tobacco, and footwear as among the most heavily affected, noting that approximately 31 percent of Philippine exports to the United States remain subject to the full headline rate, namely men's cotton trousers, leather shoes, knitted shirts, unprocessed tobacco, and cigarettes. Philippine trade officials have confirmed they are working to secure exemptions for garments, textiles, furniture, and automotive products in future rounds of negotiation. Workers in those industries were not protected by the exemption architecture under IEEPA, and they remain unprotected under the current Section 301 regime, though the rate they face has fallen from 19 percent to 12.5 percent. That fact deserves the same plainness as the exemptions themselves.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When those exemptions are counted against the headline rate, Salceda calculated the effective tariff rate on Philippine goods entering the United States at approximately 6.33 percent as of the July 22 deal, the second lowest rate in Asia, behind only oil-exempted Malaysia. That figure has likely fallen further since the November 14 Executive Order expanded agricultural exemptions to cover nearly half of all Philippine exports to the United States. To put that concretely: on every 56,000 pesos worth of Philippine goods shipped to the United States (approximately $1,000 at the 2025 exchange rate of roughly 56 pesos to the dollar), the effective tariff burden at 6.33 percent amounts to about 3,545 pesos rather than the 10,640 pesos the headline rate implies. That difference of more than 7,000 pesos per 56,000 pesos in exports stays in Filipino hands rather than the American treasury. The 19 percent figure that generated alarm is not the rate most Philippine exporters actually pay. It is the rate applied to the minority of Philippine goods not shielded by existing agreements and newly negotiated exemptions. This is not a small distinction. It is the difference between a damaging tariff regime and a manageable one.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Framing That Missed the Story</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Salceda was direct about the narrative problem. "This was never just a 20-to-19 tariff story," he said at the Saturday News Forum in Quezon City on July 26, 2025. "That framing is misleading. What the President did was avert a full 20 percent across-the-board tariff through early engagement and high-level negotiation." He also described the one-percentage-point reduction from 20 to 19 percent as "much ado about nothing," not because it was insignificant, but because the real story was in the exemptions secured quietly before and during President Marcos's July 22 White House visit, not in the headline rate that Trump announced for his domestic audience.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">"Trump always plays to his domestic audience," Salceda said. "Plenty of deals can be made with that knowledge." This is not a criticism of American bad faith. It is a description of how trade negotiations actually work: a public announcement calibrated for one audience, and a set of technical exemptions negotiated for another. Filipino readers who consumed only the public announcement received the version designed for Americans, not the version that determines what Philippine exporters actually owe.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The most credible Filipino policy critics deserve a direct hearing. Oikonomia Advisory economist Reinielle Matt Erece acknowledged the deal was "better than nothing" while noting that "the US has the upper hand in negotiations, having obtained zero tariffs in return." UnionBank chief economist Ruben Carlo Asuncion was more measured, observing that "the one-ppt [percentage point] reduction may seem modest" but that it "translates to tens of millions in annual savings for key sectors like electronics." Neither economist called the deal a betrayal. Both called it a starting point, which is precisely what Salceda, Romualdez, and Marcos himself have said it is.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Asymmetry That Needs Context</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The deal's most frequently cited inequity is its asymmetry: Philippine exports to the United States initially faced a 19 percent tariff (now 12.5 percent under Section 301), while American goods entering the Philippines face zero tariffs. Several commentators called this a colonial-era arrangement dressed in modern trade language, and the structural complaint deserves a fair hearing rather than dismissal. It is not an equal exchange on its face.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What that framing omits, however, is where the Philippines stood before this deal. The Generalized System of Preferences, which had granted many Philippine goods zero-tariff access to the American market, lapsed in December 2020 and was never renewed under the Biden administration. The Biden administration also explicitly ruled out a bilateral free trade agreement with the Philippines in April 2023, with U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai stating it was not on the negotiating table. The Philippines entered the Trump tariff environment without a bilateral FTA, without renewed GSP access, and facing a threatened 20 percent across-the-board tariff on the 27 percent of its goods not already protected by Annex II exemptions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Against that baseline, rather than against some imagined equal partnership that did not exist, the July 22 deal represents a net improvement, not a deterioration. The Board of Investments' Managing Head, Trade Undersecretary Ceferino Rodolfo, confirmed that the Trump administration's key officials, including U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, hold a "welcoming attitude" toward a bilateral FTA and sectoral agreement with the Philippines, a posture the Biden administration had explicitly refused to adopt. The Philippine Exporters Confederation noted that exemptions on coconuts, pineapples, bananas, and mangoes are "expected to improve demand, stabilize prices, and directly benefit exporters, farmers, and rural communities across the Philippines." PCCI President Consul Enunina V. Mangio was equally direct: "The exemptions will provide much-needed relief to exporters, help safeguard jobs, and strengthen the competitiveness of Philippine products in one of our most important markets." Executive Secretary Ralph G. Recto, speaking at a Senate hearing on November 18, was blunter still: "It's positive for us. I think President Trump realized that imposing tariffs on agriculture is inflationary, so he removed them. That's good for us."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Door the Deal Opens</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The most consequential argument in favor of this tariff arrangement is not what it contains today but what it may produce tomorrow. Salceda was unambiguous: "A Philippines-US free trade agreement is becoming increasingly possible. Being a net exporter to the US, we stand to benefit from such a deal." The Philippines exported $12.12 billion in goods to the United States in 2024, while the United States exported approximately $9.3 billion to the Philippines, meaning the Philippines runs a trade surplus with its largest export market. A full bilateral FTA, which would eliminate or substantially reduce the current 12.5 percent headline rate across all categories, would benefit the Philippines more than it would benefit the United States, precisely because the Philippines sells more to America than America sells to the Philippines. In practical terms, that means lower tariff costs for Philippine semiconductor workers, banana farmers, and coconut oil producers who depend on the American market. The headline rate, already reduced from 19 to 12.5 percent and cushioned further by exemptions, would fall to zero under a full agreement.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Biden administration refused to open that door. The current arrangement, for all its asymmetry, has cracked it. Salceda's reading of the one-percentage-point reduction from 20 to 19 percent was precisely this: not a meaningful concession in itself, but a goodwill signal that talks can continue and that a larger agreement is within reach. Philippine Ambassador to Washington Jose Manuel Romualdez confirmed in July 2025 that "there will still be more discussions ahead," and that the 19 percent rate was "a good deal for the moment" rather than a final settlement. If those discussions stall and no FTA materializes, the Philippines will still face a 12.5 percent headline rate on approximately 31 percent of its exports to the United States. That is a worse outcome than a full agreement, but still better than the threatened 20 percent across-the-board rate the Philippines faced before Marcos's July 22 White House visit, and still cushioned by the exemptions that protect electronics and the majority of agricultural exports.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What the Electronics Exemption Actually Protects</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Electronics account for approximately 53 percent of all Philippine export revenue, according to the Philippine Statistics Authority's 2024 trade report, with total earnings of $39.09 billion. Of that, $6.4 billion flowed to the United States. The Philippine electronics industry employs over 3 million workers across direct manufacturing and supporting industries, according to SEIPI, the Semiconductor and Electronics Industries in the Philippines Foundation — workers in Laguna, Cavite, Cebu, and across CALABARZON whose livelihoods depend on continued access to the American market. The electronics exemption under Annex II of Executive Order 14257 protected that access from the headline 19 percent rate. The Department of Economy, Planning, and Development estimated that the 19 percent tariff, with the electronics exemption in place, would reduce Philippine GDP by approximately 0.12 percent, or roughly $489.6 million, an impact the department described as limited to "the immediate term only" and likely to "turn positive over the medium term" as trade adjustments are made.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Philippine government's own economic planners, in other words, regard the tariff's GDP impact as modest and temporary, not structural or permanent. Nomura Global Markets Research estimated a larger 0.4 percentage point GDP impact in July, before the electronics exemption was fully confirmed and before the November 14 Executive Order expanded agricultural exemptions further, which accounts for the difference between the two figures.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What Changed in 2026: The Legal Ground Shifted, the Direction Did Not</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The tariff architecture described above no longer exists in the form it took in 2025. On February 20, 2026, the United States Supreme Court struck down all tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act in a 6-3 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts (<em>Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump</em>), holding that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs and that the power to do so is reserved to Congress under Article I of the Constitution. All IEEPA tariffs, including the 19 percent reciprocal tariff on the Philippines, terminated at 12:00 AM on February 24, 2026. The Palace confirmed that the majority of Philippine exports "already enjoyed zero tariff in the US even before this decision," a statement consistent with the exemption architecture this essay has documented.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A Filipino reader inclined to view this ruling as evidence that America imposed unlawful tariffs on Philippine goods for seven months should consider what the ruling actually demonstrates. The American judiciary overrode its own President's trade policy on constitutional grounds. No comparable institution exists in China, Russia, or any other major trading partner in the Pacific. The Supreme Court did not act on behalf of the Philippines; it acted on behalf of American importers who challenged the tariffs in court. The result, however, was the same: an American institution, operating under the rule of law, struck down the very tariffs that Philippine critics called exploitative. That is not the behavior of a predatory power. It is the behavior of a constitutional republic whose internal checks function even when they are politically inconvenient for the sitting President.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the same day the Supreme Court ruled, President Trump invoked Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose a temporary 10 percent global tariff on all trading partners, including the Philippines. Section 122 tariffs are capped at 150 days and require Congressional approval for extension. This was a stopgap, not a strategy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When the Section 122 tariffs expired on July 23, 2026, the Trump administration replaced them with permanent tariffs under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, citing the failure of 60 trading partners to prohibit or effectively enforce bans on the importation of goods produced with forced labor. The Philippines was placed in the higher tier at 12.5 percent rather than 10 percent, because the USTR determined that the Philippines lacks a specific statutory prohibition on forced labor imports. The Department of Foreign Affairs rejected this characterization, with spokesperson Analyn Ratonel stating that "the Philippines has long demonstrated that its locally produced goods, including those exported to the US, do not rely on forced labor." Ambassador Romualdez confirmed that negotiations continue: "We can still negotiate," he told Rappler on July 25, 2026.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It is important to understand what the forced labor finding is and what it is not. It is not an accusation that Filipino workers are enslaved or that Philippine-made goods are produced through coercion. It is a procedural determination that the Philippines lacks a specific statutory import ban on goods produced with forced labor elsewhere, particularly goods transshipped from countries with well-documented forced labor practices, including China and Myanmar. The distinction matters because the fix is legislative, not moral. Cambodia, India, Sri Lanka, Guatemala, Honduras, and Trinidad and Tobago each enacted forced labor import bans between June and July 2026 and were moved to the lower 10 percent tier as a result. These are not countries with stronger labor records than the Philippines; they are countries that passed a specific law faster than the Philippines did. Salceda has already responded by pushing House Bill legislation to enact a comparable Philippine prohibition. "Of course, we want to protect Philippine exporters, Filipino jobs, and our competitiveness in the U.S. market," he said. "A 12.5-percent additional tariff has real consequences for our industries." The legislation, if passed, would give the Philippines a clear basis to request reclassification to the 10 percent tier, reducing the headline rate by a further 2.5 percentage points through a one-paragraph domestic statute rather than through negotiation with Washington. The forced labor characterization is a problem the Philippine Congress can solve on its own, and Salceda is already telling them to solve it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The executive branch has not waited for Congress. On August 6, 2026, Palace press officer Claire Castro confirmed that the DTI, DOLE, and DOF have issued a Joint Administrative Order establishing a mechanism for investigating and blocking goods produced with forced labor, and that the government's explicit target is to bring the Philippine rate from 12.5 to 10 percent. "We have many laws proving that forced labor is prohibited," Castro said. "There are penalties for employers who are caught imposing forced labor."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The urgency is not abstract. Indonesia and Malaysia both received the 10 percent rate, as confirmed by the Dateline Philippines on August 8, 2026, leaving Philippine goods at a 2.5-percentage-point disadvantage against direct ASEAN competitors for the same American buyers. Every month the Philippines remains in the higher tier is a month its garment, footwear, and tobacco exporters lose ground to neighbors who moved faster.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Philexport President Sergio Ortiz-Luis Jr. was more cautious, noting that with exemptions under the new regime still unclear, Philippine exporters are "likely to hold back on production and defer orders until there is greater clarity." That caution is warranted, and exporters waiting for clarity have every reason to be careful. As of September 18, 2026, DTI Undersecretary Gepty confirmed to Context.ph that the Philippines is pursuing the tariff reduction on a bilateral track with Washington, separate from broader ASEAN-US discussions, and that negotiations remain active. Three facts, however, deserve equal weight. First, the headline rate the Philippines now faces is 12.5 percent, not 19 percent; the direction of travel since the July 2025 deal has been downward, not upward. Second, electronics, semiconductors, computers, tropical agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and critical minerals are among approximately 2,120 product-level exemptions under Part A of the Section 301 regime, meaning the exemptions that shielded the Philippines' most important export categories under IEEPA have substantially survived the legal transition under a different statutory authority. Third, the path from 12.5 percent to 10 percent is explicitly open through domestic legislation that is already before the Philippine House of Representatives. A headline rate that started at a threatened 20 percent, was negotiated to 19, was struck down entirely by the Supreme Court, was temporarily replaced at 10 percent, and now stands at 12.5 percent with a legislative pathway to 10, is not the trajectory of a nation being exploited. It is the trajectory of a negotiation still in progress, between allies who have every reason to keep talking.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Verdict</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, the case against the tariff arrangement that began this story rested on the headline figure of 19 percent. That figure no longer applies. The current headline rate is 12.5 percent under Section 301, with electronics, semiconductors, tropical agriculture, and over two thousand additional product categories exempted. The case for a measured assessment rests on the effective rate of 6.33 percent as of the July 2025 deal (a figure that has since fallen further), the survival of the exemption architecture through a Supreme Court ruling and two changes of legal authority, the opening of a path toward a full bilateral FTA that the previous American administration refused to walk, a clear legislative pathway from 12.5 percent to 10 percent through domestic action, and the Philippine government's own finding that the GDP impact is small and short-term. None of this means the arrangement is ideal. The Philippine government itself disputes the forced labor characterization, and the 12.5 percent rate remains higher than the near-zero access the Philippines enjoyed under GSP before 2020. Further negotiation is both necessary and possible. Philippine and American negotiators owe that effort most urgently to the garment, footwear, and tobacco workers whose industries remain subject to the full headline rate, and most visibly to the more than 3 million electronics workers whose access to the American market this deal has already shielded.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A commentator who tells you only that America has imposed tariffs on Philippine goods, without naming the exemptions, the effective rate, the downward trajectory from 20 to 19 to 12.5 percent, and the legislative pathway to 10, is telling you the version designed for an American domestic audience. The version designed for an informed Filipino reader includes all of it. It includes the words of Joey Salceda, who concluded in July 2025 that the finer details of the Marcos-Trump negotiation "will benefit the Philippines in the long run," and who responded to the 2026 developments not with retreat but with legislation to bring the Philippines into the lower tariff tier. That is not the conclusion of a man who was deceived, nor of a man who was uncritical; it is the conclusion of a man who called the headline reduction "much ado about nothing" and still read the fine print and found the deal worth taking, a conclusion, moreover, that Roque, Recto, Mangio, and Romualdez have each reached independently from their own vantage points.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For those who wish to act rather than wait, the path is clear: Philippine exporters should verify whether their specific products fall under the Part A exemptions of the Section 301 regime. Filipino citizens should urge their Congressional representatives to pass Salceda's forced labor import ban legislation, which is the single fastest route from 12.5 to 10 percent. Philippine trade associations should continue engaging with the DTI's bilateral submissions to Washington. The tariff story is not over. It is being written, and Filipinos who read the fine print can help write the next chapter.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Long live the prosperity of the Philippines, and long live our alliance with America!</p><p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/from-20-to-12-5-what-trumps-tariffs-actually-mean-for-filipinos/">From 20 to 12.5: What Trump's Tariffs Actually Mean for Filipinos</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>The Empty Chairs That Nearly Acquitted Sara Duterte</title>
		<link>https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-empty-chairs-that-could-acquit-sara-duterte/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-empty-chairs-that-could-acquit-sara-duterte</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marcial Bonifacio]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 09:35:21 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Philippine History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philippine Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Duterte Impeachment Trial]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sara Duterte]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.marcialslaw.com/?p=2485</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Marcial Bonifacio 9/17/26 Updated: 9/30/26 My friends and countrymen, on September 23, 2026, the Senate impeachment court voted thirteen to one to lower the conviction threshold in the trial of Vice President Sara Duterte. The fixed requirement of sixteen votes, which Presiding Officer Francis Escudero had established on the opening day of trial, was [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-empty-chairs-that-could-acquit-sara-duterte/">The Empty Chairs That Nearly Acquitted Sara Duterte</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Marcial Bonifacio</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">9/17/26</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Updated:</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">9/30/26</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, on September 23, 2026, the Senate impeachment court voted thirteen to one to lower the conviction threshold in the trial of Vice President Sara Duterte. The fixed requirement of sixteen votes, which Presiding Officer Francis Escudero had established on the opening day of trial, was overturned. The court ruled that the two-thirds requirement for conviction applies only to those senator-judges who are legally qualified to participate in the proceedings, not to the full twenty-four seats of the chamber. That vote followed a week of deliberation in which four retired Supreme Court justices appeared before the court as <em>amici curiae</em>, or "friends of the court," to advise on the constitutional question. This essay explains why the Senate ruled correctly, what constitutional principles compelled that result, and why every Filipino voter should understand what was at stake. I have written separately about the substantive case against the Vice President in <em><a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-case-for-the-conviction-of-vice-president-sara-duterte/">The Case for the Conviction of Vice President Sara Duterte</a></em>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Two Interpretations</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Two interpretations of the Constitution are now before the Senate impeachment court, and the distinction between them rests on a question as old as legal reasoning itself: Does one follow the literal words of the law, or the reason behind them? The first is the literal or fixed interpretation, grounded in the principle of <em>verba legis</em>, which holds that when the text of the law is clear, it must be applied as written without interpretation. Article XI, Section 3(6) requires the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the Senate, and "all the members" means the full twenty-four seats regardless of who occupies them, who is present, or who is legally capable of participating. Under this reading, sixteen votes are required for conviction under all circumstances. The second is the contextual or functional interpretation, grounded in the principle of <em>ratio legis est anima</em>, which holds that the reason of the law is its soul. The phrase "two-thirds of all the members" must be read alongside other constitutional provisions and practical realities, and the denominator must reflect the number of senators who are qualified and able to discharge their duties as judges, not the number of seats that nominally exist. Under this reading, the threshold adjusts to reflect the actual composition of the court. The question is whether the Senate impeachment court will follow the dead letter or the living purpose of the Constitution.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The American Precedent</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Filipino voters who find this debate unfamiliar should consider how our own Constitution was modeled. Article I, Section 3 of the United States Constitution provides that "no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present." The critical word is "present." The American framers understood that a conviction threshold must account for the real composition of the body sitting in judgment, not an abstract number on a roster. The Philippine Constitution of 1987 uses the phrase "all the Members of the Senate" rather than "Members present," and it is precisely this difference in language that has produced the current dispute. However, three former chief justices of our Supreme Court have now concluded that the Philippine phrase, properly interpreted, does not require the rigid result that its critics claim. Indeed, Davide, who helped write the 1987 provision, testified that the Philippine framers intended the same functional result that the American framers achieved with the word "present": a senator who cannot participate in the trial cannot be counted toward the threshold for conviction.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What the Framers Said</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Former Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr., a framer of the 1987 Constitution, submitted a memorandum stating that the basis of computing the two-thirds must be the number of senators who are qualified to vote, "not the 24 in the present Senate." Davide specified that the framers of the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions could never have intended to include in the phrase "all the Members of the Senate" those who are outside the jurisdiction of the Philippines, whose whereabouts are unknown, who are in hiding to avoid arrest, or who suffer from legal impediments or restraints that render them incapable of exercising their duties. Davide's position is not without precedent in Philippine jurisprudence. In <em>Avelino v. Cuenco</em> (83 Phil. 17, 1949), the Supreme Court treated the Senate's effective membership as twenty-three instead of twenty-four because Senator Tomas Confesor was in the United States and beyond the Senate's ability to compel attendance, and Senator Vicente Sotto was confined on medical leave. The Court ruled that twelve senators constituted a valid majority of twenty-three. Although Davide himself noted that the Avelino case is "not directly applicable in impeachment cases" because it concerned quorum for ordinary legislative business, he concluded that by analogy it provides guiding light for the present question. The principle is the same: a senator who cannot be compelled to participate cannot be counted as though he had participated.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Christian Monsod, a fellow member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission who chaired the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers that drafted the impeachment provisions of the 1987 Charter, confirmed the Senate's ruling in interviews with One News and dzBB radio on September 23 through 25. As Monsod stated plainly, "The denominator can be changed." Referring to Senators Estrada and Marcoleta, Monsod said, "They are only senators in name and not in substance." He further noted that Republic Act 7080, the Anti-Plunder Act, explicitly mandates that government officials charged with plunder shall be suspended from exercising the functions of their office, and that a fugitive from justice should likewise be excluded from the denominator "because once he is arrested, he is already prevented from exercising his power." When asked about Senator Alan Peter Cayetano's argument that the threshold should remain fixed at sixteen, Monsod replied: "He's wrong." Of Senator Camille Villar's emotional defense of her detained colleagues, Monsod said: "She does not understand the law." Monsod also affirmed that the framers did not anticipate the present situation, in which multiple senator-judges would be simultaneously incapacitated by detention, flight from justice, or prolonged medical absence. The failure to anticipate such a scenario does not mean the Constitution prohibits the Senate from addressing it. It means the Senate must exercise the interpretive authority that the Constitution grants it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Rene Sarmiento, another member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated in interviews with DZMM on September 11 and Bilyonaryo News Channel on September 16 that the framers built the impeachment court on the assumption that every senator seated as a judge would be, in his words, "present, active, functioning and participative." The drafters, Sarmiento acknowledged, "simply never pictured senator-judges who might be behind bars or evading arrest." That gap between the framers' assumption and the present reality is the origin of the dispute. Sarmiento's conclusion was direct: "Those beyond the coercive powers of the state, they should be excluded in the voting." He cited the American impeachment proceedings, in which only senators present at the trial cast the vote, and referenced <em>Avelino v. Cuenco</em> as a persuasive guide. Sarmiento also clarified where the authority to resolve the question resides, stating that the threshold is not for the presiding officer alone to determine: "It's not the presiding officer, who's Senator Escudero." It is for the Senate impeachment court as a whole.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What the Former Chief Justices Said</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno rejected a standalone literal reading of Article XI, Section 3(6). He observed that if the framers had intended a fixed number, they would have written "sixteen" rather than employing a fraction. As Puno stated, "By using two-thirds, the number of votes to convict will have to move depending on certain factors," including which senators are legally and physically capable of participating. Puno further cautioned that wrongfully excluding a senator-judge from participating could expose the entire proceeding and any eventual verdict to Supreme Court review and possible nullification. This caution deserves honest acknowledgment, for it cuts in both directions. If the Senate wrongfully excludes a senator-judge who should have been counted, a conviction could be voided. If the Senate wrongfully includes a senator-judge who should have been excluded, an acquittal could be challenged on the same grounds. The solution is not to avoid the question but to answer it correctly, which is precisely why Puno advocated for what he called a "contextual and functional interpretation of the Constitution" rather than a mechanical recitation of the number twenty-four.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban described the impeachment trial as <em>sui generis</em>, a Latin term meaning "of its own kind," possessing both legal and political character. He questioned whether it would be fair to allow senators who are traveling abroad or hiding "in the dark corners of the world" to participate in the final vote when others have spent their time hearing arguments and examining evidence. He urged senators who have failed to actively participate to consider inhibiting themselves from the proceedings. Panganiban also stressed that the threshold question is not for the Supreme Court to decide. It is for the Senate itself, as the sole judge of impeachment cases, to resolve. That distinction matters. The Senate is not waiting for permission. It is exercising a power that the Constitution exclusively confers upon it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Retired Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, though not among the four amici curiae who appeared on September 16, has independently and consistently argued the same position since before the trial began. Carpio maintained that the phrase "all members of the Senate" refers only to those who remain qualified to perform the functions of a senator, and he applied that principle to three specific cases: Senators Rodante Marcoleta and Jinggoy Estrada, both detained on separate plunder charges, and Senator Ronald dela Rosa, who never took the oath as a senator-judge. As Carpio stated plainly, "If you cannot hold office, you cannot vote." Under his computation, only twenty-one senators are presently qualified to be counted, which would reduce the two-thirds threshold to fourteen votes. The arithmetic is not arbitrary. It follows directly from the constitutional principle that membership requires the capacity to serve. Hence, the constitutional standard of two-thirds does not change. The fraction remains identical. Only the number of qualified members to whom the fraction applies changes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Lone Dissent</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The lone dissenter among the amici curiae was retired Associate Justice Adolfo Azcuna, who served as vice chair of the same Committee on Accountability of Public Officers that Monsod chaired. Azcuna insisted that "all means all" and that the constitutionally mandated two-thirds vote must be computed on the basis of all twenty-four senators without exception. He argued that a threshold must be fixed and determinable from the start, not subject to adjustment depending on how many senators are present on any given day. Azcuna illustrated the concern with arithmetic: if only twenty senators were counted, two-thirds would amount to roughly thirteen or fourteen votes, substantially below sixteen. He concluded that such a reduction would undermine the very nature of a supermajority requirement. Presiding Officer Francis Escudero, in his July 6 ruling, adopted the same position, citing the Supreme Court's ruling in <em>Bayan v. Zamora</em> (2000), which held that despite only twenty-three incumbent senators at the time, the constitutional requirement still meant at least sixteen affirmative votes. However, <em>Bayan v. Zamora</em> concerned a vacant seat, not senators who are detained, in hiding, or legally incapacitated. A vacancy means no occupant exists. The present situation is fundamentally different: the occupants exist but cannot serve, which is the precise category that Davide, Puno, and Panganiban addressed in their opinions. It should also be noted that during the impeachment trial of President Joseph Estrada in 2000, there were only twenty-two sitting senators, and confusion arose among lawmakers over whether fifteen or sixteen votes were needed for conviction. Davide himself served as presiding officer of that trial, which ended not in a conviction vote but in a walkout by the prosecution and mass public protest that forced Estrada from office. The threshold question was never formally answered. It has been deferred, not resolved.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defense has also invoked the 2012 impeachment trial of former Chief Justice Renato Corona. At the time of the Corona trial, only twenty-three senators sat because one seat was vacant after Benigno Aquino III won the presidency. The Senate applied the sixteen-vote threshold despite having only twenty-three members, and Corona was convicted twenty to three. Defense counsel Michael Poa cited this precedent to argue that the Senate has never lowered the threshold, even with fewer than twenty-four members. The argument fails on the same distinction. In 2012, the twenty-fourth seat was vacant. No occupant existed, and no senator was being counted in the denominator while simultaneously being unable to serve. The Corona precedent, properly understood, supports the contextual interpretation rather than the textual one. The Senate kept the threshold at sixteen in 2012 because all twenty-three sitting senators were qualified to participate. Had any of them been detained or in hiding, the question now before the court would have arisen then.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Why the Fixed Threshold Fails</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Justice Azcuna's position, while internally consistent, does not withstand scrutiny against the realities of the present Senate. Several senator-judges cannot regularly attend the proceedings: Senators Jinggoy Estrada and Rodante Marcoleta are detained on separate plunder charges, Senator Ronald dela Rosa has evaded public life amid an active International Criminal Court arrest warrant and never took the oath as a senator-judge, and Senator Loren Legarda is on extended medical leave abroad with no confirmed date of return. To count those absent or legally incapacitated senators in the denominator is to grant them a de facto vote against conviction without their ever hearing a single witness, examining a single document, or deliberating upon a single article of impeachment. The Constitution does not confer that power upon an empty chair. A fixed threshold of sixteen under such circumstances does not protect the integrity of the supermajority requirement. Quite to the contrary, it weaponizes absenteeism. Any faction seeking to shield an impeached official from conviction need only ensure that enough allied senators remain absent, detained, or beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate to make sixteen votes arithmetically impossible. The events of September 23 confirmed this danger in practice: six senator-judges from the minority bloc refused to cast a vote on the threshold question itself, and four others have been absent from the trial for months, meaning that ten of twenty-four senators have now declined or been unable to exercise their constitutional function as judges in this proceeding. That is not constitutional governance. That is constitutional sabotage.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Defense Responds</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Vice President Duterte's spokesperson, Salvador Paolo Panelo Jr., warned that lowering the sixteen-vote threshold could invite the sitting government to target senators expected to vote against its preferred outcome. This argument sounds reasonable in the abstract but collapses upon contact with the facts. The question before the impeachment court is not whether the government may target senators. The question is whether senators who are unable or unwilling to perform their constitutional duty as judges should nevertheless be counted as though they had performed it. If Panelo's concern is political interference, the remedy is to protect each senator-judge's independence, not to count non-participating senators in the denominator so that conviction becomes structurally impossible.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Defense counsel Michael Poa, in his oral arguments on September 23, raised a broader constitutional objection: lowering the denominator in the impeachment threshold would carry consequences for other constitutional provisions that also require a two-thirds Senate vote, including the extension or revocation of martial law, the expulsion of a senator, and the amendment of the Constitution itself. The concern is legitimate in principle. In practice, the impeachment court addressed it directly. Presiding Officer Escudero ruled that the court's decision applies <em>pro hac vice</em>, meaning only to this impeachment proceeding, and will not bind future impeachment courts or other Senate functions. The threshold was adjusted for this trial because the specific conditions of this trial, detained, absent, and fugitive senator-judges, required it. That is not a precedent that rewrites the Constitution. It is a ruling that applies the Constitution to the facts before the court.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Senator Imee Marcos, one of the six senator-judges who refused to vote on the threshold question, stated the opposition's constitutional argument in its most forceful form: "Dapat natin bilangin ang mga boto ayon sa Saligang Batas, hindi natin dapat baguhin ang Saligang Batas ayon sa mga boto. Kabuktutan ito, kabaligtaran." The translation: "We should count the votes according to the Constitution, not change the Constitution according to the votes. This is corruption, this is inversion." The accusation is serious, and it deserves a direct answer. The contextual interpretation does not change the Constitution. It does not alter the two-thirds requirement. It corrects the denominator to which that requirement applies, based not on legislative amendment but on the factual reality that certain senators cannot discharge their constitutional function. Thus, the Constitution was not rewritten on September 23; the denominator was simply corrected.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">House Prosecutor Representative Chel Diokno, in his oral arguments before the Senate impeachment court on September 23, 2026, stated the consequence plainly: a fixed denominator of twenty-four, applied to a Senate in which four members cannot participate, would amount to "an acquittal by default." As Diokno told the court, "Yes, the Constitution deliberately makes conviction harder by imposing the two-thirds requirement. But making it harder is not the same as making it depend on senators who are not judges, or who are incapable of acting as judges." Diokno further dismantled the premise that adjusting the denominator favors the prosecution. Excluding non-participating senators from the computation reduces the number of votes required on both sides. The threshold for conviction decreases, but so does the threshold for acquittal. The fraction remains two-thirds. The constitutional standard does not change. What changes is the number of qualified members to whom the standard applies. As Diokno stated, "The articles do not change. The burden, imposed upon the prosecution, does not change. In the same breath, the responsibility of this Court to render independent judgment remains the same. Whatever the Court decides, the prosecution will respect that decision. Because ultimately, two-thirds remains two-thirds."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Former Senator and delegate of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Richard Gordon has articulated a position that exposes the deeper problem with the defense's posture. As Gordon himself declared, "Hindi itinatakda ng Konstitusyon ang 16 na boto para sa paghatol sa impeachment," which translates to: the Constitution does not fix sixteen votes for conviction in impeachment. Gordon has also described Vice President Duterte as an official who behaves as though she is owed her standing in public life, yet the impeachment clause exists precisely to hold powerful officials to account. A conviction threshold that becomes unreachable due to the voluntary or involuntary absence of allied senators does not preserve the constitutional order. On the contrary, it dismantles it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The contextual interpretation is the correct one, for four reasons. First, it reflects the stated intent of the framers of the Constitution themselves. Four members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission have spoken publicly on this question: Davide, Monsod, Sarmiento, and Azcuna. Of the three who support the contextual interpretation, Davide authored the memorandum, Monsod chaired the committee that produced the impeachment clause, and Sarmiento acknowledged the gap between the framers' assumptions and the present reality and reached the same conclusion. Azcuna alone dissented. Davide did not speculate about what the framers might have intended. He told the Senate what they indubitably intended, because he was among those who wrote the provision. Monsod confirmed it. Sarmiento corroborated it. Second, it prevents the absurdity that Panganiban identified. If five senators were to die and three were to resign, leaving only sixteen members, the literal interpretation would require all sixteen remaining senators to vote for conviction, a unanimity requirement that no constitution in the world imposes for impeachment. Third, it prevents the manipulation that Puno warned against. A wrongful exclusion or a wrongful inclusion of a senator-judge in the count could expose the entire proceeding to Supreme Court nullification. The contextual interpretation, applied honestly, addresses that risk by requiring the Senate to determine the composition of its court based on legal qualification rather than political convenience. Fourth, it produces a concrete and defensible result when applied to the present Senate. Carpio has done the arithmetic, and it holds. That is not a weakening of the supermajority requirement. Indeed, it is the honest application of the supermajority requirement to the Senate as it actually exists.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Senate impeachment court is not a legislature counting heads for a quorum. It is a constitutional tribunal sitting in judgment of the second highest official of the Republic. Its members must have heard the evidence, examined the witnesses, and deliberated upon the articles before casting their votes. To count senators who have done none of those things in the denominator is to make a mockery of the trial itself.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Senate Votes</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On September 23, 2026, the twenty-ninth day of trial, the Senate impeachment court voted on the question. Thirteen senator-judges voted to overturn Presiding Officer Escudero's July 6 ruling and to set the conviction threshold at two-thirds of those who are legally qualified to participate in the proceedings. Escudero cast the lone dissenting vote. Six senator-judges refused to vote at all: Senate Minority Leader Alan Peter Cayetano, Pia Cayetano, Imee Marcos, Bong Go, Camille Villar, and Robinhood Padilla. Before the threshold vote itself, the court had rejected Cayetano's motion to defer the issue and refer it to the Supreme Court, by the same margin of thirteen to six. Cayetano warned that changing the denominator could produce the equivalent of a "mistrial." The court was not persuaded.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Escudero's response to the vote deserves to be recorded in full, because it is the statement of an officer who disagrees with a ruling and nevertheless submits to the authority of the body he serves: "For the record, while the chair takes exception to this decision, the chair nonetheless accepts it as a judgment of this court and is bound to give it effect." That is the conduct of a presiding officer who understands that the sole power to try and decide impeachment cases belongs to the Senate as a whole, not to the chair alone.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The defense has indicated that an appeal to the Supreme Court remains a possibility. Diokno has responded that such a challenge would not be justiciable until after the Senate renders an actual verdict. Until then, the impeachment court's ruling stands.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, the Senate has answered the constitutional question that has hung over this trial since its opening day. It has determined, by an overwhelming margin, that a senator who cannot serve as a judge cannot be counted as though he had. The empty chairs will not cast votes. The three constitutional framers, three former chief justices, and Justice Carpio showed the way, and thirteen senator-judges followed. What remains is the trial itself, the evidence, the deliberation, and the verdict. We, the citizens who entrusted our sovereignty to these institutions, must now hold every senator-judge accountable not merely for the threshold vote that has passed, but for the conviction vote that is yet to come.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Long live the rule of law, and long live the Republic of the Philippines!</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p><p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-empty-chairs-that-could-acquit-sara-duterte/">The Empty Chairs That Nearly Acquitted Sara Duterte</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>EXPLAINER: How Many Votes to Convict Sara Duterte? The Constitutional Arithmetic the Senate Must Now Resolve</title>
		<link>https://www.marcialslaw.com/explainer-how-many-votes-to-convict-sara-duterte-the-constitutional-arithmetic-the-senate-must-now-resolve/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=explainer-how-many-votes-to-convict-sara-duterte-the-constitutional-arithmetic-the-senate-must-now-resolve</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marcial Bonifacio]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 04:42:49 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.marcialslaw.com/?p=2481</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Marcial Bonifacio 9/16/26 My friends and countrymen, the impeachment trial of Vice President Sara Duterte has been underway since July 6, 2026, and before a single article of impeachment has been decided on its merits, the Senate impeachment court has been forced to confront a question that may determine the outcome of the entire [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/explainer-how-many-votes-to-convict-sara-duterte-the-constitutional-arithmetic-the-senate-must-now-resolve/">EXPLAINER: How Many Votes to Convict Sara Duterte? The Constitutional Arithmetic the Senate Must Now Resolve</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Marcial Bonifacio</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">9/16/26</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, the impeachment trial of Vice President Sara Duterte has been underway since July 6, 2026, and before a single article of impeachment has been decided on its merits, the Senate impeachment court has been forced to confront a question that may determine the outcome of the entire proceeding: how many senator-judges must vote "guilty" in order to convict?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The answer appears straightforward. Article XI, Section 3, Paragraph 6 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states that no person shall be convicted "without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." The Senate is composed of 24 members. Two-thirds of 24 is 16. On the opening day of the trial, Presiding Officer Senator Francis Escudero ruled accordingly: 16 votes are required for conviction, and no senator-judge challenged or appealed that ruling at the time.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The matter did not remain settled for long. As the trial progressed, four senator-judges became unable or unwilling to participate. Senator Jinggoy Estrada was arrested and detained on plunder charges. Senator Rodante Marcoleta was likewise arrested on separate plunder charges. Senator Ronald "Bato" dela Rosa has been in hiding since May, evading an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court for his alleged role in former President Rodrigo Duterte's drug war. Senator Loren Legarda has been absent on medical leave since August 3, with the Office of the Ombudsman announcing a preliminary investigation against her for graft and plunder over alleged anomalous solar projects.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">With four of 24 senator-judges effectively absent, the question became unavoidable: should the conviction threshold remain at 16, or should it be recalculated to reflect only those senators who are legally qualified and physically able to participate?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On September 8, 2026, Senator Erwin Tulfo formally appealed Escudero's July 6 ruling, asking the impeachment court to revisit the threshold. Tulfo maintained that his appeal was not intended to lower the bar for conviction, but to clarify whether senators who cannot participate should continue to be counted among "all the Members of the Senate" as the Constitution uses that phrase.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The impeachment court has invited four retired Supreme Court justices as amici curiae, or "friends of the court," to advise on the matter. Three of them are scheduled to appear physically before the court on September 16: retired Chief Justices Artemio Panganiban and Reynato Puno, and retired Associate Justice Adolfo Azcuna. Retired Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr., who presided over the impeachment trial of former President Joseph Estrada in 2000, will submit a legal memorandum rather than appearing in person. Notably, both Davide and Azcuna were framers of the 1987 Constitution. The prosecution and defense will present oral arguments on September 23, after which the senator-judges are expected to vote.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What follows is a presentation of the competing positions, sourced from the officials and legal authorities who have stated them publicly.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Those Who Argue the Threshold Must Remain at 16</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The textualist position holds that the Constitution means precisely what it says. "All the Members of the Senate" refers to the total composition of the chamber, which is 24. Two-thirds of 24 is 16. The threshold does not move.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Presiding Officer Francis Escudero established this reading on July 6, 2026, when he ruled that conviction requires at least 16 affirmative votes based on a literal interpretation of the constitutional provision. He has since invited the amici curiae to weigh in, but his original ruling stands unless overturned by the senator-judges.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Senator Alan Peter Cayetano affirmed the 16-vote requirement on July 7, stating that the court had effectively settled the matter when no senator-judge objected on the first day. Cayetano further argued that senators who are unable to vote would effectively be counted in favor of acquittal, a consequence he suggested might be more favorable to the defense than a reduced threshold.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Acting Senate President Win Gatchalian declared on June 10 that the threshold would remain at 16 "regardless of how many senators attend the trial, which bloc controls the chamber, or who presides over the impeachment court."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Vice President's camp has publicly agreed with Escudero's ruling, maintaining that the two-thirds requirement refers to the total number of seats in the chamber.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Representative Paolo Duterte, the Vice President's brother, argued on social media that 10 votes cannot amend a constitutional requirement, writing that a bare majority tally "has no bearing on the Constitution."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Senator Pia Cayetano cautioned against treating selective interpretations of Supreme Court decisions as though they were established jurisprudence or Senate rules.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Senator Robin Padilla insisted that constitutional provisions cannot be altered arbitrarily and must undergo standard amendment procedures through proper legislative committees.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Impeachment court spokesman Reginald Tongol, in a separate statement from his procedural clarifications, warned that lowering the constitutionally cited 16-vote requirement would set a "dangerous precedent" and that the court "cannot bend established legal standards for the convenience of any party."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Those Who Argue the Threshold May Be Adjusted</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The functional position holds that "all the Members of the Senate" should be understood to mean all members who are legally qualified to exercise the functions of a senator, not those who have been removed from participation by suspension, detention, or flight from the law. Under this reading, the two-thirds calculation changes when the number of qualified members changes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonio Carpio has been the most prominent voice for this position. Carpio's view evolved over the course of the proceedings. In April 2026, he stated that conviction requires 16 affirmative votes regardless of absences, and that senators who do not participate effectively count against conviction because the threshold is fixed. By June 2026, Carpio revised his position, arguing that the threshold is not fixed and will depend on the total number of active senators when the court convenes, because the constitutional computation should include only those legally qualified to participate. Specifically, Carpio argued that suspended Senator Jinggoy Estrada should be excluded from the count, citing Supreme Court rulings and provisions of the Plunder Law. He also maintained that only senators who took their oath should sit as judges, which he said would not include Senator Ronald dela Rosa, who has not resurfaced since slipping out of custody in May 2026.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Retired Associate Justice Adolfo Azcuna, who was one of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, raised a separate basis for reducing the count. Azcuna suggested that dela Rosa could be excluded from the computation if judged a fugitive, arguing that being a fugitive amounts to what he called "constructive resignation." In his words: "Being a fugitive entails running away from the legal system. If one runs away from the legal system, he relinquishes all membership in that system." Under this reasoning, the conviction threshold could drop to 15.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Retired Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban wrote in his Philippine Daily Inquirer column that Escudero's 16-vote ruling is "not set in stone." He described the ruling as "merely interlocutory," meaning the impeachment court can reverse or modify it at the proper time. Panganiban added that such reversal or modification "requires only a simple majority, not two-thirds."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">University of the Philippines College of Law Associate Dean and constitutional law professor Paolo Tamase initially held the traditional view, stating in June 2026 that "all the members" requires an absolute two-thirds majority and that conviction remains possible as long as at least 16 senators are available. He subsequently told Rappler that he found Carpio's argument persuasive, noting that the conventional reading "opens the possibility to some Senate functions being incapable of being fulfilled" if the number of functional members drops below the thresholds the Constitution requires. Tamase acknowledged these are "unprecedented times" and concluded that the emerging view "seems persuasive if we intend a functional Senate and functional constitutional processes."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Former Integrated Bar of the Philippines president Domingo Cayosa argued that lowering the threshold to match the number of participating senator-judges would be the "fair and practical" reading of the 1987 Constitution, consistent with its spirit of keeping institutions operative and effective.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lead Public Prosecutor Representative Gerville Luistro was among the first officials to express support for potentially reducing the required votes to between 14 and 15.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Procedural Mechanics</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Impeachment court spokesman Tongol clarified on September 13 that the court will need 11 votes from the active roster of 20 senator-judges to overturn Escudero's ruling. This corrected his earlier statement that only 10 votes were needed, an error that was carried in national headlines. The correction accounts for the fact that Presiding Officer Escudero is now expected to vote on the threshold question, bringing the active roster to 20 rather than 19. Tongol also explained on September 14 that the court may have to vote twice: first on whether to overturn Escudero's existing ruling, and then, if that vote succeeds, on what the new threshold should be. If the vote to overturn results in a tie, the motion fails and Escudero's 16-vote ruling stands.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Voices Urging Procedural Integrity</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Former Senator Richard Gordon has warned publicly against efforts to block or frustrate the impeachment trial, positioning himself as a voice for procedural legitimacy rather than advocating for a specific threshold number. His commentary has focused on the Senate's constitutional duty to conduct the trial itself.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Former Senate President Franklin Drilon has emphasized that impeachment is a political process, not a criminal case, and that conviction requires a two-thirds vote based on the senators' conscience. "Not all senators are lawyers," Drilon has noted. "Therefore, they cannot act as judges in determining whether there is proof beyond reasonable doubt. What matters is what is in their conscience, and that is what will prevail."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">House prosecution spokesman Representative Zia Alonto Adiong has stressed that the two-thirds rule itself is fixed, but that the translation of that rule into an actual number of votes is a matter for the impeachment court to decide. He stated that the prosecution "does not want its case to be driven by vote counting."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Historical Precedent: The Estrada Trial</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is not the first time the conviction threshold has been debated in the Philippines. During the impeachment trial of former President Joseph Estrada in 2000, news archives indicate that there was initial confusion among lawmakers on whether 15 or 16 votes were needed for removal, as there were only 22 sitting senators at the time. The trial, presided over by Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr., did not reach a verdict; it was aborted when the senator-judges voted 11 to 10 against opening a sealed envelope containing critical bank records, triggering the public outrage that led to the Second EDSA Revolution.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The unresolved arithmetic of the Estrada trial now returns to the same chamber, with the same constitutional text, and with Davide himself being asked to advise on the very question his predecessors never formally settled.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The American Parallel: "Members Present" vs. "All the Members"</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Philippine Constitution was largely modeled after the Constitution of the United States, and the impeachment clauses of both nations are structurally identical in design, with one critical divergence in the language governing the conviction threshold.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The American text, under Article I, Section 3, Clause 6, reads: "No Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Philippine text, under Article XI, Section 3, Paragraph 6, reads: "No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The American framers chose "Members present." The Philippine framers chose "all the Members." That single substitution is the origin of the entire dispute now before the Senate impeachment court.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Under the American system, the two-thirds threshold operates on a sliding scale. If some senators are absent, recused, or the chamber has vacancies, the number needed for conviction adjusts accordingly. The only fixed requirement is that a quorum must be present, which the U.S. Constitution sets at a majority of the chamber, or 51 senators. In theory, a conviction in the United States would count as constitutionally valid with as few as 34 affirmative votes, provided the minimum quorum of 51 senators participated.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This was precisely how the threshold was applied in the first impeachment trial of an American president. In 1868, when the United States Senate tried President Andrew Johnson on eleven articles of impeachment, 54 senators voted on the articles. The result was 35 guilty and 19 not guilty. The tally fell one vote short of the two-thirds of those present required for conviction. No constitutional dispute arose over whether absent senators should have been counted in the denominator, because the American text explicitly limits the calculation to those present.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Philippine framers studied the American original when they drafted the 1987 Constitution. The parallel structure of the two impeachment clauses confirms this. Both documents name a presiding officer for exactly one scenario (the impeachment of the sitting president; the Chief Justice in both cases). Both documents vest the Senate with the sole power to try all impeachments. Both documents require senators to be under oath. The Philippine framers adopted the American architecture, but on the conviction threshold, they made a specific textual choice: they replaced "Members present" with "all the Members."</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That substitution is the heart of the current debate. Those who argue for the fixed threshold of 16 contend that the framers deliberately chose a higher, more rigid standard than the American model, one that cannot be lowered by the absence or incapacity of individual senators. Those who argue for an adjustable threshold contend that "all the Members" was intended to mean all members who are legally qualified to serve, not members who have placed themselves beyond the reach of the legal system through suspension, detention, or flight from justice.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Both sides claim to honor the framers' intent. The fact that two of those framers, Davide and Azcuna, are now among the amici curiae advising the court means the Senate has an opportunity that rarely presents itself in constitutional disputes: the opportunity to ask the authors of the text what they meant when they wrote it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What Happens Next</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The amici curiae will present their views on September 16. The prosecution and defense will argue their positions on September 23. The senator-judges will then vote. Their decision will determine not only whether 16 votes or fewer are required to convict Vice President Sara Duterte, but also whether the Senate, as a constitutional institution, can function when a significant number of its own members are under criminal prosecution or in hiding from the law.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, the question before the Senate is not merely one of arithmetic. It is a question of whether the Constitution was written to protect the rights of the accused, to preserve the functional integrity of the institutions it created, or both at the same time, even when those two purposes appear to pull in opposite directions. Two of the men who drafted the relevant provision will soon tell the Senate what they intended. Whether the senator-judges will listen is a separate matter entirely, and that is a question only they can answer.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Long live the rule of law, and long live the Republic of the Philippines!</p><p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/explainer-how-many-votes-to-convict-sara-duterte-the-constitutional-arithmetic-the-senate-must-now-resolve/">EXPLAINER: How Many Votes to Convict Sara Duterte? The Constitutional Arithmetic the Senate Must Now Resolve</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>EXPLAINER: What Are Confidential Funds, and Why Should Every Filipino Understand Them?</title>
		<link>https://www.marcialslaw.com/explainer-what-are-confidential-funds-and-why-should-every-filipino-understand-them/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=explainer-what-are-confidential-funds-and-why-should-every-filipino-understand-them</link>
					<comments>https://www.marcialslaw.com/explainer-what-are-confidential-funds-and-why-should-every-filipino-understand-them/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marcial Bonifacio]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 07:10:25 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Blog]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.marcialslaw.com/?p=2476</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Marcial Bonifacio 9/13/26 My friends and countrymen, this is an explainer to Vice President Sara Duterte's impeachment trial, which I have written about in The Case for the Conviction of Vice President Sara Duterte. The trial has placed a term at the center of national conversation that most citizens have heard but few have [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/explainer-what-are-confidential-funds-and-why-should-every-filipino-understand-them/">EXPLAINER: What Are Confidential Funds, and Why Should Every Filipino Understand Them?</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Marcial Bonifacio</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">9/13/26</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, this is an explainer to Vice President Sara Duterte's impeachment trial, which I have written about in <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-case-for-the-conviction-of-vice-president-sara-duterte/"><em>The Case for the Conviction of Vice President Sara Duterte</em></a>. The trial has placed a term at the center of national conversation that most citizens have heard but few have been asked to understand precisely: confidential funds. Before any Filipino judges whether ₱612.5 million in such funds was spent properly or improperly, every Filipino deserves a precise understanding of what those funds are and why the rules governing them exist.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What Confidential Funds Are</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Confidential funds are lump-sum budget allocations given to civilian government agencies for a single, narrow purpose: surveillance and confidential information-gathering activities that support an agency's official mandate. They are authorized through the General Appropriations Act, the annual law that funds the entire national government, and governed by Joint Circular No. 2015-01, issued jointly by the Commission on Audit, the Department of Budget and Management, the Department of the Interior and Local Government, the Department of National Defense, and the Governance Commission for Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These are not slush funds. They are not petty cash. They are not discretionary spending that an agency head may direct toward any purpose she sees fit. They exist for one category of activity, surveillance and information gathering, and for no other.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>How Confidential Funds Differ From Intelligence Funds</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This distinction matters more than most citizens realize, because the two terms are often used interchangeably in public conversation, even though they describe legally separate categories of spending with different rules.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Confidential funds are for civilian agencies. They cover surveillance-related expenses that support an agency's own operations, such as a mayor's office quietly monitoring narcotics activity in a municipality. Such an operation requires discretion but is not military work.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Intelligence funds are for uniformed and military personnel and designated intelligence practitioners from agencies such as the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police, the Philippine Navy, and the Philippine Air Force. These cover information-gathering activities with a direct impact on national security, and their release requires prior approval from the President of the Philippines, a requirement confidential funds do not carry.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The dividing line is the nature of the work and the personnel performing it. Civilian surveillance in support of an agency's mandate falls under confidential funds. National security intelligence work performed by military or law-enforcement professionals falls under intelligence funds. The two are not interchangeable, and the law does not treat them as such.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>How Confidential Funds Differ From Ordinary Government Spending</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Here is where the distinction becomes most important for any citizen who pays taxes and expects them to be accounted for. Ordinary government spending, whether for school buildings, road repairs, or employee salaries, follows a standard trail of documentation: purchase orders, receipts, invoices, delivery confirmations, and itemized reports submitted to the Commission on Audit for regular review. A citizen, a journalist, or a legislator can, in principle, trace a peso from the treasury to the project it paid for.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Confidential funds operate under a fundamentally different accountability structure. Because the activities they finance are, by definition, meant to remain undisclosed, the standard receipt-and-invoice trail does not apply. Instead, disbursements are certified through accomplishment reports and sealed documentary evidence, submitted in sealed envelopes to a specialized COA unit called the Intelligence and Confidential Fund Audit Unit, which operates directly under the Office of the COA Chairperson. The COA itself has acknowledged that auditing these funds is inherently difficult, since the commission is largely dependent on trusting whatever the disbursing agency submits.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is where the system's vulnerability lies. The reduced transparency is not a defect in the rules; it is a feature, designed to protect the operational security of legitimate surveillance work. It becomes a defect only when an agency treats the reduced documentation requirements as an invitation to spend without genuine accountability, which is precisely the allegation at the center of the current impeachment trial.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Who Handles the Money, and Who Is Liable</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Confidential funds are entrusted to a Special Disbursing Officer, a regular government employee designated by the agency head. The SDO manages the funds, maintains the sealed documentation, and submits liquidation and accomplishment reports to the COA. Under the governing rules, both the SDO and the agency head can be held jointly and severally liable for failure to render proper accounts or for misuse of the funds, with penalties that include perpetual disqualification from public office.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is not a minor administrative consequence. It means that when the Commission on Audit flags an irregularity in how confidential funds were disbursed, the person who signed off on the disbursement and the person who ordered it both face personal legal exposure, not merely institutional embarrassment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The current trial has already put these roles to the test. Former OVP Special Disbursing Officer Gina Acosta testified that she disbursed the full ₱500 million in OVP confidential funds directly to Colonel Raymund Dante Lachica, head of the Vice Presidential Security and Protection Group, on Duterte's own orders. At DepEd, Special Disbursing Officer Edward Fajarda testified before the House that he handed confidential fund cash to Colonel Dennis Nolasco for distribution. In both agencies, the person who physically handled the money and the person who authorized its release are now exposed to the same legal consequences the governing rules were built to impose.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Why the DepEd and OVP Allocations Raised Questions</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Not every government agency receives confidential funds, and not every agency that requests them has an obvious operational reason for doing so. The Department of National Defense, the Philippine National Police, and the Office of the President have clear mandates that align with surveillance and intelligence work. The Department of Education and the Office of the Vice President do not. This is not a political observation. It is a structural one: neither office has a law-enforcement, military, or intelligence mandate that would ordinarily justify confidential expenditures.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Duterte's defense has argued otherwise, contending that both offices conducted intelligence-adjacent activities, including anti-drug monitoring and campus safety work, that fell within the rules governing confidential fund use. Whether those activities actually occurred, and whether they account for the scale of spending now in question, is precisely what the trial's evidentiary phase is testing. The structural observation stands regardless: neither office's core mandate resembles that of the agencies for which confidential funds were originally designed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When the Commission on Audit flagged ₱125 million of the OVP's confidential funds (Notice of Disallowance No. 2024-002-100, dated August 8, 2024) for having been disbursed in full within eleven days, it was testing exactly this question: whether spending of that speed and scale, from an office with no surveillance mandate, could be justified under the rules that govern these funds. That question remains at the center of Article I of the impeachment case.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Testimony from the trial's twentieth and twenty-first days sharpened this question considerably. Two Army colonels, Manaros Boransing II and Magtanggol Panopio, testified that their units never received confidential funds from DepEd for the Youth Leadership Summits their certifications had been used to justify, and that those certifications were never intended to validate confidential fund spending. The following day, former DepEd chief of staff Michael Poa, testifying as a hostile witness and himself a member of Duterte's defense team, confirmed under oath that not a single peso of DepEd's confidential funds went to the AFP for those summits. If the certifications submitted to the COA did not reflect actual confidential-fund expenditures, the question becomes what the funds were actually spent on, and whether the sealed documentation submitted to auditors accurately describes activities that took place.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The American Parallel: The Black Budget and the Church Committee</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">American readers, and Filipino readers familiar with the American system, will recognize a close parallel. The United States has its own version of confidential and intelligence funds, known informally as the "black budget." These are classified appropriations routed primarily through the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Department of Defense. Section 6 of the CIA Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. § 3510) permits the agency to spend funds without adhering to standard federal fiscal reporting requirements, a structure that mirrors, in principle, the reduced-transparency framework governing Philippine confidential funds.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The parallel does not end with the structure. It extends to the abuse and the reform. In 1975, Senator Frank Church of Idaho led a sixteen-month Senate investigation into decades of secret spending by the CIA, FBI, and NSA. The Church Committee reviewed 110,000 documents, interviewed over 800 witnesses, and uncovered abuses that had been shielded from both Congress and the public for years, including assassination plots against foreign leaders, illegal domestic surveillance of American citizens, and covert operations conducted without meaningful oversight.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The reforms that followed created permanent intelligence oversight committees in both the Senate and the House, established a special court to review surveillance warrants, and required the Director of National Intelligence to publicly disclose the aggregate intelligence budget each year. The lesson for Filipino citizens is not that America solved the problem. It is that America recognized, through painful experience, that secret funds without meaningful oversight will eventually be misused, because the structure itself creates the opportunity, and opportunity without accountability is an invitation that someone, eventually, will accept.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Why This Matters to Every Taxpayer</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A Filipino who has never handled a confidential fund and never will still pays for them. These allocations come from the General Appropriations Act, which means they come from the national budget, which means they come from the taxes paid by every worker, vendor, and business owner in the country. When confidential funds are spent on legitimate surveillance that protects public safety, they earn their secrecy. When they are spent on activities that have no connection to surveillance or intelligence gathering, or when they are disbursed so rapidly that no meaningful accounting is possible, the secrecy that was meant to protect the operation instead protects the person who spent the money.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That is the distinction every citizen should carry into any conversation about this trial. Confidential funds are not inherently corrupt. They are inherently vulnerable, because the very feature that makes them operationally useful, their exemption from standard transparency, is the same feature that makes them dangerous when the person holding them treats accountability as optional.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Philippines already has two institutions designed to prevent exactly this kind of abuse: the COA's Intelligence and Confidential Fund Audit Unit, which reviews sealed documentation submitted by disbursing agencies, and the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee on Intelligence and Confidential Funds, Programmes and Activities, which exercises legislative supervision over how these allocations are spent. Whether those mechanisms are sufficient to prevent the kind of abuse now alleged is a question the trial itself is helping to answer. Citizens who wish to monitor the oversight committee's work can begin by following its published hearing schedules and the official records of the Senate and the House of Representatives.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Understanding what confidential funds are is not a luxury reserved for auditors and legislators. It is a civic necessity for anyone whose taxes pay for them. The funds belong to the public. The secrecy that shields them is borrowed, not owned, by the officials entrusted with their use. When that trust is broken, it is not the auditor's loss. It is yours.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, follow this trial. Read the COA's findings. Demand transparency from the officials who spend your money in your name. After all, the republic endures only when its citizens refuse to look away.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Long live transparency in public service, and long live the Republic of the Philippines!</p><p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/explainer-what-are-confidential-funds-and-why-should-every-filipino-understand-them/">EXPLAINER: What Are Confidential Funds, and Why Should Every Filipino Understand Them?</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>Aliases, Heroes, and Acknowledgment Receipts: What Senator Robin Padilla Got Wrong</title>
		<link>https://www.marcialslaw.com/aliases-heroes-and-acknowledgment-receipts-what-senator-robin-padilla-got-wrong/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=aliases-heroes-and-acknowledgment-receipts-what-senator-robin-padilla-got-wrong</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marcial Bonifacio]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 07:12:54 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Philippine History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philippine Politics]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.marcialslaw.com/?p=2470</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Marcial Bonifacio 9/10/26 My friends and countrymen, on the nineteenth day of Vice President Sara Duterte's impeachment trial (about which I have written separately in The Case for the Conviction of Vice President Sara Duterte), Senator-Judge Robin Padilla attempted something bold: to place the names on the Office of the Vice President's confidential fund [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/aliases-heroes-and-acknowledgment-receipts-what-senator-robin-padilla-got-wrong/">Aliases, Heroes, and Acknowledgment Receipts: What Senator Robin Padilla Got Wrong</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Marcial Bonifacio</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">9/10/26</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, on the nineteenth day of Vice President Sara Duterte's impeachment trial (about which I have written separately in <em><a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/the-case-for-the-conviction-of-vice-president-sara-duterte/"><em>The Case for the Conviction of Vice President Sara Duterte</em></a></em>), Senator-Judge Robin Padilla attempted something bold: to place the names on the Office of the Vice President's confidential fund acknowledgment receipts, names like Mary Grace Piattos, Antonio Pagong, Timon Andrew Pusa, Don Piang, and Shane Ngitngit, in the company of the most revered aliases in Philippine history. He invoked the Katipunan. He recited a long list of revolutionary pseudonyms: Dimasalang, Siling Labuyo, Tikbalang, Magdalo, Lakambini, and others. He asked the prosecution counsel, Mae Divinagracia, whether she knew the name Marcial Bonifacio. She did not. Padilla answered his own question: Marcial Bonifacio was the alias Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino Jr. used on the passport that carried him home from exile in Boston in 1983, a name reportedly derived from martial law and Fort Bonifacio, where Aquino had been imprisoned for nearly eight years.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Let that be recorded accurately before any argument follows. Padilla's historical facts were not wrong. The Katipuneros did use aliases. Ninoy Aquino did travel under the name Marcial Bonifacio. These are documented, verifiable facts, and no honest commentator would dispute them. What Padilla did with those facts, however, is a different matter entirely. It is a textbook case of what logicians call false equivalence: placing two things side by side that share a surface resemblance, in this case, the use of aliases, while ignoring the fundamental difference in purpose, context, and consequence that makes the comparison collapse under any serious weight. That comparison deserves examination rather than applause.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Consider what the Katipuneros were doing when they adopted their aliases. They were concealing their identities from a colonial government that would have imprisoned or executed them for the act of organizing a revolution. Their pseudonyms protected their lives and the lives of their families. Ninoy Aquino adopted the name Marcial Bonifacio for the same essential reason: he was returning to a country governed by a dictator who had already imprisoned him for nearly eight years, and he needed to pass through an airport controlled by that dictator's military. In both cases, the alias shielded a person from the power of the state. In both cases, the person behind the alias was real, identifiable, and acting at personal risk.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Now consider what the names on the OVP's acknowledgment receipts were doing. They were not shielding anyone from a colonial government. They were not protecting a dissident returning to face a dictator. They were appearing on official documents submitted to the Commission on Audit to certify that the Office of the Vice President had disbursed public money, drawn from the taxes of Filipino workers, to named recipients for legitimate confidential activities. The question was never whether aliases can exist. The question was whether real people stood behind these particular names and actually received the funds those names were used to account for.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Philippine Statistics Authority answered that question on Day 22 of the trial. Assistant National Statistician Marizza Grande testified that of 2,669 names listed as confidential fund recipients across the OVP and the Department of Education, 1,685 had no birth, marriage, or death records in the PSA's civil registry database. Thirty-seven names matched records of people already dead, including one, Marlene Sunga, who died in 1965 at two months of age and appeared as a fund recipient sixty years later. Twenty-five listed payees were minors, including two children who were only one year old when they supposedly received ₱400,000 each. Mary Grace Piattos, the most publicized name of all, had no record of any kind. "Wala po," Grande told the court.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Senator-Judge Bam Aquino, Ninoy's own nephew, delivered the rebuttal Padilla's argument deserved, and he did so with a precision that managed to be both legally serious and quietly devastating. Yes, he said, his uncle did use the alias Marcial Bonifacio to come home from Boston. However, Ninoy never handled confidential funds. Ninoy never received confidential funds. The name Marcial Bonifacio never appeared on any acknowledgment receipt. Moreover, one does not defend the appearance of a dead infant's name on a government disbursement document by invoking the courage of revolutionaries who risked their lives for independence.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Prosecution counsel Mae Divinagracia addressed the legal dimension directly. Commonwealth Act No. 142, the Anti-Alias Law, does not prohibit the use of assumed names outright, but it does require that a person disclose a true identity alongside any alias used. Her position rested on that specific obligation: no one had disclosed the true identities behind these receipt names to auditors, and no evidence established that the names corresponded to real people who actually received public money.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On Day 22, the defense itself confirmed what the prosecution had been arguing. Defense counsel Justin Gular, responding to a direct question from Senator-Judge Risa Hontiveros, acknowledged for the first time on the record that the names on the acknowledgment receipts are, in fact, aliases. Hontiveros had pressed the point because the defense appeared to be arguing two contradictory positions at once: that the names might be real people missed by PSA records, and that they were aliases all along. Gular chose the latter and, in so doing, he conceded the very premise that Padilla's Katipunan analogy was designed to make unnecessary: that the names require explanation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Senator-Judge Raffy Tulfo, himself no critic of the Duterte family, added a detail that Padilla's analogy could not absorb. Examining the acknowledgment receipts, Tulfo observed that the signatures across multiple payees appeared to come from the same hand, calling the similar handwriting "very questionable." He said the aliases themselves might be forgivable, but identical signatures were not. The Katipuneros may have used borrowed names, but they did not (so far as history records) all sign their receipts with the same pen in the same hand.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Even I, your humble advocate, write this commentary under my own pen name, Marcial Bonifacio, a name I chose deliberately for the historical and symbolic resonance it carries. My readers know the name; my arguments are published under it; my accountability travels with it. A pen name used to protect a writer's identity (for fear of persecution) while publishing documented, verifiable arguments and patriotic literature is one thing. A name resembling a popular snack brand, attached to a government receipt certifying that public funds were received by a person who, according to the government's own population records, does not exist, is another thing altogether. Senator Padilla's error was not in knowing Philippine history. It was in believing that Philippine history could be made to excuse a practice that history's own heroes would have found unrecognizable and even detestable.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Katipuneros used aliases to protect their lives while fighting for a nation. The question before this court is whether aliases were used to protect the disbursement of that nation's money from the scrutiny it was owed. Those are not the same act, nor are they comparable acts. On the contrary, one risked everything for the country, while the other (if the prosecution's evidence holds) risked the country's money for reasons no one has yet been able to explain.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, our heroes earned the right to hide their names. No one earns the right to hide behind a dead infant's name on a government receipt.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Long live the memory of those who risked their lives under borrowed names, and long live the Republic they fought to build!</p><p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/aliases-heroes-and-acknowledgment-receipts-what-senator-robin-padilla-got-wrong/">Aliases, Heroes, and Acknowledgment Receipts: What Senator Robin Padilla Got Wrong</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>From Tripoli to Hormuz: Why the War Against Iran Follows Thomas Jefferson&#039;s Example</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Marcial Bonifacio]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2026 08:37:41 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[American History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Government]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran War]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[James Madison]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thomas Jefferson]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.marcialslaw.com/?p=2462</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By Marcial Bonifacio 9/4/26 My friends and countrymen, the United States of America is once again fighting to keep the sea lanes open to honest commerce, and it is not the first time (as I have shown in 8 Indisputable Reasons America Remains Exceptional at 250) a president has had to make that choice without [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/from-tripoli-to-hormuz-why-the-war-against-iran-follows-thomas-jeffersons-example/">From Tripoli to Hormuz: Why the War Against Iran Follows Thomas Jefferson's Example</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>By Marcial Bonifacio</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">9/4/26</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">My friends and countrymen, the United States of America is once again fighting to keep the sea lanes open to honest commerce, and it is not the first time (as I have shown in <em><a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/8-indisputable-reasons-america-remains-exceptional-at-250/">8 Indisputable Reasons America Remains Exceptional at 250</a></em>) a president has had to make that choice without asking permission from the men who would strangle American trade for tribute.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The First Barbary War: Jefferson and the Precedent</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In the final years of the eighteenth century, the regencies of Tripoli, Algiers, Tunis, and the Sultanate of Morocco routinely seized American merchant vessels in the Mediterranean, enslaved their crews, and demanded annual tribute payments from the United States government in exchange for safe passage. This was not metaphorical piracy. It was a documented, decades-long extortion racket conducted against American shipping, and previous administrations under Presidents George Washington and John Adams had paid it rather than fight it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Thomas Jefferson, upon assuming the presidency in 1801, refused to continue the practice. When Tripoli's Pasha, Yusuf Karamanli, demanded an increased tribute and declared war on the United States after Jefferson would not pay it, Jefferson dispatched a small naval squadron to the Mediterranean under strictly defensive orders, without first seeking a formal declaration of war from Congress. When Congress convened that December, Jefferson reported what he had done and asked for expanded authority, telling the legislature that the pasha's ultimatum, in his words, "admitted but one answer." Congress answered on February 6, 1802, with the Act for the Protection of Commerce and Seamen of the United States against the Tripolitan Cruisers, a statute declaring it lawful for the president's commanders "to subdue, seize, and make prize" of Tripolitan vessels and goods. The resulting conflict, known as the First Barbary War, ran from 1801 to 1805. It included the burning of the captured USS Philadelphia in Tripoli harbor by Stephen Decatur's raiding party in February 1804. The Philadelphia was a thirty-six-gun frigate carrying twenty-eight eighteen-pounder cannon and sixteen thirty-two-pounder carronades, manned by a crew of three hundred and seven, and built only five years earlier as one of the newest warships in the American fleet. Had the Tripolitans been able to refit and sail her, they would have possessed the most heavily armed vessel in the Mediterranean theater, outgunning every ship in their own navy several times over. Decatur's raid denied them that capability permanently. The war also produced the overland march of a mixed force of United States Marines and mercenaries under William Eaton against the city of Derne in April 1805, an engagement commemorated in the Marine Corps hymn's reference to the shores of Tripoli. The war concluded with the Treaty of Tripoli, signed on June 4, 1805, which ended tribute payments to that regency and secured the release of American captives.<br /><br /></p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="697" height="1024" src="https://www.marcialslaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/1804-Burning-of-USS-Philadelphia-697x1024.jpg" alt="Stephen Decatur orders burning of USS Philadelphia to deny Tripolitan terrorists of its utility." class="wp-image-2467" srcset="https://www.marcialslaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/1804-Burning-of-USS-Philadelphia-697x1024.jpg 697w, https://www.marcialslaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/1804-Burning-of-USS-Philadelphia-204x300.jpg 204w, https://www.marcialslaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/1804-Burning-of-USS-Philadelphia-768x1129.jpg 768w, https://www.marcialslaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/1804-Burning-of-USS-Philadelphia.jpg 838w" sizes="(max-width: 697px) 100vw, 697px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption"><em>Stephen Decatur orders burning of USS Philadelphia to deny Tripolitan terrorists of its utility.</em></figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Second Barbary War: What Happens When Enforcement Lapses</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The history that followed proves Jefferson was right to fight rather than pay, because the moment enforcement lapsed, the tribute returned. While the United States was occupied fighting Britain in the War of 1812, the Dey of Algiers resumed seizing American merchant vessels and enslaving their crews, exactly as the Barbary regencies had done before Jefferson's war. When the War of 1812 ended, President James Madison sent Commodore Stephen Decatur back to the Mediterranean with a ten-ship squadron in May 1815. Decatur captured the Algerian flagship Meshouda, killed the corsair Raïs Hamidou in the engagement, and dictated peace terms in the Bay of Algiers on June 30, 1815. The treaty ended all tribute payments permanently and secured full shipping rights for American vessels. The entire campaign, from departure to signed treaty, lasted approximately six weeks. This was not a new war. It was the same war, fought a second time because the first resolution had not been enforced while America was looking elsewhere. Any reader who believes the United States can simply walk away from the Strait of Hormuz and expect Iran to stop collecting tribute should study what Algiers did the moment the American Navy sailed home. Iran has already demonstrated the same pattern: the April 8 ceasefire paused the fighting, and the Revolutionary Guard Corps resumed its toll regime the moment the truce collapsed in early July, exactly as the Dey of Algiers resumed seizing American ships the moment American attention turned to Britain.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Jefferson did not fight his war for territory, and he did not fight it to remake Tripoli's government. Madison did not fight his war to govern Algiers. Each fought for one narrow, nameable objective: the end of tribute. Once that objective was secured, the war ended. Neither Jefferson nor Madison would accept a peace that left a foreign power taxing American commerce by force, but neither confused that principle with a mandate for open-ended war.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Parallel: Trump and the Strait of Hormuz</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The current war against Iran did not begin over shipping. It began on February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel carried out a preemptive strike on Iran's rapidly advancing nuclear and missile program along with its military leadership, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran's retaliation arrived that same day: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps warned all vessels over VHF radio that "no ship is allowed to pass the Strait of Hormuz," a waterway that had carried roughly a quarter of the world's seaborne oil trade before the war.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The path from there to renewed fighting was not a straight line to war, and readers skeptical of this conflict deserve to know that. Pakistan brokered an initial ceasefire on April 8, 2026, and mediation continued for months afterward. In mid-July, as the truce frayed, a further proposal reportedly floated by regional mediators would have let Iran collect what one source described as "reasonable service fees" for maritime security in the strait, in place of the unilateral, multimillion-dollar tolls the Revolutionary Guard Corps later imposed. That proposal did not hold. Iran's Foreign Ministry maintained it had no ongoing negotiations with Washington beyond talks with Oman over the strait itself, and President Trump, after a wave of Iranian strikes killed American service members in Jordan, dismissed further talks as a "waste of time." Whatever else is true of this war, it was not the first option reached for. It followed a real, if ultimately failed, diplomatic effort to reach the more modest arrangement Jefferson himself might have recognized: a paid right of passage negotiated rather than extracted at gunpoint. As of early September 2026, the situation has deteriorated further. On September 1, United States Central Command struck Iranian military targets around the strait, and on September 2, the United States struck two Iranian government tankers anchored off Iran's coast, the first reported case of tankers themselves being targeted. Iran retaliated with approximately twenty-five ballistic missiles and drone strikes against American-linked bases in Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Erbil. Strait transit volume has fallen to single digits per day against a pre-war baseline of eighty-five. Iran and Oman continue talks over navigation routes in the strait, and Qatar's Prime Minister visited Tehran in late August as part of ongoing mediation, but Iran's Foreign Ministry insists these discussions concern vessel routing, not reopening the waterway.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When the ceasefire collapsed and fighting resumed, President Trump notified Congress on July 10 that hostilities had resumed, and the fighting since has centered specifically on one demand: Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps operates what it calls the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, charging commercial vessels tolls of up to two million dollars, payable in Chinese yuan, Bitcoin, or Tether, for passage through routes Iran alone designates as safe. Ships that refuse to pay, or that use routes Iran has not approved, have been fired upon and disabled, including three vessels attacked on July 6 and 7, 2026.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Set the two demands side by side and the parallel is exact. Karamanli told Jefferson: pay tribute in gold, or your ships will be seized and your sailors enslaved. The Revolutionary Guard Corps tells commercial shippers: pay toll in cryptocurrency, or your ships will be fired upon and disabled. Jefferson answered a demand for gold with the United States Navy. Trump has answered a demand for Bitcoin the same way, ordering sustained air operations against Iranian military assets after the July toll attacks, having already made his posture toward Tehran clear months earlier when he declared there would be "no deal with Iran except unconditional surrender." Two presidents, separated by more than two centuries, reached the identical conclusion: a nation that controls the world's shipping lanes does not rent its own strait back from whoever threatens to close it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Answering Two Objections</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Critics raise two serious objections, and both deserve a direct answer rather than a sidestep.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The first concerns whether this is truly a war on terror, or something narrower. The Barbary States were sovereign regencies engaged in piracy and slave-taking, not a state accused of directing proxy militias such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and various Iraqi armed groups. The distinction is real, yet it does not undercut the tribute parallel, because the Barbary States were themselves acting with the implicit protection of the Ottoman Empire, using state ports and state-sanctioned violence to extract payment from nations they judged too weak to fight back. Iran's use of the Revolutionary Guard Corps to enforce its Hormuz tolls follows the same structure: force applied by a state actor, with just enough deniability to complicate a clean response. The tribute, in both cases, was never really about the money. It was about who controls the passage.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The second concerns whether this war was ever lawfully authorized. This objection demands careful engagement, because its premise is partly right and partly outdated. Jefferson secured explicit statutory authorization through the front door: he told Congress what he had done, and Congress answered with a named statute granting him expanded power. Trump has not received that kind of explicit authorization. That much is true, and no honest commentator should pretend otherwise.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What is also true, however, is that no president since Franklin Roosevelt has operated under a formal congressional declaration of war. President George H.W. Bush ordered the invasion of Panama and the overthrow of Manuel Noriega in 1989 under Article II authority alone. President Clinton sustained a seventy-eight-day bombing campaign against Serbia over Kosovo in 1999 without congressional authorization and in direct defiance of a House vote that declined to endorse the air war. President Obama directed a seven-month air campaign against Libya in 2011 under Article II, continuing well past the War Powers Resolution's sixty-day deadline while the Office of Legal Counsel argued the operation did not constitute "hostilities" within the meaning of the statute. In each case, Congress protested, and in each case, the president continued. The constitutional norm that critics invoke, a formal declaration of war before the first shot is fired, has not been operative in American governance for eighty-four years. Trump's Article II claim is not novel. It is the standard modern template, used by presidents of both parties, for military operations the executive branch deems necessary to protect American national interests abroad.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Moreover, the Trump administration has never conceded that it exceeded the War Powers Resolution's sixty-day limit. The White House argued in a May 1, 2026 letter to Congress that the April 7 ceasefire terminated the original hostilities and stopped the clock. When fighting resumed in July, the president's July 10 notification to Congress opened a fresh sixty-day window. Senate Democrats, including Adam Schiff, Chris Van Hollen, and Tammy Duckworth, have publicly rejected that reading, and both the House and Senate passed war powers resolutions in 2026 aimed at restricting the president's ability to continue the war. Van Hollen, sponsoring a war powers resolution in the Senate, argued the case for restraint by pointing out that shipping in the strait had "once again been ground to a halt." It is worth stating plainly, however, that Van Hollen's own description of the problem is precisely the condition Jefferson and Madison went to war to end: a strait ground to a halt by a foreign power extracting tribute from commercial shipping. If the senator's diagnosis is correct, the Jeffersonian prescription is not withdrawal. It is the opposite.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Those resolutions, however, were concurrent resolutions with no force of law. They did not go to the president's desk, and they could not compel withdrawal. Congress possesses a constitutional instrument that can end any war at any time: the power of the purse. It has not used it. On the contrary, House Republicans passed a ninety-five-billion-dollar funding package that included direct appropriations for the Iran war. A Congress that funds a war while passing symbolic resolutions against it has, in constitutional terms, chosen the check that carries actual legal force over the one that does not. Jefferson received a yes in the form of a named statute. Trump has received a yes in the form of a signed appropriation. The vehicles differ; the constitutional effect, the decision to resource rather than defund, is the same.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Furthermore, President Trump's own March 2 report to Congress specifically cited among its justifications "ensuring the free flow of maritime commerce through the Strait of Hormuz," the very principle this essay argues is at stake. The freedom-of-navigation case is therefore not an interpretation Marcial Bonifacio, your humble advocate, has imposed on the war from outside. It is the legal position the administration itself has filed with Congress.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In an ideal constitutional order, Congress would still do what the Congress of 1802 did: pass its own Act for the Protection of Commerce, naming the Strait of Hormuz mission and granting the president explicit, bounded authority to keep it open. That a politically fractured Congress has proven unable to do so does not strip the president of the authority that Article II, eighty-four years of bipartisan precedent, and a funded appropriation have already conferred. It means Congress has defaulted on its own responsibility, not that the president has exceeded his.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>What the War Has Cost, What Victory Would Deliver, and What Jefferson Would Ask of Us Now</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Jefferson did not know his war would succeed before he began it. The First Barbary War lasted four years, produced no single decisive victory, and required a young nation to sustain a naval presence across the Atlantic at real cost. He fought anyway, because he judged indefinite tribute the greater cost, and Congress, when finally asked, agreed with him. When the tribute ended, so did the war. He did not stay to govern Tripoli.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The current war has already exacted its own price. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth told the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 21, 2026, that the war has cost the United States thirty-seven and a half billion dollars to date, with experts warning the true bill will run higher. Eighteen American service members have died in connection with the conflict. Global oil prices have climbed past ninety dollars a barrel. Senator John Kennedy of Louisiana, describing the naval blockade's effect on Iranian oil exports, called the strategy "very effective," while Senator Tim Sheehy of Montana, a former Navy SEAL, told his Senate colleagues in late July 2026 that Iran's theocratic leadership constitutes a regime that must be neutralized, a judgment his Democratic colleagues on the same floor have directly disputed. Jefferson would not have waved these costs away. He buried sailors and spent money the young republic could not easily spare, and he did it anyway, because he judged that a nation which pays tribute once will be asked to pay it again, at a higher price, indefinitely. That same judgment, and not a comfortable certainty about how this war ends, is the actual case for seeing it through: not that the cost is small, but that the alternative, permanent submission to a toll collector in the strait, compounds rather than resolves it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Skeptics who ask what victory would deliver in concrete terms deserve a concrete answer, because Jefferson's wars had clear endpoints and this one should too. The International Energy Agency has called the Hormuz closure the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Brent crude, which sat at seventy-two dollars a barrel on February 27, the day before the war began, surged past one hundred and twenty-six dollars at its peak in March, and every ceasefire announcement since has triggered an immediate drop of fourteen to twenty percent in global oil prices. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy estimated in March 2026 that the closure raised global energy prices by approximately five to eleven percent and food prices by three to five percent, driven by the cascade from oil through fertilizer costs to food production. The International Maritime Organization reported in April that twenty thousand mariners and two thousand ships were stranded in the Persian Gulf. These are not abstract strategic consequences. They are the grocery bill, the gas pump, and the heating invoice of every American household, and they will remain elevated for as long as Iran controls the strait.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Victory, in Jeffersonian terms, means an open Strait of Hormuz guaranteed by an enforceable agreement that permanently ends Iran's toll regime, restores unimpeded commercial passage, and brings global energy and food prices back toward the levels that prevailed before Iran closed the waterway. President Trump's own rhetoric has been broader than that, calling for "unconditional surrender" rather than a bounded treaty on a single issue, and this essay will not pretend that the two formulations are identical. The Jeffersonian precedent supports the narrower objective, not the wider one, and the case this essay makes is for the endpoint the precedent actually warrants. Jefferson's Treaty of Tripoli (1805) and Decatur's Treaty of Algiers (1815) are the models: a signed, enforceable document that ends the tribute, frees the passage, and allows the Navy to come home. Anything less invites the relapse of 1812.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Hence, the question Jefferson faced in 1801 is the same one worth asking plainly in 2026, without pretending the answer is free: does a nation that controls global trade have the standing to simply stop paying whoever threatens to interrupt it, even at a cost of eighteen lives and thirty-seven billion dollars and rising, or does it pay the toll and hope the demands do not grow? Jefferson chose the first answer, and his choice built the credibility that made the United States Navy the guarantor of freedom of navigation for two centuries afterward.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Whether this war built anything comparable is not yet settled, and will not be settled by this essay. However, the principle he established, that the United States does not pay tribute to sail its own trade routes, is the same principle now being tested in the Strait of Hormuz. Will this generation of Americans decide, as Jefferson's did, that the price of resolve is worth paying, bounded to its purpose and funded by a Congress that has voted with its wallet whether it admits so or not, rather than the price of tribute? My friends and countrymen, a nation that would not pay a pirate a single coin in 1805 should not pay a regime a single Bitcoin in 2026.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Long live the spirit of Presidents Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Donald Trump! Long live the USA!</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p><p>The post <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com/from-tripoli-to-hormuz-why-the-war-against-iran-follows-thomas-jeffersons-example/">From Tripoli to Hormuz: Why the War Against Iran Follows Thomas Jefferson's Example</a> first appeared on <a href="https://www.marcialslaw.com">Marcial's Law</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
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